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Bibliographic aggregates such as anthologies, collections, journal issues, and media series 
are increasingly becoming the focus of bibliographic description. Bibliographic 
description, typically in the form of bibliographic metadata records, forms the cornerstone 
of information retrieval systems. Library users rely on bibliographic metadata records to 
find, identify, select, and obtain information resources of interest to them. In turn, library 
catalogers and metadata librarians rely on high-level conceptual standards to inform them 
regarding what metadata is central to each kind of bibliographic entity's description, 
including bibliographic aggregates like those mentioned above. However, not all of our 
high-level conceptual standards agree on how bibliographic aggregates should be modeled 
and what metadata is significant enough to be recorded in their bibliographic descriptions. 
 
This dissertation analyzes conceptual models for bibliographic aggregates central to 
metadata descriptions for bibliographic description in library settings. More specifically, 
this dissertation focuses on the variations in conceptual models for bibliographic 
aggregates in four high-level library-centric conceptual models: Dublin Core Collections 
Application Profile (DC-CAP), Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records 
(FRBR), Object-Oriented FRBR, and Library Reference Model (LRM). 
 
The first three standards take an approach to modeling bibliographic aggregates that is 
based on concepts of parts and wholes. The more recent LRM standard takes a different 
approach by closely linking its bibliographic aggregate model to its central model for 
bibliographic entities in general—Work-Expression-Manifestation-Item (WEMI). This 
iii 
 
dissertation makes a conceptual analysis of all four approaches in order to compare, 
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Overview & Summary 
This dissertation analyzes conceptual models for bibliographic aggregates such as anthologies, 
collections, journal issues, and series. These conceptual models are central to metadata 
descriptions for bibliographic control in library settings. 
 
Models for bibliographic entities are intended to inform the shape of metadata schemas supporting 
their management and access. Well-known examples of these models that this dissertation 
examines include the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR [IFLA 1998]), 
the Dublin Core Collection Application Profile (DC-CAP [DCCDTG 2007]) and CIDOC’s 
Object-Oriented FRBR (FRBROO [Bekiari et al. 2016]).1 These models all take a mereological 
approach to the description of bibliographic aggregates; thereby, we will group them together by 
calling them mereological aggregate models. That is, they use the traditional terminology of parts 
and wholes, and the relationships of parts and wholes, as the basis for conceptualizing 
bibliographic aggregation. 
 
IFLA’s recently issued bibliographic conceptual model—Library Reference Model (LRM [Riva, 
Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017]) abandons this mereological approach. LRM provides an alternate 
conceptual account based on the concept of embodiment, as that notion has been defined and used 
in various IFLA documents over the years (IFLA 1998; FRBR-WGA 2011; Žumer and O’Neill 
2012; Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017). We will call this non-mereological approach the content-
artifact aggregate model, as it is primarily concerned with leveraging particular aspects of 
                                                 
1 The referenced version of FRBROO is the most recent at the time of writing. The 1st version of the FRBROO model emerged in 2006. 
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intellectual abstraction along a continuum that spans from content (informative, artistic, etc.) to 
the real-world (concrete) artifacts upon which it is stored and through which it is transmitted. 
Specifically, the content-artifact aggregate model defines bibliographic aggregates as 
manifestations in the Work-Expression-Manifestation-Item (WEMI) model,2 and implies that they 
do not have parts in a mereological sense (Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, pp 93-4). The analysis 
presented here compares these two approaches. 
 
To demonstrate where core concepts of the mereological models (parthood relationships such as 
isGatheredInto, [bibliographic]PartOf, etc.) fall among the family of standard mereological 
relationships, we first examine a set of 20 metaproperties. This set of metaproperties supports a 
clarification of the ontological status of the aggregating relationships used in the mereological 
models. We then show that all of the aggregating relationships in these standards are specialized 
versions of Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s collection-member relationship (1987) and should 
therefore not be interpreted as specialized versions of the [set-]member-of relationship found in 
standard mathematical set theory (Fraenkel and Bar-Hillel 1958). This determination is based on 
the fact that some form of the Homogeneous metaproperty (e.g., WEMI Homogenous, etc.), in 
addition to the Transitivity metaproperty, is necessarily possessed by these aggregating 
relationships but such is not the case for the [set-] member-of relationship defined in set theory. 
 
The axiomatic approach to defining and analyzing mereological models is familiar and well-
developed (Simons 1987, Varzi 1996, and Varzi 2016), but there is no comparably familiar formal 
approach to embodiment. In this dissertation, we develop an account of embodiment that helps us 
                                                 
2 Also known as the FRBR Group 1 Entities. 
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understand its role in aggregate models, or as Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer imply, its role as an 
aggregating relationship. We do this by analyzing the WEMI model set forth in LRM. As this is 
a very different model from the one set forth in the original FRBR document, we refer to it as 
WEMI2. 
 
We conduct an analysis of WEMI2’s core entities and relationships much as Wickett and Renear 
(2009) have already done for the original WEMI model. Through this analysis, we show that while 
LRM presents a much-improved sense of works, expressions, and items, its concept of 
manifestation is semantically overloaded. This is due in part to WEMI2 manifestations being 
defined as curated sets. This leads to the WEMI2 model employing manifestations for three distinct 
use cases: 
 
1. As bibliographic aggregates in which expressions “appear.” 
2. As sets of WEMI2 items related to one another through shared characteristics. 
3. As something that reflects the characteristics shared by the items that are elements of them, 
e.g., a production plan or a metadata record. 
 
Additionally, the analysis of these models finds that:  
• All of the mereological aggregate models examined are closely related to one another 
through sub-property relationships.  
• All of the mereological aggregate models are agnostic with respect to specifics of kind of 
bibliographic object (e.g., collection, anthology, series, etc.), and thereby: 
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o Provide practioners with flexibility of choice as all can be expected to perform 
similarly and, 
o Are general enough to record the particulars of the part/whole relationships of the 
bibliographic object, without impinging upon other metadata facets needed to 
describe bibliographic aggregates as first-class bibliographic objects. 
• The content-artifact aggregate model directly limits certain kinds of metadata from being 
recorded, e.g., topicality. 
• The content-artifact aggregate model causes some confusing situations for information 
retrieval systems: 
o Since exemplifies is a one-to-many relationship, we become uncertain as to which 
set a WEMI2 item belongs when it is both mass-produced and part of a series. 
o This problem compounds when nesting series, such as trilogies that are part of a 
larger overarching series, need to be accounted for. 
• The manifestation entity in WEMI2 is semantically overloaded. 
• Ignoring the WEMI2 manifestation entity altogether results in some unique benefits: 
o An existing mereological aggregate model deployed in LRM can be used as a 
superior model for bibliographic aggregates. 
o With some extra-refinement, the trio of work-expression-item entities can be 
leveraged into a superior item-deduplicating model, as it provides clear links from 
content to signs conveying content (e.g., a particular version of some text), to 
objects carrying signs conveying content (e.g., a book on a shelf, a particular copy 




While the findings described above ultimately indicate LRM’s approach to bibliographic 
aggregates lacking, LRM nonetheless provides many valuable additions to overall descriptive 
enterprise for bibliographic entities in general. In particular, the WEMI model described by LRM 
is both different from and much more clearly stated than the one set forth in FRBR. This new 
WEMI model indicates that progress in the description of both the physical and abstract aspects of 
bibliographic entities is being made as our high-level conceptual standards continue to evolve. But 
it also implies that practioners need to be wary of idiosyncrasies in the standard document’s text 
and be made aware that the ER-diagram previously used to illustrate the WEMI model is not 




1. Introduction & Method 
1.1. Introduction 
1.1.1. Bibliographic Metadata Standards 
Library users rely on bibliographic metadata, typically communicated to them in the form of 
metadata records, to, as the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA) tells us in 
their Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR), find, identify, select, and obtain 
information resources of particular interest to them (1998, p 8). Library catalogers and other 
metadata creators rely on bibliographic metadata standards to identify what information particular 
to an artifact (e.g., a book, etc.) or its content (e.g., a “work”) should be included in a metadata 
record to best facilitate library users meeting the goals set out by the aforementioned user activities. 
 
Prior to the 20th century, these metadata standards could be relatively simple, since libraries were 
primarily concerned with the collection and organization of three variations of text media—
monographs (i.e., books), serialized publications (e.g., journals, newspapers, etc.), and 
manuscripts. The 20th century saw an explosion in the kinds of media that libraries collected and 
organized. Serialized publications were collected and bound into psuedo-monographic formats or 
were photographed and copied onto storage formats like microfilm and microfiche. Sound 
recordings, video recordings, and vast collections of digitized materials (ranging from government 
documents to photograph collections) have all become objects that libraries collect and organize. 
 
The means by which we create, store, and interact with the metadata records representing media 
objects have also evolved. Data models, document models, and similar information design guides 
require clear ideas both about what thing the information being stored describes, and what portions 
of that information are available to which users. The relatively recent advent of the Semantic Web 
(Burners-Lee, Hendler, and Miller 2001; Shadbolt, Hall, and Burners-Lee 2006) requires even 
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more stringent descriptive rules to avoid blending different entities together through our metadata 
descriptions (Jett et al. 2016b). The needs of library users, especially scholarly users, are also 
becoming increasingly sophisticated. Providing enough metadata to simply meet FRBR’s user 
goals is no longer enough. Increasingly, library users need metadata robust enough to aid them 
with their analyses (Fenlon et al. 2014). 
 
The standards by which metadata records for these objects are crafted have also evolved 
throughout the 20th century. Increasingly, divisions become increasingly fine-grained to describe 
these objects in a variety of ways, in order to better manage the organization of materials and the 
information they bear. 
 
This dissertation examines one particular distinction made by bibliographic metadata standards—
the division between bibliographic entities that are singular things (e.g., a book, a film, a game, 
etc.) and bibliographic entities that are groups of other things (e.g., a collection of items, an 
anthology of short stories, a series of publications, etc.). More precisely, the focus of this 
dissertation is on the latter of these two broad categories—groups of things or bibliographic 
aggregates. The ultimate goals of this research are to assess the manner in which four high-level 
conceptual standards model bibliographic aggregates in order to clarify similarities and 
differences among them, and to assess the implications of those similarities and differences for 
bibliographic control (i.e., the creation of metadata) for bibliographic aggregates. 
 
1.1.2. Bibliographic Aggregates 
Bibliographic aggregates, like digital cultural heritage collections, anthologies, serialized 
publications, and similar objects, play an important role in many kinds of scholarship. They play 
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a particularly important role in humanities scholarship. Collections (or corpora as many humanists 
call them) are so important that there is even a TEI extension designed to capture relevant metadata 
about them—the Metamodel for Corpus Metadata (MCM).3 We can see there is clear user need 
for the capture and creation of metadata that focuses on aggregates as distinct bibliographic 
entities. 
 
Whether they are objects of research themselves, or the objects from which scholars select parts 
for research, bibliographic aggregates are first-class bibliographic entities. As such, bibliographic 
aggregates receive special treatment in library standards regarding the kind of metadata to record 
for their best representation when situated among other kinds of bibliographic entities. 
 
The representation of bibliographic entities is itself a tricky matter. Librarians and other 
information professionals have for centuries known that there is a distinction between the 
information content of an artifact and an artifact itself. More contemporary library cataloging 
scholars such as Verona (1959), Wilson (1968), Lubetzky (1969), Svenonius (2000), and Smiraglia 
(2001)4 have all addressed this other distinction between “text” (Wilson 1968, Smiraglia 2001), 
“documents” (Svenonius 2000, Smiraglia 2001), “bibliographic units” (Verona 1959), or “books” 
(Lubetzky 1969) on one hand, and “works” (Wilson 1968, Lubetzky 1969, Svenonius 2000, 
Smiraglia 2001) or “literary units” (Verona 1959) on the other. Conceptually, this distinction boils 
down to the difference between the artifacts that store (or transmit) inscriptions and the meanings 
that human beings ascribe to those inscriptions. 
                                                 
3 [see https://zenodo.org/record/267999#.XDNsaPlKiM9] 
4 To name only a very few of the very many. 
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One might think that this distinction is orthogonal to our distinction between singular entities and 
aggregate entities. However, a new standard (Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017) recently set forth by 
IFLA, argues that matters of aggregation and singularity directly align with matters of 
metaphysical distinctions between artifacts and information content. 
 
One group of metadata standards takes a mereological approach. That is, they propose models 
using parts and wholes to describe aggregates. Among these metadata standards are IFLA’s FRBR 
(IFLA 1998), the Dublin Core Collection Application Profile (DC-CAP [DCCDTG 2007]) and 
CIDOC’s Object-Oriented FRBR (FRBROO [Bekiari et al. 2016]).5 For the purposes of the analysis 
we carry out in this dissertation, we call this group of conceptual models using mereological 
approaches mereological aggregate models. 
 
In contrast, new conceptual standards for metadata records employ a distinction between abstract 
content and physical artifacts (i.e., “works” and “text”) to describe aggregates. One of these new 
standards is IFLA’s Library Reference Model (LRM [Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017]). LRM’s 
aggregate model is focused on exploiting features of the Work-Expression-Manifestation-Item 
(WEMI) model first introduced by FRBR. The WEMI model is primarily concerned with 
illustrating the differences between content and artifacts. We call aggregate models built around 
this distinction content-artifact aggregate models. 
 
Our goal in this dissertation is to compare and contrast these two descriptive agendas. By doing so 
we aim to assess how comparable the aggregate models used by our four cases—DC-CAP, FRBR, 
                                                 
5 The referenced version of FRBROO is the most recent at the time of writing. The 1st version of the FRBROO model emerged in 2006. 
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FRBROO, and LRM—are to one another. From the beginning, LRM stands out because it uses a 
different kind of aggregate model than the other three cases, but the implications of using this 
different model are not yet fully understood. The analysis herein aims to illuminate some of these 
implications. 
 
1.1.3. Research Problem 
The central focus of this dissertation is to clarify the differences between these two models and 
thereby better identify the features each approach has for the creation and implementation of 
metadata and the organization of knowledge. A superficial study of the content-aggregate model 
reveals some potentially troubling gaps in features it provides for the creation of high-quality 
metadata describing bibliographic aggregates (Jett, Fenlon, and Downie 2018). These gaps raise 
questions regarding how the aggregate model in LRM is to be implemented and how it should be 
expected to perform. 
 
Lurking unresolved issues with the WEMI model itself may cause obstacles for the content-
aggregate model. For instance, a key assumption that is often made with regard to the WEMI 
model is that properties possessed by an entity at one level of intellectual abstraction, e.g., work, 
are inherited by the entity at the next level “down” the model, e.g., an expression of a work. 
However, Renear and Choi (2006) argue that nothing in the FRBR document’s text asserts or even 
implies that an inheritance relationship exists among the WEMI entities. As they point out, when 
inheritance of attributes and properties from one entity to another is an expected feature of our 
bibliographic conceptual models, then the relationships accomplishing that task need to be 
specified in the standards documents. Simply stating that the entities in the models represent sets 
and sub-sets is not enough as inheritance is not entailed by ordinary set-subset relationships. As 
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Jett, Fenlon, and Downie (2018) point out, when there is no inheritance from one WEMI entity to 
the other, then bibliographic aggregates modeled using the content-artifact model lack properties, 
like topicality, that are vital for accomplishing FRBR user tasks.   
 
Further, since the content-artifact aggregate model is built around the many-to-many cardinality 
of the WEMI embodies relationship, it raises questions about dependent works (Jett & Dubin 2018) 
and authorial intentions. Is it possible that FRBR expressions may realize more than one FRBR 
work, or that FRBR items might exemplify more than one FRBR manifestation? How can we know 
with certainty that authors intend their works to first be published and best be understood on their 
own? What are the implications of choosing to model aggregates as a specific WEMI entity, i.e., 
as manifestations? 
 
Standards like FRBR and LRM are typically produced with some clear pragmatic benefit in mind. 
In the cases of FRBR and LRM, the goal is to provide some clarity in how various editions (e.g., 
mass-produced consumer artifacts like large-print books or trade paperback books) relate to one 
another through shared intellectual content. These standards thereby inform how metadata records 
are to be crafted and what representational roles they play in end user information needs 
satisfaction workflows. 
 
However, as Dubin, Senseney, & Jett (2013) point out, these standards also provide detailed 
domain models that represent a particular joint understanding of an abstract phenomenon. In this 
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case the aggregate models used in FRBR and LRM6 represent particular views of bibliographic 
aggregates. From a researcher’s point of view, the dichotomy of these disparate views is of interest 
because each model has distinct implications for how well metadata records crafted according to 
them can be expected to satisfy end user information needs. The implications of each model can 
indicate gaps in the fulfillment of end user information needs. 
 
This dissertation uses formal methods to compare these two analytical approaches to bibliographic 
aggregates. Through our formal analysis of these two approaches we develop answers to the 
following research questions: 
1. How comparable are the mereological aggregate models used by the standards in our case 
studies? 
a. The texts of these standards often employ terms like, “container,” “component,” 
“member,” “part,” etc.; as these terms all refer to distinct part/whole relationships, 
are we to take them at face value or are they being employed synonymously to 
indicate one specific part/whole relationship? 
b. If they are being used to indicate one specific part/whole relationship, which 
part/whole relationship is it?  
2. How does the content-artifact aggregate model used in the LRM case differ from the 
mereological aggregate models employed by the other cases? 
 
                                                 
6 We should note that not all of the potential models that could fall into the first category are analyzed. For instance, since it is not primarily intended 
as library-centric standard, NISO’s Z39.29 (Bibliographic References) standard is not examined. The still under-development Bibframe 2.0 standard 




1.2.1. Conceptual Analysis as Method 
This dissertation examines both mereological aggregate models and content-artifact aggregate 
models through the critical lens of conceptual analysis, (Glock 2008, Beaney 2016). This is 
appropriate as these models are conceptual analyses, although not clearly documented as such.  
 
Our objective is to better understand these models, to determine their differences and relative 
advantages, and to discover whether they succeed in modeling bibliographic aggregates—and if 
they fail to model bibliographic aggregates, the method of conceptual analysis will help us 
understand exactly why they fail and perhaps how that failure might be remedied.  
 
1.2.2. Conceptual Analysis in the Library and Information Sciences 
Discussion and analysis of core concepts is routine in LIS research. Certainly, much of the 
scholarship of influential LIS researchers such as Shera (1966) and Buckland (1991, 1997) is 
analyzing important LIS concepts. In the conceptual space of interest for this dissertation, we find 
important works that are quite clearly engaged in the analysis of concepts, including the 
aforementioned Verona (1959), Wilson (1968), Lubetzky (1969), Svenonius (2000), and Smiraglia 
(2001). Although they provide examples of conceptual analysis, these writers do not necessarily 
say that is what they are doing, nor do they typically deploy the specialized terminology or devices 
we might see in philosophical writing—there are exceptions: in Wilson (1968) and Svenonius 




Jonathan Furner7 has frequently employed conceptual analysis, for instance, in his works 
discussing information (Furner 2004), the place of philosophical methods in LIS (Furner 2010), 
and the nature of data (Furner 2016). Furner offers this description of conceptual analysis:  
“Conceptual analysis is a technique that treats concepts as classes of objects, 
events, properties, and relationships. The technique involves precisely defining the 
meaning of a given concept by identifying and specifying the conditions under 
which any entity or phenomenon is (or could be) classified under the concept in 
question. The goal in using conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry into a given 
field of interest is to improve our understanding of the ways in which particular 
concepts are (or could be) used for communicating ideas about that field” -- Furner 
2004, pp 233-4. 
Furner links his application of the conceptual analysis method to the analytic traditions of Frege, 
Moore, and Russell, but like Glock (2008), he also notes that there is no one “method” that one 
can point to and definitively claim as the conceptual analysis method. Furner also employs 
conceptual analysis to respond to other authors (e.g., Buckland 1991, 1997; Duranti, Eastwood, 
and MacNeil 2002; Tourney 2003, etc.) who have provided meditations on LIS-centric conceptual 
problems (e.g., what is a document? what is information? etc.). 
 
This dissertation makes use of previous conceptual analyses of the FRBR family of conceptual 
models (Renear & Choi 2006, Wickett & Renear 2009) and builds on previous meditations on 
                                                 
7 As well as Furner, a number of other LIS researchers, have been employing conceptual analysis as their primary research method. These include 




bibliographic aggregates (Wickett, Renear, & Furner 2011, Wickett et al. 2013, and Wickett et al. 
2014). 
 
As Sacchi and Wickett (2012) point out, the ultimate goal of the kind of analytic process employed 
in this dissertation is to identify problems of consistency in conceptual and data models (i.e., points 
where the descriptive or narrative accounts they provide become confused) and to unpack the 
“black box” representations of information objects in various models (p. 2). 
 
1.2.3. Characterizing Conceptual Analysis 
Although there is no agreed upon formal definition of what conceptual analysis is, or how it should 
be deployed, we can provide a characterization that extends the account given by Furner. 
 
A conceptual analysis “precisely defin[es] the meaning of a given concept by identifying and 
specifying the conditions under which any entity or phenomenon is (or could be) classified under 
the concept in question” – Furner, p 234. We extend this by saying more broadly that the 
conceptual analysis of a concept space also (i) specifies relationships between concepts and (ii) 
gives an account of how phenomena of interest can be adequately described using these concepts 
and relationships. 
 
Generally, conceptual analyses are developed by identifying important concepts, conjecturing 
defining conditions for those concepts, and indicating relationships between concepts. In the case 
of relationships, one might also conjecture cardinality (whether a relationship is one to one, one to 
many, etc.) or relationship properties (transitive, reflexive, etc.), or classify entities as to 
ontological type (physical object, abstract object, event, class, etc.). Typically, in practical 
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applications of conceptual analysis, a number of concepts are being defined together.  Clues as to 
what concepts are involved in a domain and need to be identified and analyzed are often found in 
the nouns, names, and other referring expressions used by practitioners in that domain. 
 
Conceptual analyses should be clear, precise, and rigorously expressed. Even when presented in 
natural language, they should be easily translated into first order logic, or some well-defined 
extension of first order logic. ER diagrams, UML class diagrams, and RDF schemas are all 
considered useful for ensuring logical precision and clarity. As we will show in the subsequent 
chapters, our conceptual standards already employ a combination of natural-language definitions 
and ER diagrams to characterize bibliographic entities and various aspects of them in general. 
However, these natural-language definitions and their attendant ER-diagrams do not always agree 
with one another. Throughout this dissertation we also interpret the natural-language definitions 
using first-order modal predicate logic with identity as a means to more easily analyze their 
implications. 
 
Difficult or specialized terms or locutions must either be themselves defined or, if primitive, 
identified as such and kept to a minimum. Indeed, much of Chapter 3 is spent clarifying what high-
level conceptual standards mean when they use part/whole terms like container, component, part, 
member, etc., interchangeably. This analysis is carried out by identifying the specialized properties 
that each of the relationships suggested by the individual terms possess. These specialized 
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properties are known as metaproperties.8 Similarly, much of the analysis in Chapter 5 relies on 
notions of which terms employed in LRM’s natural-language definitions should be taken as 
primitive and which are defined by them. 
 
Individual analyses can be tested by counterexample, either by producing a case that falls under 
the concept but lacks a supposedly necessary condition, or by producing a case that meets all the 
conditions of the analysis but does not fall under the concept. We do this by closely examining the 
examples of bibliographic aggregates that are given in the four conceptual standards documents 
being examined and which are commonly occurring in library and similar settings. Examples and 
counterexamples are both interwoven throughout the text and represent a large portion of the 
analysis. 
 
Finally, an analysis, or set of analyses, is considered inadequate if it does not provide the concepts 
and relationships necessary to describe the important features of the phenomena it is intended to 
be modelling. An important distinction to make here is that the models being examined are 
themselves prior analyses of particular phenomena. In the cases examined by this dissertation, the 
particular phenomenon of bibliographic aggregates in general is the central focus of both the prior 
analyses (i.e., the models employed in the standards documents) and our analysis. We have taken 
great strides to fully unpack terms in our analysis in an effort to avoid semantic overloading. 
Semantic overloading is symptomatic of inadequate analyses as it indicates insufficient 
                                                 
8 Since each metaproperty represents a property of a relationship which we can understand to be properties possessed by entities. Throughout the 
dissertation text though we use the term “relationship” to indicate properties that link two entities or more together and the term “metaproperty” 
to indicate properties possessed by relationships. 
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atomization of concepts important to the described phenomena. As such, where semantic 
overloading of terms is found during an analysis, it is strongly indicative that a model (i.e., the 
result of a prior conceptual analysis) is inadequate to fully describe the phenomena it sets out to. 
 
1.3. Dissertation Layout 
The core content of this dissertation is laid out across four central chapters and is followed by a 
concluding chapter. The first of these central chapters, Chapter 2, serves as a review of the 
literature that provides a general account of bibliographic metadata, bibliographic entities, 
bibliographic entity models, and bibliographic aggregates. A series of conceptual analyses are then 
carried out in the subsequent three chapters. Chapter 3 analyzes the part/whole terms employed in 
high-level conceptual standards for bibliographic entities in general by closely examining the 
varying metaproperties possessed by the part/whole relationship suggested by each part/whole 
term. Chapter 4 analyzes the three conceptual standards that employ mereological aggregate 
models—DC-CAP, FRBR, and FRBROO, and Chapter 5 analyzes the content-artifact aggregate 
model in the LRM conceptual standard’s context. Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation’s 
findings, considers some potentially beneficial modifications for LRM, and explores avenues for 





2. Bibliographic Aggregates in Context 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews the existing literature regarding bibliographic aggregates in library-centric 
contexts. We first review the central concepts of bibliographic metadata and the library catalog in 
order to situate the general context in which metadata describing bibliographic aggregates such as 
anthologies, digital collections, journal issues, monograph series, etc., is typically found. This is 
followed by a discussion of the concept of bibliographic entities and the general contention 
between the conceptual aspects, i.e., content, and their physical aspects, i.e., their nature as 
concrete artifacts. FRBR’s WEMI model is deeply interwoven into this narrative as it represents a 
particular evolution in approaches to modeling the content-artifact aspects of bibliographic 
entities. Finally, we review the existing work discussing bibliographic aggregates, including the 
general confounding factors that paratext presents for adequate description through metadata and 
a previous conceptual analysis of particular aggregate entities—digital collections. 
 
2.2. Bibliographic Metadata & the Library Catalog 
As we noted in the introduction, competing accounts for describing bibliographic aggregates in 
general exist in the forms of high-level conceptual models of bibliographic entities. In one account, 
the one put forth in the mereological aggregate models, certain kinds of metadata, such as what 
parts a whole has or the reason all of the parts have been brought together in the first place, would 
be suggested as constituting significant general facts about a bibliographic aggregate that should 
be recorded through metadata. The other account, as described by the content-artifact aggregate 
model, suggests such metadata is already accounted for through existing metadata that describes 
something called a manifestation. Before we explore the specifics of these notions, we will first 
examine how this state of affairs has come into being in the first place.  
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Bibliographic metadata is one of the cornerstones of libraries and related institutions such as 
archives, historical societies, and museums. Libraries, in particular, were one of the earliest places 
in which metadata was a central feature to the proper functioning of the institution as a whole, 
through the innovation of the library catalog. Through the library catalog, a library’s various users 
could search for information resources that meet some information need that they have. They could 
also discover whether or not the library has a suitable resource to meet that need, and in the event 
that library does possess such a resource, then they might obtain it for their own use. 
 
Vernacular English dictionaries (e.g., the Oxford English Dictionary, Webster’s Dictionary, etc.) 
tell us that catalogs themselves are systematically organized lists that are intended to be 
authoritative (i.e., complete) with regard to their topic. Prior to the late 19th Century, catalogs of 
all kinds were typically implemented using the print publishing technologies of the day. This was 
particularly the case for library catalogs prior to the late 19th Century (Panizzi 1841). 
 
Library catalogs became standardized during the 19th century through efforts led by Antonio 
Panizzi (1841), Melville Dewey (1885), and Charles Cutter (1891). One of the outcomes of this 
process is that the metadata describing the objects in a library’s catalog also became standardized. 
Another direct outcome of this process was the invention of the card-based catalog (Coyle 2016a), 
which was translated in machine readable format in the 1960s through the Machine-Readable 
Cataloging (MARC) document format (Avram 1968).  
 
Great innovations in computing during the 20th Century wrought great changes in how catalogs 
can be implemented. Digital technologies such as databases are now used to implement catalogs 
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such as the online public access catalogs (OPACs) used in libraries today. These technologies are 
fundamentally more flexible than old print technologies, like card catalogs, and do not suffer from 
constraints such as limited space in which metadata can be recorded and communicated or singular 
ordering regimes. Hence, OPACs do not represent any singular catalog of a library’s collection. 
Instead an OPAC’s user is free to define queries that will build “catalogs” that are best suited to 
meet their information needs.  
 
Published catalogs and card catalogs, then, are very specialized technologies designed expressly 
meet very specific user needs. In a library’s case, these needs include identifying what 
bibliographic entities a library owns and which of those they may access. As Coyle (2016b) points 
out, even when the publishing industry was young and primarily concerned with the printing and 
reprinting of relatively few books, this was a difficult task, primarily due to the economics of 
reprinting old texts, translating them into new languages, or rearranging them into new editions. 
As the demand for copies increased, publishers moved to meet it. However, each new translation 
and edition further complicated the bibliographic universe in which the library catalog was 
expected to operate.  
 
When mass-production began to emerge in the 19th Century, the universe that library catalogs 
sought to articulate was complicated to such a degree that simply entering factual information 
regarding an edition or translation’s title, author(s), publisher, etc. was no longer enough to aid the 
user in making sense of the dense and diverse bibliographic universe. By the mid-20th Century, the 
problem was beginning to come to a head as there were simply too many editions, reprints, and 
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copies of what appeared to be the same book, journal, manuscript, etc. in library catalogs for users 
to easily disambiguate one apparently same thing from another. 
 
A method for disambiguating editions, reprints, and copies of bibliographic entities from one 
another was needed. Verona (1959) proposed one by decomposing the concept of bibliographic 
entity into a distinction between what she calls “bibliographic units” (i.e., the things on the shelf) 
and “literary units” (i.e., the content that authors create). As she points out, both of these things 
must be adequately represented through metadata in order for a library catalog to successfully meet 
the users’ needs to find: 
 
“1) the rapid location of a particular book; 
2) the provision of information concerning all editions, translations etc. of a given 
work as far as the exist in the library; [and] 
3) the provision of information concerning all works by a given author as far as 
they exist in the library” – Verona 1959, p 79. 
 
The operations that Verona noted that the library catalog needed to meet were further codified 
through the Paris principles (IFLA 1961). However, these principles were not uncontroversial. 
Ranganathan (1962) in particular thought that they fell short in many areas and so produced a 
paper discussing the many shortcomings with respect to cataloging practices at the time. It is 
important to note that we can already see that the term “work,” wholly distinguishable from the 




Unfortunately, the library card catalog, like the horse and buggy, has become a technology that is 
obsolete when compared to modern digital technologies like the database software used to 
implement today’s library OPACs. Metadata too, once the principle domain of libraries worldwide, 
is now a ubiquitous feature of information technology. As many of today’s experts on metadata 
have noted (Pomerantz 2015; Coyle 2016a, 2016b, Gartner 2016; Riley 2017), metadata has grown 
to become the foundation of and driving force behind much of today’s information technologies. 
From the internet to the software applications on our smart phones, the world we live in today is 
completely awash with metadata describing where we are, what we are doing, what things we are 
interested in purchasing, the things we do purchase, and so on. 
 
It is somewhat surprising then that the bibliographic metadata that is so vital to the proper 
functioning of libraries is behind the times. However, as Coyle notes regarding the development 
of the first online public access catalogs (OPAC) in the 1980s:  
 
“We, and by ‘we’ I mean all of us in library technology during this time, created 
those first systems using the data we had, not the data we would have liked to have. 
The MARC records that we worked with were in essence the by-product of card 
production. And now, some thirty-five years later, we are still using much the same 
data even though the information technology has changed greatly during that time, 
potentially affording us many opportunities for innovation. Quite possibly the 
greatest mistake made in the last two to three decades is failing to create a new data 
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standard that would be more suited to modern technology and less an imitation of 
the library card in machine-readable form.” – Coyle 2016b, p 51.9 
 
The above quotation is from Coyle’s book FRBR, Before and After: A Look at our Bibliographic 
Models. It is a meditation on the state of bibliographic metadata in libraries today. One of the 
primary points Coyle makes is that, despite efforts to innovate bibliographic metadata through new 
overarching standards, a great deal of chaos is erupting in communities central to the creation and 
maintenance of library metadata.  
 
On one hand, new technologies are emerging at an unprecedented rate and are creating new 
expectations for metadata functionality in consumers. On the other hand, the library community 
has amassed an enormous collection of metadata that still seems relevant, even though its format 
is at least more than two generations of technology obsolete.10 It is not so surprising that possibly 
divergent approaches to articulating the minimal metadata sufficient for describing bibliographic 
entities in general are emerging.  
                                                 
9 Indeed, a key problem is that catalogs (like directories) are a technology from a bygone era and are completely unsuited to today’s highly 
interactive (meta)data intensive information technologies, as the failings of Yahoo demonstrated (Sullivan 2014). 
10 Coyle specifically mentions relational databases, XML (and declarative markup languages in general), and object-oriented programming as 
technologies that libraries have missed. However, through object-oriented markup languages like JSON-LD, which are designed to integrate the 
object-oriented programming approach with Semantic Web technologies like RDF and OWL, it does not seem that librarians have missed the 
object-oriented programming boat yet. We might also point out that to some extent Coyle has misunderstood the nature of object-oriented 
programming, which is an alternative approach to writing computer code, as opposed to functional programming, for instance. While object-
oriented programming has some value in the manner in which it handles data, especially in high-performance environments like web-browsers, it 
does so by removing control of the data from the data creator and giving it to the software developer. This often leads to either oversimplification 
of the data in order to make it easier to move from one application to another or over-specification of the data to make frequently used parts of the 
data (e.g., DOI identifiers, ISBN identifiers, etc.) easier for the developer to type when writing code. 
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Compounding this problem is the continuing focus on the metadata record, a specially-structured 
document designed to communicate assertions about an information resource to an end user. The 
metadata contained in a record has a number of potential uses for the end user ranging from the 
descriptive to the administrative and beyond. Just as how contemporary databases may be used to 
create any number of “catalogs” suitable for an end user’s information purposes, so too do they 
provide great flexibility regarding how various metadata assertions can be combined to form 
documents like metadata records. Nevertheless, the concept of the metadata record as the 
canonical holder of the metadata persists in library cataloging and metadata circles. 
 
The needs of users are also continuing to evolve. In 2000, digital humanist John Unsworth noted 
that scholars’ research cycles employ seven primitive information manipulating activities: 
discovering, annotating, comparing, referring, sampling, illustrating, and representing. Through 
linking, social widgets like Discus, social media applications like Twitter, free online tools like 
Google sheets, etc., virtually every user of the Web can successfully carry out many of these 
activities with almost any information resource they can find online. Not so with libraries and 
library catalogs, as the catalog itself is only capable of empowering users to complete just the first 
of the seven primitive tasks that Unsworth lists. 
 
At least, this is the case in traditional libraries. In digital libraries, more and more services are 
being added that allow library users to accomplish tasks like annotating, comparing, referring, 
sampling, illustrating, and representing. Digital libraries have been able to accomplish this 
primarily by abandoning the traditional library catalog and the notion of metadata records and 
embracing flexible models for representing and interacting with the bibliographic entities 
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contained in the digital library’s collection. The goal is to provide the users with sufficient 
metadata (not metadata records) to accomplish these user tasks. Two key technologies make these 
innovations possible—models and standardized vocabularies (or ontologies in today’s 
semantically-sensitive linked data environments). 
 
2.3. Bibliographic Entities & Their Models 
2.3.1. Competing and Complementary Models for Bibliographic Entities 
A core concern for the authors and maintainers of library metadata is what metadata is needed for. 
In the era before the computer revolution of the 1950s and 60s, this was a fairly constrained space, 
consisting primarily of books, serialized publications (like journals and newspapers), and 
manuscripts. Since then, the numbers and kinds of information-bearing media have exploded, so 
much so that it is easier to refer to them more generally with the term bibliographic entity. With 
this term, we might be indicating a film, a play script, a novel, or some other media type.  
 
Things have only become more complicated for libraries and similar institutions since the late 20th 
Century. Now there are electronic editions of books that need to be accounted for by the library 
catalog, and beyond those, libraries now collect a larger variety of media types than ever before, 
as the practice of maintaining large collections of films, graphic novels, and even board games and 
more esoteric media is becoming more and more common place. 
 
Additionally, by the late 20th Century, databases and similar information technologies were 
becoming the norm in all sectors that employed metadata as a fundamental part of their business 
models (e.g., in banking, market exchanges, government agencies, and of course, in libraries, 
among other enterprises). Databases rely on a series of interlocking models to achieve full 
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functionality, and these are: conceptual models (sometimes called domain models), query models 
(sometimes called operational models), data models, and document models. And in this 
environment, three additional innovations to Verona, Wilson, and Lubetzky’s conceptual analyses 
occurred.  
 
As we mentioned in the previous section, a distinction between “books” on one hand and “works” 
on the other was already being drawn. Verona tried to clarify these notions by renaming them 
“bibliographic units” on one hand and “literary units” on the other. Similarly, Wilson (1968) and 
Lubetzky (1969) drew distinctions between “text” (Lubetzky actually still uses the existing term 
“books”) and “work” to meet the same user needs that Verona listed. Despite these meditations, a 
true conceptual model for bibliographic entities eluded the library sector until Barbara Tillett 
closely inspected the kinds of information library catalog records were trying to communicate 
(Tillett 1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 1992b). In her own words, the goal of her study was to 
“provide the groundwork for understanding the conceptual structure of the ideal library catalog in 
terms of bibliographic relationships” – p 1.  
 
Bibliographic relationships, specifically, became the cornerstone of her analysis and of them she 
says, “A bibliographic relationship exists when we associate two or more bibliographic items or 
works” – p 1. In the pages of her dissertation, much of which was published in LIS-centric journals 
in 1991 and 1992, Tillett demonstrates that catalogs were already recording much finer-grained 




In turn, both Tillett and the chair of her dissertation committee, Elaine Svenonius, participated in 
a series of meetings whose foundations stretch back as far as 1988 (Madison 2009) and which 
directly led to the development of the WEMI model. As Madison tells us, the focus of these initial 
meetings was to design an agenda “around cooperative cataloging that focused on standardization 
and cost-benefits vis-à-vis the current technological and economic environment.” – p 17. 
 
One of the most important of these meetings was a 1990 symposium held in Stockholm just prior 
to IFLA’s annual conference that year. Madison tells us the scope of this symposium: 
 
“The central issues supporting the framework of the papers and discussions were: 
• The mounting costs of cataloging and corresponding interest in simplifying 
the bibliographic content of cataloging records; 
• Interest in decreasing the cost of cataloging by increasing the sharing of 
bibliographic records and thereby reducing duplicate cataloging, both 
nationally and internationally; 
• The explosion of the amount of published materials—regardless of 
format—throughout the world, thereby increasing interest in universal 
bibliographic control; 
• The increasing awareness of the benefits to adapt cataloging practices and 
codes to electronic environments that support online library management 
systems and mega national and international bibliographic data systems; 
• Increasing interest in examining the role of our bibliographic universes 
through the eyes and needs of their users.” – Madison 2009 p 18. 
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The FRBR study was a direct outcome of this seminar, and both Tillett and Svenonius were 
brought into the study as consultants in 1992. As Madison points out, Tillett, through her 
dissertation, was a pioneer in the use of entity-relationship analysis of bibliographic records and 
the things described by them. It is not so surprising then, that FRBR and especially the WEMI 
model it espouses, speaks of the bibliographic universe in terms of entities and relationships. 
Indeed, Madison tells us that Tillett’s approach was successful enough when applied to the FRBR 
study that in 1996, when IFLA appointed a Working Group on Minimal Level Authority Record 
and ISADM, Barbara Tillett was appointed its chair (Madison 2009 p 23). 
 
All along, though, a point Tillett had made through the entity-relationship analysis that she carried 
out in her dissertation was coming to the fore. Specifically, in existing metadata records of the 
time, there seemed to be sufficient information concerning editions or versions of them that they 
could be treated as entities in their own right for the purposes of the analysis. It seems likely, then, 
that the inclusion of the expression and manifestation entities in the WEMI standard was a result 
of Tillett’s analysis and her subsequent participation in the development of the WEMI conceptual 
model through the mid and late 1990s. 
 
Arguably, the first actual conceptual model for bibliographic entities in terms of entities and 
relationships is the one set forth through IFLA’s FRBR bibliographic standard (1998), the WEMI 
model. The WEMI model, which invokes the ER-diagram method (Chen 1976) as an explanation 
for its appearance (Figure 2.1 below), “represents the different aspects of user interests in products 
of intellectual or artistic endeavor” (IFLA p 13), and these aspects are named to be—works, 




Figure 2.1: WEMI ER-Diagram 
 
As we can see, this is a radical expansion from the binary decompositions of bibliographic entities 
that Verona, Wilson, and Lubetzky were arguing for (and which seemed to have been well-
acknowledged by their contemporaries and peers, such as Ranganathan). However, this model was 
also very useful because this kind of entity-relationship conceptual design technique is highly 
valuable in the conceptual design of databases. 
 
Figure 2.1 presents a view of the various aspects comprised by bibliographic entities. It implies 
that a successful, minimal metadata description for any bibliographic entity needs to provide 
characteristic information about each aspect that allows bibliographic entities to be grouped by the 
features of those aspects. Unfortunately, we are unable to provide much more detail because, as 
many have noticed (Taniguchi 2002, 2003; Renear and Choi 2006; Wickett and Renear 2009, 
among others), the manner in which these aspects are defined is not particularly illuminating.  
 
From a philosophical perspective, such as the one used as a method in this dissertation, we can say 
that the conceptual approach taken by IFLA is one that is primarily concerned with describing the 
roles and participation constraints of entities within the model. We say this because, even though 
it is unclear precisely what works or expressions are, the model does tell us that they are the kinds 
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of things that are directly related to one another through the “is realized through” relationship. 
Wickett and Renear (2009) go on to point out that this relationship entails that for an expression 
to exist (whatever an expression is), there must exist a work for which the expression is in the role 
of realizing. It is possible, then, to analyze the WEMI model just by examining the participation 
constraints and roles that have been defined for it. 
 
More pragmatically, we can say that the WEMI model was designed to help us make sense of 
situations where we have many physically different copies of the same text. We will examine a 
curious example discovered by Nurmikko-Fuller et al. (2015) during their process of assessing 
metadata schemas for the HathiTrust Research Center’s11 various usages. In Figure 2.2 below we 
see what WEMI would call an expression, the book, [The Game of Chess]. 
 
As Nurmikko-Fuller et al. (2015) explain, the book in the figure ([The Game of Chess]) is owned 
by the British Library. In the 1960s, the British Library photographed the entirety of the book to 
produce a copy of it on microfilm. One of these copies was eventually sold to the University of 
California, which in turn produced a new print copy of the book from the microfilm. Later, both 
of these print copies were digitized. A digital copy of the University of California’s digitized 
version was given to the HathiTrust Digital Library (HT).12 
 
                                                 
11 https://analytics.hathitrust.org  




Figure 2.2: Different manifestations of [The Game of Chess] charting its reproduction cycle 
from the British Library through UC Berkeley to the HathiTrust Digital Library13 
 
Nurmikko-Fuller et al. (2015) also tell us that there are separate cataloging records describing this 
book, one produced by the British Library, and one produced by the University of California. The 
catalogers who produced these records did not agree how the book should be cataloged and so the 
facts describing the book, even the title, are altogether different from one another. Despite this, 
Nurmikko-Fuller et al. (2015) have been able to link all of the copies together, because at some 
point before the first microfilm copy was produced, someone spilled coffee or tea on the book 
owned by the British Library. This created an item-level feature that has been preserved in all of 
the various copies, which according to WEMI, are putatively different manifestations.  
 
In theory, WEMI’s manifestation and expression entities should be able to draw these links exactly 
as Figure 2.2 illustrates. However, we do have some questions if what we are looking at are called 
                                                 




manifestations or items. At this point though, we cannot completely resolve them, because as we 
mentioned above, the information about WEMI’s entities is quite sparse. 
 
Not long after FRBR was published, two additional accounts of bibliographic entities, possibly in 
response to all of the confusion that the WEMI model caused among the cataloging community, 
were published. 
 
Svenonius (as we mentioned—also a consultant for the committee that initially developed the 
WEMI model and the chair of Tillett’s dissertation committee) provides one of these accounts 
(2000). In Svenonius’ case, she sets out to provide a much different, extremely positivist view of 
bibliographic entities. She employs set theoretics in an effort to reduce the overall number of entity 
types and relationships needed by any model of them. Thereby, she focuses on a small handful of 
things—sets, documents, and constrained-set-member-of relationships—all in the service of 
providing what some call a reductionist account for bibliographic entities. 
 
This set theoretic view of bibliographic entities arranges “documents” into larger and larger sets, 
by first grouping all of the “documents” which are the same “versions” into sets, and then grouping 
all of the “version” sets onto bigger sets that are the same “edition.” In turn, all of the “edition” 
sets are grouped together into a “work” set which relates them all through having the same content. 
This imperfect subsumption hierarchy, where larger sets comprise smaller sets, provides a view of 
bibliographic entities that is quite similar to the one set forth by FRBR’s WEMI model. Indeed, 





Figure 2.3: ER-Diagram Illustration of Svenonius’s Bibliographic Entities 
 
Ironically, we can use the entity-relationship approach taken by Tillett to provide a partial 
illustration (Figure 2.3 above) of what Svenonius tells us are distinct bibliographic entities. There 
are many problems with Svenonius’s account, which we do not go into here. The important factor 
is that we have a WEMI-like picture of the bibliographic universe, but unlike the traditional entity-
relationship approach taken by Tillett in her analysis, Svenonius takes the position that we can 
define each entity in set-theoretic mathematical terms.  
 
While this approach can be a useful one when we focus on building actual IR systems, especially 
where we have relatively few works (i.e., our collection is small), it is not necessarily a scalable 
one because each work in a collection, as well as each edition, version, document, etc., would need 
its own unique specifications. As Svenonius remarks, “Specification is not easy.” – p 36. In part, 
this is because individual phenomena must be unpacked so that the language needed to describe 
them can be worked out. Set theoretics does not do this unpacking in and of itself, so one needs to 




For instance, a reductionist model of a phenomenon like ballistic range might propose that the 
distance a projectile travels can be reduced to a set of vectors. While this is true, this is not very 
helpful if one wants to model a particular vector. For that, one needs to develop a quadratic 
equation that can unpack all of the concepts necessary to model an individual ballistic range. This 
equation includes factors like the initial height of the projectile, the projectile’s initial velocity, the 
time it takes to reach the ground, the angle of its trajectory, and acceleration effects from the force 
of gravity, etc. Similarly, Svenonius’s reductionist account of bibliographic entities is not overly 
helpful because it is not sufficient to group bibliographic entities into sets. The languages needed 
to describe individuals in the sets still needs to be specified, and for this task, the conceptual 
approach will be necessary. 
 
In contrast, Smiraglia’s (2001) meditation on bibliographic entities is a much simpler one, but no 
less useful. However, it is more directly useful for conceptualizing bibliographic entities than for 
directly developing databases (and is probably also a response to the WEMI model). Like Tillet, 
IFLA, and Svenonius, Smiraglia is also considering how to unpack the subtle differences among 
different “documents” which all have a “family resemblance” in the Wilsonian (1968) sense. 
Instead of proposing a hierarchy of sets though, he sticks to higher-level conceptual spaces, and 
he proposes a view of bibliographic entities that decomposes them into three aspect entities—





Figure 2.4: Smiraglia’s Bibliographic Entity Model14 
 
Figure 2.4 is not an ER-diagram. As such, we should not interpret particular shapes as imparting 
any additional meaning. Indeed, Smiraglia is taking a semiotic approach which we might interpret 
as a kind of type-token analysis of works and documents (Smiraglia 2008; Wetzel 2009). While 
we do not employ this particular kind of semiotic analysis ourselves, preferring instead to examine 
roles and participation constraints on entities, Smiraglia’s diagram does possess two particularly 
important innovations that have major implications for what metadata is required at a minimum 
for the basic description of any bibliographic entity. For one thing, it is much clearer that the entity-
like boxes in the model: work, text, and document, are not kinds of bibliographic entities in and of 
themselves, rather they are all aspects comprised by a bibliographic entity. The second important 
thing follows from this first one—namely, a complete description of a bibliographic entity 
possesses metadata for all three of these aspects.  
 
Metadata describing each aspect is necessary so that any data infrastructure built around the 
metadata can group bibliographic entities in one of three ways: 
 
                                                 
14 Reproduced from Figure 1.1 in Smiraglia 2001, p 4. 
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1. By physical characteristics 
2. By textual characteristics 
3. By intellectual characteristics 
 
Taken together, these three approaches leave us in an interesting space. This is because entity-
relationship diagrams are intended to illustrate the conceptual space of data in databases. Thus, we 
are free to interpret the WEMI model illustrated in Figure 2.1 to actually be describing sets of 
tuples that correspond to things, i.e., works, expressions, manifestations, and items. However, the 
language on FRBR’s p 13 (IFLA 1998) makes it clear that these four things are not distinct 
bibliographic entities, as Svenonius sets forth, but are instead distinct aspects comprised by a 
bibliographic entity. Additionally, their individual definitions on the same page of FRBR are vague 
enough that we might interpret the relationships among them as being the kind of semiotic 
relationships that Smiraglia discusses.  
 
Complicating these interpretations are a series of attributes that are defined for each of the WEMI 
entities. Which, in turn, are further complicated by the fact that many in the cataloging community 
frequently speak of the values of these attributes as being able to be inherited (i.e., to propagate 
from one entity to another entity) across the disjoint boundaries in the model (Coyle 2016b). This 
is a trend despite the lack of any language in the FRBR document supporting the sharing of 
attributes by disjoint entity classes (Renear and Choi 2006). Regardless of these additional 
complications, we can more clearly say that the WEMI entities form a continuum of classes that 
describe bibliographic entities in a manner that spans from their physicality as artifacts (e.g., 
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“documents,” “items”) to the abstract content that they are used to communicate (e.g., “works”), 
or in other words, they form what might be called a content-artifact model. 
 
2.3.2. Moving Beyond WEMI 
As we noted in the section above, information defining the WEMI entities is quite limited, and 
over the years there have been a number of attempts to either rehabilitate it as a model for 
bibliographic entities or move beyond it. Taniguchi (2002, 2003), in particular, tries to provide 
one conceptual mapping that proposes that by expression, WEMI’s authors really mean text, and 
by manifestation, they mean medium. However, with several examples of differences in medium 
(e.g., the film adaptation of Moby Dick vs the novel, Moby Dick) and Michael Gorman’s earlier 
(1998) point about describing physical objects (p 27), full rehabilitation of the manifestation notion 
specifically has proved elusive. 
 
In particular, several mediums (e.g., video games, live performances, etc.) seem15 to evince 
features that suggest that there are expressions that are possibly directly related to other 
expressions, or manifestations possibly related to other manifestations through embodiment-like 
relationships. These dualistic expressions and manifestations caused problems when attempts were 
made to expand the general model espoused by WEMI to encompass specific kinds of 
bibliographic entities spanning from manuscripts to video games and on to live performances of 
various kinds (Jonsson 2005, Miller and Le Boeuf 2005, Nicolas 2005, Baca and Clarke 2007, 
McDonough et al. 2010, Lee et al. 2012).  
 
                                                 
15 And this still seems to be the case for many, if not all, of these mediums. 
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Video games (and digital media types in general) have been particularly troublesome. This is 
because there are frequently multiple languages involved simultaneously—one language for the 
human consumer and one language for the machine16 rendering the end-product to the human 
consumer. As the WEMI model is, itself, based on the decomposition of existing, mass-market 
monograph-centric catalog records, it is perhaps not too surprising that it begins to quickly break 
down when confronted by mediums that are well beyond the scope of what monographic-centric 
catalog records are designed to describe. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Jett et al.’s Conceptual Model for Video Games17 
 
                                                 
16 The actual situation is much more complex even than this. 
17 Reproduced from Jett et al. 2015, p 507. 
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Various repairs for specific types of bibliographic entities have all been suggested. One example 
is the video game metadata standard (Figure 2.5 above) suggested by Jett et al. (2015) which more 
or less abandons the WEMI model in favor of an approach that expands WEMI’s expression into 
“edition” and “local release” entities in order to articulate differences in both machine languages 
(via “edition”) and human languages (via “local release”). 
 
Similar problems led to the formation of the FRBR working group on Aggregates which developed 
the content-artifact aggregate model (FRBR-WGA 2011; Žumer and O’Neill 2012) deployed in 
IFLA’s new LRM standard (Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017). And it is here at this point that our 
account of the state of affairs for describing bibliographic aggregates actually turns to them 
specifically. 
 
2.4. Bibliographic Aggregates 
2.4.1. Bibliographic Aggregates as Bibliographic Entities 
Several bibliographic entities that libraries commonly collect that are intrinsically composite in 
nature. Some examples are anthologies, serial publications (like journals and newspapers), bound 
journal volumes (multiple journal issues bound together as a single monograph-like object), and 
microfilms (the practice of mounting photographs of the pages of multiple newspaper issues into 
a single reel of film). Even library (to say nothing of archival and museum) collections themselves 
can be viewed as bibliographic entities. Indeed, with the advent of digital collections, which can 
be copied en masse from one computer to another, an entire industry of creating both collections 
and metadata describing them is evolving (Hunter, Legg, and Oehlerts 2010; Lewis 2013, 




These are all examples of composite bibliographic objects which group together what would, in 
other circumstances, be singular bibliographic objects. All of these more complex bibliographic 
objects are generally understood to be forms of bibliographic aggregates. 
 
Bibliographic aggregates, especially in the forms of curated collections and serialized 
publications, have a long history as objects of policy, e.g., collection development policy, and 
cataloging practice, e.g., through rules and guidelines such as the American Library Association’s 
(ALA) Anglo-American Cataloging Rules (AACR2 [ALA 2002]) and Resource Description and 
Access (RDA) from the Joint Steering Committee for Development of RDA (JSCD-RDA 2014).  
 
Conceptual debates regarding the nature of library and archival collections in particular can be 
found in both library-centric (Lee 2000, 2005; Palmer 2004; Palmer et al. 2006; Palmer, Zavalina, 
and Fenlon 2010) and archive-centric (Currall, Moss, and Stuart 2004; Yeo 2012) LIS literature. 
How to best model collections as first-class bibliographic entities in IR and metadata management 
systems has also been discussed in the LIS literature (Lagoze and Fielding 1998, Gonçalves et al. 
2004, Galton 2010, Wickett et al. 2013, Wickett et al. 2014, Jett 2015). 
 
Similarly, despite the acknowledged need to describe and represent serialized publications as 
bibliographic objects within library IR systems, a satisfactory conceptual model eluded the 
AACR2, as evidenced by the LIS domain’s need for supplication in the form of the Library of 
Congress’s CONSER Cataloging Manual. CONSER has always been an imperfect solution. 
Indeed, the historical approach to cataloging serials now presents some significant problems for 
using serials catalog records to support text analytics endeavors. This has resulted in calls to reform 
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serials metadata practices (Antelman 2004, Kemp 2008, Krier 2012). More recently, there has also 
been conceptual work on a number of related kinds of bibliographic aggregates, such as video 
games that are compounding resources (Lee, Jett, and Perti 2015), series as bibliographic entities 
(Jett et al. 2017), and overarching “superworks” that collocate all resources in particular popular 
cultural domains (Kiryakos and Sugimoto 2018, Sugimoto et al. 2018, Lee et al. 2018). 
 
As we mentioned in the previous section, the WEMI model set forth in FRBR seems to break down 
when we move from metadata common, to all bibliographic entities, to those needed to sufficiently 
describe more specific kinds of bibliographic entities, like video games. Similarly, it has also been 
noted that IFLA’s FRBR framework has difficulty in accommodating bibliographic aggregates 
generally and serialized publications specifically (FRBR Working Group on Aggregates [FRBR-
WGA] 2011). As such, they propose a model for aggregates that does not depend on parts and 
wholes. 
 
However, Barbara Tillett and others suggest in their 2014 “Letter to the Editor” of Cataloging & 
Classification Quarterly that: 
 
“FRBR allows aggregates and components of any entity. The choice of which to 
identify should be paired with application design decisions and cataloging 
instructions and policies.” – Tillett et al. 2014, p 360. 
 
In theory, the problem the FRBR-WGA is addressing is not a problem that should have occurred, 
given that bibliographic aggregates in general are relatively generic, and the basic FRBR standard 
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already possesses relationships (i.e., part-of) through which metadata that link bibliographic 
entities comprising more bibliographic entities to one another (e.g., that links collections and items 
together) can be recorded. In theory, we should only experience problems when we try to articulate 
something about more specific bibliographic aggregates, such as digital library collections.  
Nonetheless, a WEMI-centric solution (the content-artifact aggregate model) to the purported 
problem was suggested. As an aggregate model, the content-artifact aggregate model is not 
without its own forbears. 
 
As early as 1987, in the pages of Tillett’s own dissertation thesis, an aggregate model that is 
suspiciously similar to the content-artifact aggregate model is described. Or as Tillett says then: 
 
“The whole-part (or part-whole) relationship holds between a component part of a 
bibliographic item or work and its whole, such as between a short story and the 
anthology in which it is contained. The components may be parts of some particular 
physical manifestation of a work, that is, parts of a bibliographic item, or they may 
be parts of some abstract work. For instance, The Wife of Bath's Tale is a 
component part of The Canterbury Tales. When a library has a separately published 
edition of The Wife of Bath's Tale and wants to show its relation to The Canterbury 
Tales, the relationship may be understood to hold between a physical item (the 
edition the library has) and the work as an abstract whole.” – Tillett 1987 p 59. 
 
As a means to delineate when parts and wholes are both “items” and when the parts are “items” 
and the wholes are “works,” she sets forth a taxonomy of three whole-part relationships: 
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“containing relationships,” “extractive relationships,” and “abstract relationships.” Of the first 
relationship, Tillett tells us: 
 
“The category ‘containing relationship’ specifically refers to those relationships 
involving the component parts of a physical unit, other than extracted parts. A 
containing relationship characterizes monographs and their individual chapters, 
published sets and their individual volumes, as well as series and their subseries. 
The series-subseries relationship typically is more complex than the other two 
examples of containing relationships, because a series may include collections or 
sets of monographs, or a series may be part of a larger series in a series hierarchy. 
In any case, the use of the term ‘containing relationship’ to identify this category 
connotes actual parts of some physical unit.” – Tillett, pp 59-60. 
 
It would seem that common-place, specialized bibliographic entities like digital collections, 
anthologies, series, etc. are all kinds of containers, or at least they are if we take the term 
“container” to possess the meaning and connotations that we are typically familiar with. 
 
With regard to “extractive relationships” Tillett tells us: 
 
“When the parts of an item have been extracted and issued separately as individual 
selections, the relationship between the extracted items and the whole is categorized 
as an ‘extractive relationship.’ This category obviously excludes exact reprintings 
of a whole edition. Such reprintings are considered equivalent works, whereas 
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extracts must be considered precisely equivalent only to passages, lines, or other 
small portions of a work. As for detached copies that are parts of a larger work, 
their relationship to the part they copy is also an equivalence relationship, while 
their relationship to the whole work from which they are detached is whole-part.” 
– Tillett, p 60. 
 
This is an unusual category and seems to have some overlap with a non-part/whole category of 
relationships that Tillett calls “derivative relationships.” Indeed, it is probably best articulated as a 
kind of derivation, as it is difficult to claim that a short story reprinted separately as an individual 
selection is really part of the same contextual unit that it was originally published with. However, 
this is similar space from which the content-artifact aggregate model appears to evolve as the 
“copies” in the quoted text seem to indicate “items” that have been detached from a “whole work.” 
 
One of the problems here is to what extent context matters. If Palmer (2004) and Palmer, Zavalina, 
and Fenlon (2010) are correct, then the very act of aggregating creates a context distinct from that 
in which the individual items exist. To some extent, this seems to bear out when Tillett says that 
the individual “items” are part of the “whole work,” even though they have been detached. The 
context provided by the “whole works” seems indispensable for the meaning of the separated 
“items.” As we will see later, this is actually the opposite position of the content-artifact aggregate 
model set forth by the FRBR-WGA (2011) and canonicalized in LRM (Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 
2017). But for now, we have this odd part/whole relationship between what must be abstract 




Finally, with regard to “abstract relationships,” Tillett tells us: 
 
“The ‘abstract relationship’ holds between parts of a work and the work. Work here 
is to be understood as an abstraction. The term ‘abstract relationship’ is used 
therefore to convey the connotation of a relationship to some abstract whole rather 
than some physical item. This relationship is further described in the discussion of 
the linking device, uniform titles (see III. C. 4. c. 1)).” – p 61. 
 
This is once again, a part/whole relationship, like the “container relationships” that operates with 
a specific aspect of a bibliographic entity, that of “work.” However, like the previous relationship, 
there seems to be some intellectual overlap with another kind of relationship in Tillett’s overall 
taxonomy—linking relationships. Unfortunately, it is not particularly informative beyond telling 
us that the part/whole relationship between parts of works and whole works is abstract. On the 
whole, it seems as though one of the problems we face when developing and discussing our 
conceptual models for things like bibliographic aggregates is that the definitions and examples 
often employ part-whole terms that are not actually synonymous with one another (e.g., containers, 
components, members, etc.). 
 
2.4.2. The Problem of Paratext 
Paratextual features present an additional problem for cataloging efforts in general and for the 
description of bibliographic aggregates in particular. As Coyle (2016b) points out in her chapter, 
“Some issues that arise in FRBR,” paratext (Genette 1997) can pose a significant problem for the 




“What often interferes here is the complication that publishers and producers of 
creative works add to the picture. Although it may be quite accurate to say that an 
expression is manifested in a physical product, it is something else to say that the 
physical product is solely the manifestation of the expression. The reason is that the 
physical, publisher-produced package nearly always has content and qualities that 
are in addition to the expression. From the design of the package to liner notes, 
creator biographies and prefatory material, the expression is packaged as a 
manifestation with content provided by the publisher or producer.” – Coyle 2016b, 
p 131. 
 
Coyle presents paratext as a problem for the FRBR (or really the WEMI) model in particular; 
however, this does seem to be a problem for cataloging in general. The question is whether 
paratextual content is significant enough to change the “primary” content of a work. When it is 
deemed so (as in the case of a scholarly or critical edition) then it seems clear that the work can be 
treated as a derivative work. When it is not, then it seems altogether safe to not record any metadata 
regarding it at all. This position may have particular implications for cataloging in general; 
however, for our efforts in this dissertation, we are going to treat paratext as something that does 
not significantly impact our understanding of what bibliographic aggregates are. Thereby, we will 
ignore those examples in the four standards examined in this dissertation that seem to be 
paratextual features (e.g., a table of contents in the role of being a bibliographic part). We will 




2.4.3. An Initial Analysis of Bibliographic Aggregates 
2.4.3.1. Confounding Factors 
One problem with using different part-whole terms indiscriminately is that it causes confusion 
with respect to what the essential conceptual nature of the whole (i.e., the aggregate) is in relation 
to the part. We can showcase an example of this confusion by examining the FRBR standard’s 
treatment of “Aggregate and Component Entities.” What FRBR states is: 
 
“The structure of the model […] permits us to represent aggregate and component 
entities in the same way as we would represent entities that are viewed as integral 
units. That is to say that[,] from a logical perspective the entity work for example, 
may represent an aggregate of individual works brought together by an editor or 
compiler in the form of an anthology, a set of individual monographs brought 
together by a publisher [or author] to form a series, or a collection of private papers 
organized by an archive as a single fond.” – IFLA 1998, p 29. 
 
We are referred to subsequent sections (which we examine in more detail in Chapter 4) for 
additional examples corresponding to each of the aspects of the bibliographic entities articulated 
in the WEMI model. From the example in the text above, the authors mean that the “components” 
of works are other works. However, this does not seem to correspond to some of our commonsense 
notions of the components of a work. Surely it is the case that we would normally consider the 
main character (i.e., a person, fictional or otherwise) of a work to be a substantial component of 
that work. But, on no account would we conceptualize a person to be a work in their own right. 




What is likely meant by the word “component” in this context is some other part/whole 
relationship. But how can we determine which one? 
 
One method is to reuse a tried and true solution. While the LIS domain may be ill-equipped for 
the description of foundational concepts, such descriptions are a matter of course in the 
philosophical domain. 
 
2.4.3.2. Collection-Item Metadata Relationships – A Brief Case Study 
During the late 2000s, a group of researchers led by Allen Renear at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign analyzed the relationship between metadata describing digital collections and 
metadata describing the digital objects gathered into them (Renear et al. 2008a; Renear et al. 
2008b; Wickett, Renear, and Urban 2010). For this conceptual analysis work, they employed an 
ontological analysis approach (OntoClean) set forth by Guarino and Welty (2004). The approach 
focuses on using formalisms in first-order logic to interrogate the metaproperties of relationships 
between entities, as defined in formal ontologies such as the Dublin Core Metadata vocabulary.  
 
Guarino and Welty were particularly interested in determining when relationships in ontologies 
represented contingent roles that entities were playing. However, as a formal analysis technique, 
the OntoClean method also has clear applications for ontology alignment (through metaproperty 
alignment) and broader analysis of metaproperties possessed by relationships. Or in simpler terms, 
Renear et al. were focused on the roles of entities and relationships in the conceptual models and 
the participation constraints that governed them. An approach different from, but complementary 




The work ultimately resulted in a framework describing how particular attributes of the members 
of a collection are reflected by attributes of the collection through propagation relationships 
(Wickett 2018). For our purposes, we want to narrowly focus on one particular paper produced by 
this group—“Are Collections Sets?” (Wickett, Renear, and Furner 2011). In this paper, Wickett, 
Renear, and Furner are engaging with an ongoing issue in ontologies and conceptual models—the 
use of sets as a basis for entities. Specifically, they are contemplating whether or not the notion of 
collections set forth in several schemas (Powell, Heaney, and Dempsey 2000; Shreeves and Cole 
2003; DCMIDTG 2007)18 are best represented as sets, a conclusion reached by several of the 
approaches to characterizing digital collections at the time (Lagoze and Fielding 1998; Gonçalves 
et al. 2004; Meghini, Spyratos, and Yang 2010).19 
 
2.4.3.3. Part/Whole Conceptual Spaces 
As we already mentioned, the LIS domain (and other domains too) frequently conflates 
conceptually distinct terms when it defines bibliographic aggregates. To overcome this issue in 
“Are Collections Sets?,” Wickett, Renear, and Furner import an already well-developed formal 
conceptual space that describes parts and wholes as primary objects of research. This conceptual 
space is called Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM [Simons 1987; Varzi 1996; Varzi 2016]).20 
 
Importantly, CEM provides a basic framework for analyzing part/whole relationships using 
axioms, definitions, and theorems that are already well-established. We explicate a truncated 
                                                 
18 All of which are based on an ER-diagram for collections set forth by Heaney (2000). 
19 And as we shall see in Chapter 5, this approach is still alive and well. 
20 They don’t tell us that they’re using this well-developed vocabulary until deep into the analysis. 
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version of CEM—[Core] Mereology (M)—here, to gain a better sense of the conceptual space 
that Wickett, Renear, and Furner employed. 
 
As a great deal of work has already been established considering the formal status of parts and 
wholes, this dissertation employs existing work as framework for interpreting the various 
part/whole relationships set forth in the four conceptual models selected for analysis. The 
part/whole framework—M—will provide a thorough background for developing a more precise 
account of aggregate entities, like those set forth in the mereological aggregate models. The 
following text reproduces well-established axioms, definitions, and theorems describing parthood 
and proper parthood from sources like Simons (1987) and Varzi (2016). 
 
As Simons, Varzi, and other philosophers tell us, the part-of relationship typically possesses the 
following metaproperties: 
• Reflexive – something is always part of itself 
• Antisymmetric – the part-of relationship is directed, and its domain and range must be 
different entities 
• Transitive – parts of parts are also part of the whole 
 
The following three axioms express that the part-of relationship possesses the reflexive, 
antisymmetric, and transitive metaproperties. 
 
A.1 (Reflexive Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Axiom A.1 states that an entity, x, is always part of itself. 
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A.2 (Antisymmetric Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 ��𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)� → (𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�  
 
Axiom A.2 states that if an entity, x, is a part of an entity, y, and that entity, y, is also a part of 
entity x, then entity x is identical to entity y. 
 
A.3 (Transitive Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)� → 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)�   
 
Axiom A.3 states that if an entity, x, is a part of an entity, y, and that entity, y, is, in turn, a part of 
another entity, z, then entity x is also part of entity z. 
 
Together, these three axioms form M (Varzi 2016). These are not actually all the axioms, 
definitions, and theorems that Wickett, Renear, and Furner employ in their analysis (recall they 
are using CEM), but they are sufficient for us to get a sense of what they are doing here. Rather 
interestingly, they find that the is-gathered-into relationship they are investigating is more 
comparable to Frænkel and Bar-Hillel’s ZFC set-member-of relationship. Like the set-member-of 
relationship (which is always an intransitive relationship), they find that the is-gathered-into 
relationship is sometimes an intransitive relationship (in effect noting that axiom A.3 above cannot 
hold for all instances of the is-gathered-into relationship). The implication is that the is-gathered-
into relationship is not related to the part-of relationship described by M. 
 
As Wickett, Renear, and Furner observe, “Allowing collections to be members of collections with 
transitivity would distinguish collections and [the] isGatheredInto [relationship]21 from sets and 
set relationships” – p 4. However, they ultimately reject this position, saying: 
                                                 




“If collections can be gathered into collections, as opposed to the items of some 
distinguished collections being gathered into a collection, then this creates a 
hierarchical structure within the collection. Allowing isGatheredInto to be 
transitive then collapses this structure. In order to preserve the intentions of curators 
who choose to gather whole collections instead of individual items from 
collections, we can consider transitivity not to hold for isGatheredInto.” – p 4. 
 
Ultimately, they reject a variation of axiom A.3 specific to the is-gathered-into relationship. Their 
reason for doing so hinges on two arguments: 
 
1. That transitivity collapses the hierarchical structure of collections, and 
2. That rejecting transitivity helps preserve the intentions of curators who choose to gather 
whole collections instead of individual items from collections. 
 
However, there is a problem here. They no longer seem to be talking about instances of the is-
gathered-into relationship (i.e., instances of collections), but instead, they seem to be talking about 
situations in which collections might find themselves. The apparent hierarchical structure of a 
collection is only useful when agents, like us, want to discuss apparent structures within the 
collection (regardless of whether such structures are there).  
 
We can contrast this with another example where it does seem to be the case that some instances 
possess a specific metaproperty and other do not: overlap. We can formally define overlap using 
the following axiom which says that two wholes overlap when they have a part in common. 
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D.1 (Definition of Overlapping Parts): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥) ˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Having defined overlap in general for part/whole relationships, let us propose a variation of the 
definition specific to the is-gathered-into relationship which simply tells us that when something 
appears in two different collections then those collections overlap.  
 
D.1-C (Definition of Overlapping Collection Members): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥) ˄ 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
The question becomes, is it possible for two different collections to share the exact same item? If 
we consider the works in a digital library collection like the HathiTrust’s, are there any instances 
where they are shared with other collections? The answer to this question is a resounding yes. Yes, 
because the HathiTrust has a tool that lets its users gather together digital objects from its corpus 
and curate them into their own personalized digital collections. 
 
As an aside, we might point out that the HathiTrust has such a tool because it is trying to support 
additional primitive user activities—specifically Unsworth’s referring, sampling, and representing 
activities (2000). These activities may be a step beyond the kinds of functionality (discovery) that 
is traditionally thought to be important for libraries to support (Verona 1959; Wilson 1968; 
Lubetzky 1969; IFLA 1998); however, as Unsworth points out, these are vital primitive activities 
that all researchers perform and that libraries should be supporting. Coyle (2016b) also remarks 
on Unsworth’s primitives (p 43), but the timbre of her prose suggests that she is not convinced that 




Nonetheless, the important thing to note here is that we have clear evidence that there exist some 
collections (i.e., some instances of the is-gathered-into relationship) that evince the metaproperty 
of overlap (because they have overlapping members). This is not the case at all with transitivity. 
In the transitivity case, it is simply that sometimes, we want to examine the internal hierarchy of a 
collection, and as such, all instances of the is-gathered-into relationship must necessarily lack the 
property of transitivity, else the hierarchy necessarily collapses, and the examination becomes 
impossible. At other times, we want to make claims about what items are in the collection 
regardless of whether or not it is actually in a sub-collection within the collection; in these cases, 
all instances of the is-gathered-into relationship must possess the metaproperty of transitivity, 
otherwise no claims that the items in the sub-collection are also part of the parent collection can 
be made. 
 
The real problem is that axiom A.3 (and all possible versions of it) is that it is too coarse of a tool 
for the analysis Wickett, Renear, and Furner are carrying out, and so they are unable to reconcile 
those situations in which any given instance of the is-gathered-into relationship seems to be 
transitive with situations where it seems to be intransitive. 
 
If we cannot reconcile these two situations, then it would seem we have to reject some of our 
commonsense intuitions regarding collections and the things in them. For instance, if we accepted 
that the is-gathered-into relationship is an intransitive one, then we would no longer be able to say 
things like the library’s collection includes the book Moby Dick if, in fact, that book is actually 




This problem is solvable, although probably not in the space that Wickett, Renear, and Furner have 
been allotted, as “Are Collections Sets?” is a conference paper. Specifically, there are additional 
tools suggested in the existing mereological literature that are expressly designed to cope with the 
first argument (hierarchy collapse) that Wickett, Renear, and Furner set forth.  
 
The collapse of hierarchy is a problem that Bittner and Donnelly (2005) faced when they analyzed 
the differences between the containment and componenthood relationships. As Bittner and 
Donnelly realized, sometimes we want to talk about properties of part/whole relationships that are 
clearly transitive and sometimes we want to talk about properties of part/whole relationships, like 
hierarchy, that are clearly intransitive. Their solution for containment and componenthood 
relationships is also applicable to the is-gathered-into relationship. We discuss that solution further 
in the next chapter. 
 
2.5. Chapter Summary 
As we have seen in this chapter, adequate description of bibliographic entities through metadata is 
the central feature of the library catalog. Beginning as early as the eighteenth century, the task 
library catalogs are designed to accomplish was severely complicated by the advent of the mass-
publication industry. These complications were compounded throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries by the continuous invention of new media forms and communication methods. 
In turn, these complications have become the driving force in the further development of library-
centric conceptual models for bibliographic entities.  
 
Bibliographic aggregates present a specialized sub-class of bibliographic entities wherein the 
wholes and their parts require equal descriptive accounts in order for users to make full use of 
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them as information resources. Just as the overall account of bibliographic entities has evolved 
over time, so too has the general account of bibliographic aggregates. However, the language 
employed by conceptual standards is frequently unclear, since it uses a variety of part/whole terms 
(e.g., using terms like “component” and “member” interchangeably) that actually play distinct 
roles in part/whole conceptual frameworks. Conceptual analysis work like Wickett, Renear, and 
Furner’s showcases how the application of informal formal methods can help to clarify our 
understanding of complex concepts like bibliographic aggregates.  
 
In the next chapter, we review the existing mereological literature in order to define a fine-grained 
set of tools that will help us showcase the differences between the componenthood relationship, 
the kinds of part/whole relationships that our bibliographic standards likely mean, and an array of 
other part/whole relationships. To some extent, this means temporarily stepping away from LIS 
literature to better focus on the mereological literature that is going to provide us with a rich enough 
conceptual space to describe bibliographic aggregates with enough detail to distinguish them from 




3. Part/Whole Conceptual Frameworks 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, we examine existing conceptual accounts of parts and wholes, in an attempt to 
reconcile the use of part/whole terms employed in our bibliographic standards documents (and 
their conceptual models) with their traditional semantics in mereological contexts. Thereby, the 
chapter begins with a deeper discussion of the terms being used in the context of the standards 
documents they are employed in. This is followed by a longer treatise on the use of existing 
mereological theory, specifically Extensional Mereology (EM). Following this explication, we 
examine Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s (1987) taxonomy of mereonymic (i.e., part/whole) 
relationships. As we note, modern approaches in computer science contexts expand upon this basic 
hierarchy. 
 
Having established the basic framework for the analysis, we then examine the properties (a.k.a. 
metaproperties) of each relationship, to both differentiate each named relationship from one 
another and to identify those metaproperties that are of particular interest in our analysis. EM is 
then extended to incorporate those metaproperties and an initial, deeply informal, analysis is made 
to narrow the number of candidate part/whole relationships to just those that possess most, or all, 
of the metaproperties thought to play important roles for bibliographic aggregates. These are 
found to be the component-of, contained-in, and member-of relationships. The chapter concludes 
with a deeper analysis of all three of the candidate part/whole relationships. 
 
3.2. Parts, Wholes, and Bibliographic Aggregates 
As we noted in the previous chapter, many of our standards use part/whole terms without regard 
for the fact that in many instances, such terms indicate very different kinds of part/whole 
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relationships. The state of being a component is very different than the state of being in a container. 
In this chapter, we are going to closely examine some of the existing mereological literature to 
suggest a number of metaproperties (i.e., dimensions or facets) through which we can illustrate the 
differences among various part/whole relationships.  
 
We are doing this so that we can account for the differences among the part/whole terms used in 
the bibliographic standards we are examining. For instance, the DC-CAP uses the label is-
gathered-into to make bibliographic aggregates distinct from other kinds of parts and wholes, for 
which they have a more general part-of relationship to describe (DCCDTG 2007). Perhaps 
contrarily, IFLA’s FRBR standard uses the label part-of but places narrow constraints on the range 
and domain of the part-of relationship (IFLA 1998) and, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
frequently uses the term “component” in language describing the parts (e.g., the section heading 
“3.3[:] Aggregate and Component Entities”). Similarly, FRBROO uses three different labels—
component-of, member-of, and incorporates—to signal apparently different senses of part-of with 
regard to three specific, apparently different, kinds of bibliographic aggregates (Bekiari et al. 
2016). 
 
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, we will develop a conceptual framework through which 
we will be analyze the different part/whole relationships set forth in our existing library metadata 
standards. We will do this by first considering other examples where different labels have been 





1. We will consider a series of formal axioms and definitions in modal first-order logic with 
equivalence from the existing mereological literature with which to differentiate the 
properties (or more properly the meta-properties) possessed by various part/whole 
relations. 
 
2. We will also examine the rich taxonomy of part/whole relationships set forth by Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann (1987) who postulate the following part/whole relationships 
(component-object relations, member-collection relations, portion-mass relations, stuff-
object relations, feature-activity relations, and place-area relations) that are related to but 
still different from the general part-of relation.22 
 
Afterwards, in Chapter 4, we will employ modified versions of the existing axioms and definitions 
from this chapter to suggest initial formalizations for potential metaproperties that the relationships 
used by the mereological aggregate models seem to possess. We will use these initial 
formalizations as the basis for our analyses in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3. Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s Meronymous Relationships 
3.3.1. Establishing an Initial Formal Framework 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Wickett, Renear, and Furner used a formal framework called 
Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM) to provide a conceptual space in which to carry out their 
analysis. Our first task here is to provide the additional axioms, definitions, and theorems to build 
a similar conceptual space; however, unlike Wickett, Renear, and Furner, we are going to build 
                                                 
22 We should note that Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s taxonomy is a feature in several ontological approaches to describing parts and wholes 
(see for example, Bittner and Donnelly 2005; Guizzardi 2005; Keet 2006a, 2006b, among others). 
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our conceptual space using a simplified formal framework for mereology, called Extensional 
Mereology (EM).23 We will begin by adding additional definitions to the three axioms (M) that 
we provided in the previous chapter, precisely as Varzi proceeds in his explanation (2016). 
 
In his 2016 explication of Mereology for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Varzi also uses 
M (i.e. A.1~A.3) to define several additional mereological predicates. We reproduce them here as 
definitions D.2~D.6, as they contribute towards arriving at EM, which is the mereological 
framework used in the analysis carried out in the following chapter. 
 
D.2 (Definition of Equality): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
Definition D.2 states that an entity, x, is equivalent to another entity, y, when entity x is a part of 
entity y, and entity y is also a part of entity x. 
 
The addition of definition D.2 to M provides the casus belli for a new relationship—proper-part-
of that is irreflexive in nature instead of reflexive. In other words, proper parts are not parts of 
themselves. 
 
                                                 
23 We will note here that our reason for doing this is that CEM also employs two axioms from which the entire mathematics of algebra can be 
derived. Similarly, a related formal framework to CEM, General Extensional Mereology (GEM), has an axiom from which functions can be 
fashioned and which can be further extended to derive the mathematics of set theoretics. GEM and closely related frameworks (e.g. GEM+, 
AGEM, and AGEM+) in particular is often employed in computer-science-oriented explications of part/whole relationships (see for example 
Guizzardi [2005] and Keet [2006a, 2006b]). 
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D.3 (Definition of Proper Parthood): 24 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ˄ ~partOf(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
Definition D.3 states that some entity, x, is a proper part of some other entity, y, if it is the case 
that entity x is part of entity y and it is not the case that entity y is part of entity x.  
 
The next definition tells us that for every part, there is some whole which it is part of. 
 
D.4 (Definition of Proper Extension): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥) ˄ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.4 states that an entity, x, is the proper extension of an entity, y, when that entity, y, is 
a part of entity x and it is not the case that entity x is identical to entity y. 
 
From here Varzi (and others) usually introduce the notion of overlapping wholes or wholes that 
share parts. 
 
D.5 (Definition of Overlap): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥) ˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.5 is a reprise from the previous chapter and, for the record, states that an entity, x, 
overlaps with another entity, y, when there exists some entity, z, such that entity z is part of entity 
x and entity z is also part of entity y. 
 
                                                 
24 Note that this is subtly different from a variant of D.3 which can be written: 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 ˄ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦) –see Varzi (1996) for a full 
explication of the variant’s equivalence to the formalization in D.3. These two accounts are sometimes distinguished by adding the word “strict” 
to the formalism appearing in D.3. 
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Varzi (and others) usually also introduce a scoping definition designed to tell us when two parts 
are part of the same whole. They call this concept “underlap.” 
 
D.6 (Definition of Underlap): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) ˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�� 
 
Definition D.6 states that an entity, x, underlaps another entity, y, when there exists some entity, z, 
such that entity x is part of entity z and entity y is also part of entity z. 
 
These five definitions (D.2~D.6) form a quintet of basic mereological relations. A more intuitive 
sense of what each relationship is intended to communicate with regard to mereological status of 
entities can be gained from the Venn diagram in Figure 3.1 (below). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Basic Patterns of Mereological Relationships25 
 
If the entity y in the definitions we have already described (D.2~D.6) is the same as B in Figure 
3.1 above, then we can see that C is a proper part of B. Similarly, B demonstrates equivalence as 
it is defined in D.3. As defined, only A is a proper extension of B. With regard to overlap, the 
                                                 








diagram visually demonstrates that only E does not overlap with B.26 Finally, as it has been 
defined, all of the circles underlap with B in the context of A.27 
 
These basic definitions play an important role in characterizing what happens when one says an 
item, x, is-gathered-into a collection, y. However, these four additional definitions are not 
sufficient in and of themselves to produce EM. To arrive at the framework for our analysis, we 
must also supplement M with two additional axioms describing various aspects of overlapping.  
 
A.4 (Weak Supplementation):  
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦) ˄ ~𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
Axiom A.4 states that if an entity, x, is a proper part of another entity, y, then there exists some 
other entity, z, such that z is part of y and does not overlap with x. We should also note that by 
adding axiom A.4 to our conceptual space we have arrived at a new formal framework for 
part/whole relationships typically called Minimal Mereology (MM). We can add one an additional 
axiom to finally arrive at EM. 
 
A.5 (Strong Supplementation): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �~𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)  →  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦) ˄ ~𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
                                                 
26 By some accounts, entity z can be thought of as a “null item” which is a part of everything, in which case all of the circles in the diagram 
overlap. As Varzi (2016) points out, this is a controversial position and any discussion of it is outside the scope of the dissertation. 
27 Similar to the overlap case, by some accounts entity z can be thought of as a “universal entity” of which everything is a part. In this case 
though, the existence of such an entity does not affect underlap relationships illustrated in the figure. The existence of a “universal entity” is 
similarly controversial (Varzi 2016). 
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Axiom A.5 states that if an entity x is not a part of another entity y, then there exists some other 
entity, z, such that z is part of y and does not overlap with x. When axioms A.4 and A.5 are added 
to M the result is EM.  
 
From here we want to focus on the notion proper parts that definition D.3 introduces and produce 
new versions of the axioms of the axioms used in M. We know from definition D.3 that a new 
version of axiom A.1 will not work, since by definition, the proper-part-of relationship is not a 
reflexive relationship. So, we will need to propose an entirely new axiom that says nothing can be 
a proper part of itself.  
 
A.6 (Irreflexive Proper Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥�~𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Axiom A.6 states that an entity, x, cannot be a proper part of itself. 
 
Conversely, nothing about definition D.3 implies that the proper-part-of relationship is not 
antisymmetric or transitive like our existing part-of relationship. Our next two axioms 
encapsulate these similarities. 
 
A.7 (Antisymmetric Proper Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 ��𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)�  → (𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�  
 
Axiom A.7 states that if an entity, x, is the proper part of an entity, y, and entity y is also a proper 
part of entity x, then entity x is identical to entity y. 
 
A.8 (Transitive Proper Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ˄ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
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Axiom A.8 states that if an entity, x, is a proper part of an entity, y, and that entity, y, is, itself, a 
proper part of an entity, z, then entity x is also a proper part of entity z. 
 
From EM and our three additional axioms, we can produce a table (Table 3.1 below) of 
metaproperties that various part/whole relationships may or may not possess. Here a “+” indicates 
that all instances of that relationship necessarily possesses a particular metaproperty, a “-” 
indicates that while specific instances of that relationship may or may not possess the 
metaproperty, they do not all necessarily possess that metaproperty.28 
 
Table 3.1: Part/Whole Relationship Metaproperties 
Metaproperty part-of proper-part-of 
Reflexive + - 
Irreflexive - + 
Symmetrical - - 
Asymmetrical - + 
Antisymmetrical + + 
Transitive + + 
Weakly Supplementing - + 
Strongly Supplementing + + 
 
 
As Table 3.1 illustrates, the proper-part-of relationship is a much more constrained relationship 
than the more general part-of relation. This is so because the proper-part-of relationship possesses 
more metaproperties necessarily than the general part-of relation. 
 
3.3.2. Initial Distinctions 
For our purposes, we want to focus more narrowly on the specific kinds of examples employed in 
our existing bibliographic conceptual models. Specifically, we want to focus on those examples 
                                                 
28 Note that some of the metaproperties in Table 3.1 are mutually exclusive, e.g., reflexive and irreflexive. 
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where it seems the presence of a full-fledged, highly descriptive metadata record is going to be 
useful to library users. We already know from Brack, Palmer, and Robinson (2000), Sweet and 
Thomas (2000), Foulonneau et al. (2005) and similar sources that such metadata records offer 
library users several benefits when assessing large multi-part resources like scholarly research 
collections for new or additional uses. The separate creation of metadata describing journal series 
as grand, overarching information resources, and metadata specific to journal articles, has been 
common practice for a long period of time. Hence, we also want to identify which of the examples 
employed by our conceptual standards can meaningfully be identified as bibliographic aggregates, 
and which ones seem to actually be indicating things for which we do not need full-fledged 
bibliographic control in the form of metadata records. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Winston, Chaffin & Herrmann’s Partial Classification of Semantic Relations 
 
Work by Winston, Chaffin and Herrmann (1987) demonstrates that a wide variety of what they 
call meronymous relationships abound. Several of the relationships we noted that our merelogical 
aggregate models used (e.g., FRBROO’s component-of, member-of, and incorporates) seem to be 
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good matches for meronymous relationships named by Wiston, Chaffin, and Herrmann in Figure 
3.2 (above).  
 
However, before we go on, we need to note that modern interpretations of Winston, Chaffin, and 
Herrmann’s mereonymic relationships are frequently rearranged into the hierarchy illustrated in 
Figure 3.3. This is because the sense of the spatial is not so easily subtracted from relationships 
like component-object or place-area.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Alternative View of Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s Hierarchy29 
 
Functionally, the differences between Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are not going to impact the analytic 
framework we are developing here. This is because all the relationships in the hierarchy are really 
meronymic relationships, in the sense that Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann intend—we will not 
be accounting for the spatial aspects (or lack thereof) that may be present in some of the 
relationships. It is possible to distinguish them from one another using a common set of axioms, 
definitions, and theorems. Importantly though, we are going to add one additional meronymic 
relationship not in Figure 3.2 (but present in Figure 3.3) to our framework development process, 
                                                 
29 Reproduced from Keet 2006a, p 15. 
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the contained-in relationship. We are not necessarily adding the involved-in relationship to the 
discussion in the following sections, although it might be possible to interpret it as the functional-
feature-of relationship noted in Table 3.2 below. Note also that the feature-of relationship should 
be interpreted as a being the same relationship as the participates-in relationship that appears in 
Figure 3.3. 
 
Table 3.2 (below) provides a complete list of both metaproperties and specific part/whole 
relationships. However, not all of the listed metaproperties or specific part/whole relationships are 
going to be useful towards our discussion of bibliographic aggregates. In the subsequent section, 
we will provide a general description of the additional metaproperties beyond those supplied by 
EM (e.g., for Individual Functional Dependence [IFD], Dense, Discrete, and the like). The section 
immediately following that will discuss which of the part/whole relationships listed across the top 
row in Table 3.2 are the most likely candidate relationships for bibliographic aggregates, so that 
we can focus our efforts both here and in Chapter 4. In the final section of this chapter, we will 
develop axioms and definitions specific to the subset of metaproperties that seem to be most 
important for drawing distinctions among our candidate part/whole relationships. These will 
narrow down which of the three is most likely meant to be invoked by our bibliographic standards. 
 
However, before we move on we will address one potential problem with the framework of 
metaproperties illustrated in Table 3.2. Specifically, the keen-eyed reader will observe that two of 
the metaproperties (weak supplementation and strong supplementation) that were previously listed 
in Table 3.1 are no longer among the metaproperties in our conceptual framework. The primary 
reason for their removal is that they do not strongly figure into the analysis being carried out in 
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either this chapter or the one that follows. However, we do want to point out that continued 
controversy surrounding these axioms (Donnelly 2011, Cotnoir & Bacon 2012, Beaney 2016, 
Contnoir 2018) was also a consideration. As we explain below, another metaproperty, No Partial 




























Reflexive + - - - - - - - - - - 
Irreflexive - + + + + + + + + + + 
Symmetrical - - - - - - - - - - - 
Asymmetrical - + + + + + + + + + + 
Antisymmetrical + + + + + + + + + + + 
Transitive + + + + + + + + + + + 
IFD - - - - - - - - + + - 
Dense - + + + + + + - + + + 
Discrete - - + - - + + + + + + 
NPO - - - + + + + - + + - 
NSIP - - + + + + + - + + - 
SIS - - - + + + + - + + - 
Homeomerous - - - + - - - - - - + 




3.3.3. General Descriptions of Metaproperties for Part/Whole Relationships 
From Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s point of view, the distinctions laid out in Figures 3.2 and 
3.3 rely on three additional metaproperties—functionality, homeomerosity, and separability. 
Formalization of these three metaproperties requires extending EM with additional definitions and 
axioms, which we do in the following sections.  
 
Of these three, functionality is the most difficult to characterize and we discuss it at greater length 
in Appendix A. The metaproperty “IFD” stands for Individual Functional Dependence and was 
suggested by Vieu and Aurnague (2007). IFD is a metaproperty designed to strongly indicate when 
a part is functionally necessary to its whole, so much so that neither the part nor the whole can 
survive separation from one another. Examples of this kind of metaproperty include things like 
mammals and their hearts (precluding any interventions by modern medical techniques). Notice 
that separability is a closely linked issue here. It is so closely linked that definitions and axioms 
for separability and inseparability will be drawn from the literature that discusses functionality 
axioms like the one for IFD.  
 
It is unclear when functionality plays a distinct role in a bibliographic aggregate. Some examples 
of things said to be parts of bibliographic aggregates, e.g., a table of contents in a text or a character 
in a story, seem to be quite functional with respect to the whole that they are part of. Conversely, 
things that are more typical bibliographic aggregate examples, e.g., the short stories in an 
anthology, the items in a collection, the articles in a journal article, etc., do not seem to have clear 




Homeomerosity is a metaproperty designed to signal when a part shares virtually all or most of its 
most important properties with its whole. Examples include things like slices of pie, spoonfuls of 
soup or pudding, and tracts of land (e.g., the lot a house sits on). The metaproperty of 
homeomerosity does not seem like one we might be overly concerned with, unless we intend to 
make arguments like, the short story’s text is a portion of the anthology’s text or the short story’s 
content is a portion of the anthology’s content. We do not typically talk about short stories, articles, 
or similar bibliographic entities in this fashion. Instead, we more commonly talk about them as 
distinct entities in their own right. 
 
Separability is a metaproperty designed to signal when a part can be removed from the context of 
the whole it is a part of, without injuring either its own identity or the identity of the whole. Some 
examples of separable parts include a person in a jury, a student in a class, an egg in a carton, etc. 
Importantly, despite the existence of examples like the aforementioned table of contents, many of 
the things we typically say are parts of bibliographic aggregates, e.g., short stories, articles, etc. 
seem to possess this kind of metaproperty, as we can readily see through publications like 
selections or data stores like article databases. 
 
Beyond these three metaproperties are five metaproperties (denseness, discreteness, not partially 
overlapping, possessing no single immediate predecessor, and possessing only a single immediate 
successor) that specifically characterize the hierarchical structure that factors into our descriptions 
of parts and wholes. Bittner and Donnelly (2005) develop these metaproperties as part of their 
discussion of the contained-in and component-of relationships.  
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• Denseness is a metaproperty that characterizes when we (human beings) can conceptually 
apply some arbitrary part/whole hierarchy to a whole. Bittner and Donnelly use the 
example of their car, and their ability to divide it again and again into smaller and larger 
arbitrary portions like the front half, the back one-fifth, etc. 
• Discreteness is a metaproperty that characterizes when an existing hierarchy of parts can 
easily be identified. In Bittner and Donnelly’s case, they might employ the example of their 
car door being an easily identified, discrete part of their car. They might go on to say that 
the car door’s window, the button for rolling the window up and down, the door’s handle, 
etc. are all easily identified, discrete parts of their car’s door. 
• Not Partially Overlapping (NPO) is a metaproperty that indicates that none of the 
whole’s parts overlap with other wholes. An example of in Bittner and Donnelly’s case 
might be the fact that no two cars use the exact same door mirrors even if those mirrors are 
the same model of mirror. 
• No Single Immediate Predecessor (NSIP) is a metaproperty that indicates the minimum 
number of parts that a whole may have, i.e., two or more. Bittner and Donnelly introduce 
an axiom for this metaproperty because they are not interested in cases where a whole has 
only a single component. 
• Single Immediate Successor (SIS) is a metaproperty that indicates the maximum number 
of wholes (one) that a part may be part of. Like the preceding metapropetry, Bittner and 
Donnelly introduce this meta property because they are not interested in entities which 
share the exact same parts. Indeed, containers sharing things in them and entities with 




For our context, several of these metaproperties seem rather important. Denseness and discreteness 
seem particularly pertinent since we have several library catalogue-centric use cases that rely on 
our ability to readily identify individuals within a hierarchy, e.g., the articles in a journal issue, the 
items in a collection, etc., and to apply arbitrary hierarchies to those things, e.g., only articles on 
certain topics, only authors with certain letters in their names, etc. 
 
The NSIP metaproperty also seems as though it will be important to us, as we probably don’t want 
to consider bibliographic aggregates that only have one part. For instance, can we really say that 
an anthology with only one short story in it is different from a short story, novelette, or novella in 
and of itself? In this type of case, it seems better to err on the side of precision and name an entity 
as what it appears to be rather than what it might claim to name itself. 
 
The NPO and SIS metaproperties seem less useful for our consideration here though. This is 
primarily because we have strong evidence of content both abstract (e.g., artistic content, 
propositional content, etc.) and symbolic (e.g., text, images, etc.) being shared across multiple 
entities. A good example of this is the HathiTrust which provides its users with a tool for fashioning 
their own digital collections from the objects already in the HathiTrust corpus. Once created, the 
objects in these user-generated digital collections are shared by both the individual user-generated 
digital collections and the HathiTrust’s overarching corpus. It seems unlikely, then, that we can 
claim that bibliographic aggregates never overlap as metaproperties like NPO and SIS would 




In the next section, we use these general insights about the metaproperties of part/whole 
relationships to help us determine which part/whole relationships we should focus our efforts on. 
Through this reduction of the part/whole relationships listed in Table 3.2, we hope to decrease the 
overall number of supporting axioms and definitions that need to be developed for the analysis in 
Chapter 4. 
 
3.3.4. Candidate Part/Whole Relationships for Bibliographic Aggregates 
As we noted in the previous sections, not all of the part/whole relationships suggested by Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann are appropriate for our bibliographic aggregate modeling use case. In 
particular, it does not seem as though any of the part/whole relationships that possess the 
homeomerous metaproperty (the metaproperty of being made of the “same stuff”) is going to be 
helpful. While bibliographic entities like articles, short stories, and the like might be fashioned 
from the same kinds of “stuff,” e.g., propositions, text, etc., it usually isn’t the case that they are 
fashioned from the exact same propositions, text, etc. So, we will discount the sub-quantity-of and 
located-in relationships from our analysis. 
 
We should note that we are not removing them from consideration because bibliographic entities 
like anthologies and short stories do not participate in such relationships, but because they do not 
speak to the bibliographic aggregate role we are interested in. They do seem more relevant to 
analyses of specific bibliographic entities, e.g., the novel Moby Dick, wherein each chapter might 
be modeled as a sub-quantity-of the novel’s content as a whole, a portion of the text denoting the 
novel’s content, a range of paper leaves on which text denoting the novel’s content is inscribed, 
etc. Similarly, a part/whole relationship like located-in can be very valuable for models of a library 
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collection’s physical plant (i.e., the ranges of shelves upon which bibliographic entities are 
organized). 
 
As we also noted in the preceding section, we are interested in those part/whole relationships which 
can give us a good sense of a bibliographic aggregate’s internal hierarchies through the fact that 
the bibliographic entities that bibliographic aggregates group together are easily identified (i.e., it 
is obvious what the items of a collection, the short stories in an anthology, the articles in a journal 
issue, etc., are. So, those part/whole relationships that necessarily possess the discrete 
metaproperty should be included among our candidate relationships. This allows us to eliminate 
the constitutes relationship, along with the more general proper-part-of and part-of relationships 
from consideration. 
 
Here we need to make an important distinction. Just because a general relationship like proper-
part-of does not necessarily possess a metaproperty like discreteness does not mean that some of 
its instances (or even a great many of them) do not exhibit this metaproperty as a characteristic. It 
is well within the realm of possibility for the proper-part-of relationship to possess sub-properties 
whose instances necessarily possess the metaproperty of discreteness. It is exactly those kinds of 
sub-properties (i.e., relationships) that we are interested in. 
 
Similarly, we believe that the separability metaproperty is going to be a necessary one, as we have 
many examples where things can be removed from bibliographic aggregates (such as when a book 
is deaccessioned from a library collection) without destroying either bibliographic aggregate or 
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itself as bibliographic entities. This will allow us to remove the feature-of and functional-feature-
of relationships from our group of candidate part/whole relationships. 
 
Finally, as we previously mentioned, we do not believe that the “parts” of bibliographic 
aggregates necessarily play any specific functional role within the context of the bibliographic 
aggregate itself. Hence, we are not going to be interested in any part/whole relationships that 
necessarily possess the IFD metaproperty. Thereby, we can also eliminate the functional-
component-of relationship from our consideration. 
 
Table 3.3: Candidate Part/Whole Relationships for Bibliographic Aggregates 
Metaproperty member-of component-of contained-in 
Reflexive - - - 
Irreflexive + + + 
Symmetrical - - - 
Asymmetrical + + + 
Antisymmetrical + + + 
Transitive + + + 
Dense + + - 
Discrete + + + 
NPO - + - 
NSIP + + - 
SIS - + - 
Separable + + + 
 
 
Through these eliminations, we are left with a narrower list of both part/whole relationships and 
metaproperties as illustrated in Table 3.3 above. In fact, we are left with just three possible 
part/whole relationships: contained-in, component-of, and member-of. This is not so surprising, 
since as we already noted, our existing bibliographic standards (IFLA 1998; Bekiari et al. 2016) 
and past analyses of bibliographic aggregates (Tillett 1987) all employ labels like “container 
relationships,” “components,” “members,” etc. in their accounts of bibliographic aggregates. In 
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the next section we will extend EM with additional axioms and definitions to help us analyze the 
extent to which these three part/whole relationships are interchangeable and where they are not, 
and to better identify which of them, if any, our bibliographic standards really mean to invoke. 
 
3.3.5. Further Extensions to EM 
3.3.5.1. Immediate Parts 
As we noted, the internal hierarchy of a bibliographic aggregate is vitally important to us. The 
ability to distinguish the bibliographic entities comprised by a bibliographic aggregate along 
organic boundaries is a necessary feature of any bibliographic aggregate model. Unfortunately, 
all three of our candidate part/whole relationships also possess the metaproperty of transitivity. As 
Wickett, Renear, and Furner (2011) point out, this has the negative effect of collapsing any internal 
hierarchy. Fortunately, a solution to this problem has been proposed by Bittner and Donnelly 
(2005). 
 
Bittner and Donnelly are carrying out a close analysis of the contained-in and component-of 
relationships in order to better distinguish them from one another. As part of their analysis, they 
develop five additional relationship elements as an aid in determining when something is a 
structural-component-of a whole and when it is merely contained-in a whole. These additional 
metaproperties focus on two areas: immediate parthood (i.e., when a part is one or at most two 
hierarchical steps from the whole) and parts with arbitrary boundaries (i.e., things that lack bona 
fide boundaries, like tracts of land).  
 
Bittner and Donnelly are pursuing this avenue of conceptualization because they have already 
accepted that the part/whole relations they are examining (component-of and contained-in) are 
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sub-properties of the proper-part-of relationship. As the proper-part-of relation always possesses 
the metaproperty of transitivity, so too do the component-of and contained-in relationships (which 
they define to sub-properties of the proper-part-of relationship). 
 
There are several important implications here for our analysis of bibliographic aggregates: 
 
• If our bibliographic standards really mean relationships like component-of when they use 
the term “component,” then bibliographic aggregates like digital collections cannot 
possibly be sets like Lagoze and Fielding (1998); Gonçalves et al. (2004); or Meghini, 
Spyratos, and Yang (2010) suggest.  
• If this is the case, then Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s (2011) soft conclusion that collections 
are not sets is greatly strengthened, because the set-member-of relationship does not 
possess the metaproperty of transitivity.  
• However, it might be the case that collections are actually containers as Hadro (2015) 
suggests.30 
• Bittner and Donnelly have proposed a solution to the exact problem that Wickett, Renear, 
and Furner faced in their analysis of collections as sets. In this case, Bittner and Donnelly 
are already ontologically committed to transitive part/whole relationships. They still need 
a tool that allows them to remark on the internal hierarchy of the parts and their whole. The 
immediately-part-of relationship accomplishes this because it is by definition an 
intransitive relationship. 
                                                 
30 We should note though that Hadro might actually be using the terms for “collection” and container” that are used in object-oriented 
programming contexts and which are, in fact, sets (Hughes 1997). 
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Returning to our review of Bittner and Donnelly, we see they begin by discussing a necessary 
metaproperty of the contained-in relation—discreteness. Regarding the contained-in relation, 
Bittner and Donnelly tell us that, “Containment structures are discrete” -- p 383. They give us the 
following example: 
 
“[I]f x is contained in y then either x is an[mm] immediately contained in y or (a) 
there exists a z such that x is an[mm] immediately contained in z and z is contained 
in y, and (b) there exists a z such that x is contained in z and z is immediately 
contained in y.” -- Bittner & Donnelly (2005), p 383. 
 
What they are aiming to show is that we know precisely what the contents of the container is. 
When they say that the relationship is “discrete,” they mean that we can easily articulate the 
hierarchy between the container and containees. 
 
However, for this to work, Bittner and Donnelly need to define an additional relationship—
immediately-contained-in—which is an intransitive version of the contained-in relation. Since we 
are discussing parthood relationships, the following definitions and axioms are generalized 
adaptations of more specific ones provided by Bittner and Donnelly. 
 
D.7 (Immediate Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)���  
 
Definition D.7 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is immediately-part-of entity y if and only 
if it is the case that entity x is part-of entity y, and there exists no entities z such that entity x is part 
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of entity z and entity z is in turn part of entity y. In other words, there are no transitive parthood 
relationships between a part (x) and a whole (y). 
 
Unlike the part-of relationship, the immediately-part-of relationship is intentionally an intransitive 
relationship, allowing internal part/whole hierarchies to be illustrated. Bittner and Donnelly supply 
the following formalism to represent this metaproperty of the immediately-part-of relationship.31 
 
A.9 (Intransitive Immediate Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → ~𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.9 states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is an immediately-part-
of entity y and entity y, in turn, is an immediately-part-of entity z then it cannot be the case that 
entity x is an immediately-part-of entity z. 
  
3.3.5.2. Discrete Parts 
Discreteness can now be formalized through a series of axioms that Bittner and Donnelly develop. 
 
A.10 (Up-Discreteness): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∨
 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)��� 
 
Axiom A.10 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is part-of entity y, then it is the case that 
entity x is immediately-part-of entity y or there exists some entity z such that entity x is part-of 
entity z and entity z is immediately-part-of entity y. 
                                                 
31 We should note that they go through the steps to prove the formalism in axiom A.9 as a theorem that is partially dependent on their discreteness 
axioms. As we do not labor to demonstrate this here, we represent it as an axiom instead. 
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A.11 (Down-Discreteness): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∨
 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)��� 
 
Axiom A.11 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is part-of entity y then either entity x is 
immediately-part-of entity y or there exists an entity z such that entity x is immediately-part-of 
entity z and entity z is part-of entity y. 
 
A.12 (Discrete Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → �𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.12 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is discretely-part-of entity y then entity x 
is both Up-Discrete (UD) and Down-Discrete (DD) with respect to entity y. 
 
What is really happening here is that the analysis is making an ontological commitment to only 
remark upon one level of internal hierarchy at a time. So, if a container contains several objects 
and several additional containers, we are committed to saying nothing about the contents of those 
sub-containers, until such a time as we examine them individually, as wholes in their own right. 
In an IR-system context, this metaproperty can be useful because it suggests the scope of the 
information about a whole’s parts that should be communicated to an end user at any given time.  
 
Bittner and Donnelly go on to point out that the structural-component-of relationship is also 
discrete, so their account of the differences between structural-component-of and contained-in has 




3.3.5.3. Fiat Parts, also known as Denseness 
Bittner and Donnelly next point out that both proper parthood and structural componenthood are 
dense relationships, due, as they say, “to the existence of fiat parts (parts which lack a complete 
bona fide boundary) [Smith 2001]” – pp 343-4. Referencing Smith, they make an argument that 
containers and the things contained within them do not have fiat parts.  
 
Regarding the nature of fiat parts, they expand their explanation with the following example: 
 
“Consider my car and its proper parts. My car does not have an immediate proper 
part—What-ever proper part x we chose, there exists another slightly bigger proper 
part of my car that has x as a proper part.” – Bittner & Donnelly 2005, p 344. 
 
An adaptation of the axiom Bittner and Donnelly use to formalize the dense metaproperty appears 
below. 
 
A.13 (Dense Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.13 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is part-of entity y, then there exists some 
entity z such that entity x is part-of entity z and entity z is part-of entity y. 
 
What Bittner and Donnelly are trying to point out here is that some part/whole relationships are 
such that we can apply hierarchies of our own devising, by drawing arbitrary distinctions through 
the parts of the whole. This metaproperty actually reflects a common functionality that is seen in 
most digital libraries and many OPACs, that of refining a corpus (either resulting from browsing 
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or searching) through facets. At least with regard to digital collections, this seems to be a very 
likely metaproperty that their part/whole relationships possess. 
 
However, there is a potential problem here. If axiom A.13 holds true then it would seem to be the 
case that we can slice and dice our car an infinite amount of times, almost in the same manner that 
one uses to estimate the area under a curve using an integral. This seems to violate some intuitions 
we have about parts and wholes. We consider a narrow slice of the front of their car, say the front 
1/127th of the car or something equally arbitrary that cuts through all the things we would normally 
consider to be a component, e.g., the headlights, the grill, the bumper, etc. so that none of these 
components are wholes in themselves—now we seem to have an arbitrary component which has 
no components. Or using the language of axiom A.13 we have invented a z which seems to have 
no valid x as a part. And similarly, there must be some maximum z such that it is in fact identical 
to y. So, it must be the case there are some, yet unspecified by Bittner and Donnelly, additional 
constraints on what values of z are going to be valid z’s. There must be some constraints on axiom 
A.13 which they do not discuss but nonetheless prevent the enterprise represented by the axiom 
from slipping into absurdity. Recognizing this problem, we discuss additional axioms that can be 
used to express these constraints during our discussion of the denseness metaproperty in the 
context of bibliographic aggregates in the next chapter. 
 
3.3.5.4. Partial Overlap 
Bittner and Donnelly (2005) next introduce a metaproperty that they call no-partial-overlap 
(NPO). This metaproperty is a definitive one for their structural-component-of property. The 
example they use is, “Two distinct car components share a component only if one is a 
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subcomponent of the other” – p 343. The following axiom is adapted from their formalization for 
NPO.  
 
A.14 (No Partial Overlap [NPO]): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → �𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦 ∨
 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∨  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
Axiom A.14 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x overlaps with entity y then it must be the 
case that entities x and y are the same entity, entity x is part-of entity y, or entity y is part-of entity 
x. 
 
We showed a counter-example to this in the previous chapter, in the transitivity case that Wickett, 
Renear, and Furner were examining, which did not seem to correspond to other metaproperty cases 
(i.e., they switched from instances of relationships possessing metaproperties to situations 
instances of those relationships were found in). There are countless other examples such as journal 
articles re-published in additional venues (e.g., in the digital collection of an institutional 
repository) or short stories republished in new anthologies and so, it seems quite doubtful that any 
of the part/whole properties in our bibliographic standards are going to possess a metaproperty like 
the one set forth in axiom A.14. 
 
However, Bittner and Donnelly point out that the component-of relationship does possess such a 
metaproperty. This immediately implies that when bibliographic standards documents (IFLA 
1998, Bekiari et al. 2015) use a term like “component,” we should not interpret them as invoking 
Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s component-of relationship. In actuality, they likely mean some 
other part/whole relationship than the component-of relationship. 
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3.3.5.5. Minimum Numbers of Parts & Maximum Numbers of Wholes 
To better distinguish componenthood from containment, Bittner and Donnelly (2005) define two 
additional metaproperties, no-single-immediate-predecessor (NSIP) and single-immediate-
successor (SIS). Notably they say that the contained-in relationship lacks both of these 
metaproperties. The following axioms are adaptations of the axioms they present in their 
formalization of NSIP and SIS. 
 
A mark of componenthood then is that every integral whole y has at least two components (x and 
z). 
 
A.15 (No Single Immediate Predecessor [NSIP]): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →  ∃𝑧𝑧(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~𝑥𝑥 = 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.15 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is immediately-part-of entity y then there 
exists an entity z such that entity z is immediately-part-of entity y and it is the case entities x and z 
are not the same entity. 
 
Again, here is a useful metaproperty that has direct implications for metadata that describes 
bibliographic aggregates. If our analysis of the part/whole relationships of bibliographic 
aggregates (in the next chapter) finds that those relationships possess this metaproperty, then we 
can strongly make a case that bibliographic aggregates possessing no items or only one item are 
not actually bibliographic aggregates at all, and so no metadata should be recorded. This can be 
used as a threshold for determining when something requires bibliographic description. 
 
Bittner and Donnelly’s (2005) SIS metaproperty is designed to constrain relationships like proper  
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parthood and componenthood, so that their immediate parts do not overlap with other aggregates. 
The following axiom is an adaptation of their formalization. 
 
A.16 (Single Immediate Successor [SIS]): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧� 
 
Axiom A.16 states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is immediately-part-
of both entity y and entity z, then it is the case that entities y and z are the same entities. 
 
This is an important distinction for Bittner and Donnelly as they hold that all instances of the 
structural-component-of relationship will possess this metaproperty but only some cases of the 
contained-in relationship will possess it. They then give an example of an instance of the 
contained-in relationship that lacks the SIS metaproperty, saying the following: 
 
“Consider the tool box in the trunk of my car. It is also contained in my car. My car 
and the trunk of my car are distinct immediate containers for my tool box.” – Bittner 
& Donnelly, p 344. 
 
However, it is clear that in some instances, the contained-in relationship will possess the SIS 
metaproperty. Similarly, it is also clear that in many instances, the contained-in relationship is 
going to possess the NSIP metaproperty as well, and so neither of these metaproperties is as 
strongly indicative of the componenthood relationship as Bittner and Donnelly first hoped. In any 
event, Bittner and Donnelly provide enough formalization to provide further formal accounts of 
structural componenthood and containment. 
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3.3.5.6. Separable Parts 
Unfortunately, axioms regarding separability rarely tell us much about separability as a 
phenomenon. They speak more to the inseparability of a part, which in turn, is used in discussions 
of that part’s functionality within the context of its whole. We provide a fuller discussion of this 
in Appendix A. For our purposes here, we will reproduce several definitions and an axiom from 
Guizzardi (2005) which provide a formal basis for separable parts. 
 
Guizzardi’s first relevant definition here tells us that something is existentially-dependent on 
something else if it is necessarily the case that when one exists then so does the other. He 
introduces a primitive exists predicate to aid with the definition. 
 
D.8 (Existential Dependence): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  �𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥) →  𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦)��    
 
Definition D.8 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is existentially-dependent on entity y, if 
and only if, it is necessarily the case that the existence of entity x implies the existence of entity y. 
 
This next definition tells us that if something is an essential-part-of something else, then it must 
be the case that something else is existentially-dependent on that that thing and the thing is 
necessarily part-of it. 
 
D.9 (Essential Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  (𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)  ˄ □




Definition D.9 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is an essential-part-of entity y, if and only 
if, entity y is existentially-dependent-on entity x and it is necessarily the case that entity x is part-
of entity y. 
 
In some cases, parts are existentially co-dependent with their wholes. A common example in the 
literature is that of a brain and the person it is part-of. In these cases, we say that the thing is an 
inseparable-part-of the whole. 
 
D.10 (Inseparable Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  �𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ˄ 
□𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.10 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is an inseparable-part-of entity y, if and 
only if, entity x is existentially-dependent-on entity y and it is necessarily the case that entity x is 
part-of entity y. 
 
At this point, we can say that when something is separably-part-of a whole (e.g., like a book in a 
library collection or a tool in a toolbox), then it cannot be inseparably-part-of the whole. 
 
A.17 (Separable Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
 ~𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)� 
 
Axiom A.17 states that for entities x and y, if entity x is separably-part-of entity y, then it is not 
the case that entity x is inseparably-part-of entity y. Rather importantly, this axiom relies on 
definition D.10 which tells us that inseparable parts are both existentially-dependent on the whole 
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and necessarily part-of it. Moreover, from definition D.9, we see that no separable part can also 
be an essential part. 
 
3.3.6. Formal Analysis of Containment 
We will consider the contained-in relationship as the first candidate part/whole relationship for 
establishing what our bibliographic standards actually mean with their disparate labels. To aid in 
this, we follow the adaptation of definitions and axioms from those in our extended EM 
framework. We do this in the exact same manner in which they are set forth by Bittner and 
Donnelly (2005, p 345) to provide a formal account of the metaproperties possessed by the 
contained-in relation. Unlike Bittner and Donnelly, we will signal the changes from the base 
framework’s axioms and definitions by retaining their numbering but adding the letters “CI” (for 
contained-in) to their labels. 
 
To help us probe the internal hierarchies of containers, we will first adapt definition D.7 so that it 
is specific to the contained-in relationship. 
 
D.7-CI (Immediate Containment): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ~∃𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.7-CI states that for all entities x and y, entity x is immediately-contained-in entity y if 
and only if there exist no entities z such that entity x is contained-in entity z and entity z is, in turn, 
contained-in entity y. 
 
We should recall that the immediately-contained-in relationship is an intransitive relationship. 
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A.9-CI (Intransitive Immediate Containment): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  →
~𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.9-CI states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is an immediately-
contained-in entity y and entity y, in turn, is an immediately-contained-in entity z then it cannot be 
the case that entity x is an immediately-contained-in entity z. 
 
Conversely, the contained-in relationship is a transitive relationship. So, if something is contained 
in a container and that container is contained in another bigger container then the first thing is also 
contained in the larger container. 
 
A.3-CI (Transitive Containment): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.3-CI states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is contained-in 
entity y and entity y is, in turn, contained-in entity z, then it is also the case that entity x is 
contained-in entity z. 
 
A.13-CI (Discrete Containment): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∨ �∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�  ∧  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)���� 
 
Axiom A.13-CI states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is contained-in entity y, then it must 
be the case that entity x is immediately-contained-in entity y, or it is the case there exists some 
entity z such that entity x is immediately-contained-in entity z. In turn, entity z is contained-in 
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entity y, and there exists some entity z such that entity x is contained-in entity z and, in turn, entity 
z is immediately-contained-in entity y. Note that we have expanded the Up-Discrete and Down-
Discrete portions of the axiom. 
 
Notice here that we have followed Bittner and Donnelly’s advice and have not claimed that the 
contained-in relationship is a “dense” relationship. This is the primary distinction Bittner and 
Donnelly draw between components of things and things in containers. That the contained-in 
relationship lacks this metaproperty implies that the part/whole relationships used in our 
bibliographic standards are not the contained-in relationship.  
 
This is significant because it implies that when Hadro (2015) says something like, “this collection 
is divided into containers by country,” he does not mean to invoke the contained-in relationship. 
Rather he is using the label “container” to refer to some other part/whole relationship. This is 
precisely because the items in the “sub-containers” he speaks of can be further sub-divided 
according arbitrary criteria. In other words, we can apply an additional fiat hierarchy to them (or 
as Bittner and Donnelly would say, the sub-containers are dense [and not containers at all]). 
 
A.18 (Parts contained within Wholes): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.18 states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is a proper-part-of 
entity y and entity y is contained-in entity z, then entity x is also contained-in entity z. Axiom A.17 




A.19 (Parts of Containers are Containers): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.19 states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is contained-in entity 
y and entity y is a proper-part-of entity z, then it is also the case that entity x is contained-in entity 
z. Axiom A.18 also follows from axiom A.3-CI. 
 
Finally, we must take Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s stipulation regarding separability into 
account. We can enforce separability by adapting Axiom A.16 (separable parts) to our purposes. 
 
A.17-CI (Containees are Separable Parts): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)� 
 
Axiom A.17-CI states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is contained-in entity y then it is the 
case that entity x is separably-part-of entity y. 
 
Overall, the contained-in relationship seems like a good potential fit for bibliographic aggregates. 
However, its one notable lack, that not all of its instances necessarily possess the metaproperty of 
denseness is going to be a stumbling block. Through OPACs and digital library IR systems, it is 
easy to see that collection part/whole relationships, at the very least, will all exhibit the denseness 
metaproperty, as a great deal of IR functionality requires the ability to draw arbitrary distinctions 
among groups of things. 
 
If we carefully consider other examples like journal issues or anthologies, it seems as though all 
of their part/whole relationships that are in the context of their being bibliographic aggregates also 
exhibit this propensity. It is easily possible to arbitrarily group and regroup the articles comprised 
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by a journal issue or the short stories in an anthology by arbitrary distinctions like the letters in 
their titles, the letters in their first author’s surname, their topical aboutness, and so on and so forth. 
It does not seem that any instances of part/whole relationships with respect to bibliographic 
aggregates lack the metaproperty of denseness. And so, we may remove the contained-in 
relationship from our list of candidate part/whole relationships.  
 
3.3.7. Formal Analysis of Componenthood 
We can use the same process to analyze how well the component-of relationship fits our 
bibliographic standards’ examples of bibliographic aggregates. The following axioms, definitions, 
and theorems adapt Bittner and Donnelly’s axioms, definitions, and theorems for structural 
componenthood (see Bittner & Donnelly [2005], pp 344-5. Like our previous case, we add 
additional letters (“CO” in this case) to the definition and axiom labels to differentiate them from 
the base part-of case. 
 
Because overlapping components is not a desirable situation for Bittner and Donnelly, they begin 
their analysis by first adapting definition D.5 from EM. 
 
D.5-CO (Definition of Overlapping Components): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝ℎ(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥)  ∧
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.5-CO states that for all entities x and y, entity x has an overlapping-component-with 





A.3-CO (Transitive Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.3-CO is a specialization of theorem A.3 (transitive parts). Axiom A.3-CO states that for 
all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is a component-of entity y and entity y is, in turn, 
a component-of entity z, then it is also the case that entity x is a component-of entity z. 
 
Next, Bittner and Donnelly adapt definition D.7, because internal hierarchy is once again a core 
concern.  
 
D.7-CO (Immediate Componenthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧  ~∃𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)��
� 
 
Definition D.7-CO states that for all entities x and y, entity x is an immediate-component-of entity 
y if and only if it is the case that entity x is a component-of entity y and there exists no entities z 
such that entity x is a component-of entity z and entity z, in turn, is a component-of entity y. 
 
A.12-CO (Discrete Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
�
∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)�  ∧ 
∃𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)�
�� 
 
Axiom A.12-CO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is a component-of entity y, then it is 
the case that there exists an entity z such that entity x is an immediate-component-of entity z and 
entity z, in turn, is a component-of entity y, and it is also the case that there exists an entity z such 
that entity x is a component-of entity z and entity z, in turn, is an immediate-component-of entity y. 
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A.9-CO (Intransitive Immediate Componenthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  →
~𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.9-CO states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is an immediate-
component-of entity y and entity y, in turn, is an immediate-component-of entity z then it cannot 
be the case that entity x is an immediate-component-of entity z. This is a reminder that while the 
component-of relationship is a transitive relationship, the immediate-component-of relationship is 
an intransitive relationship. 
 
Here, we need to note that Bittner and Donnelly believe a distinguishing characteristic of the 
component-of relationship is that it is a dense relationship. We can showcase this by adapting 
axiom A.13. 
 
A.13-CO (Dense Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.13-CO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is component-of entity y, then there 
exists some entity z such that entity x is component-of entity z and entity z is component-of entity 
y. 
 
The next axiom has to do with overlapping components, or more to the point, the fact that Bittner 
and Donnelly do not see overlapping components as a possibility. It does make some sense, since 
even where a component might be shared between two or more wholes, it is likely playing different 




A.14-CO (NPO Componenthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝ℎ(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  → �(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)  ∨
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∨  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)��  
 
Axiom A.14-CO states that for all entities x and y, if it is the case that entity x is an overlapping-
component-with entity y, then it is the case that entities x and y are the same entity, entity x is a 
component-of entity y, or entity y is a component-of entity x. 
 
A whole with only one component does not seem to be something that needs to be discussed in 
whole/component terms. 
 
A.15-CO (NSIP Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~(𝑧𝑧 = 𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
Axiom A.15-CO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is an immediate-component-of entity 
y then there exists some entity z such that entity z is also an immediate-component-of entity y and 
it is the case that entities x and z are not the same entity. 
 
The next axiom is also a consequence of there being no overlap among components and wholes. 
 
A.16-CO (SIS Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛 ��𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧1)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧2)�  → (𝑧𝑧1 =  𝑧𝑧2)� 
 
Axiom A.16-CO states that for all entities x and zn, if it is the case that entity x is an immediate-
component-of both entities z1 and z2 then it is the case that entities z1 and z2 are the same entity. 




At this point, we should recall a stipulation from Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s taxonomy that 
components are separable from their integral wholes. We can provide an additional axiom to 
enforce this presence of the separability metaproperty. 
 
A.17-CO (Separable Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
~𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)�  
 
Axiom A.17-CO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is a component-of entity y, then it is 
also the case that entity x is not an inseparable-component-of entity y. 
 
At first, the component-of relationship also seems to be a good candidate for explaining 
bibliographic aggregates. Recall from our previous discussions that bibliographic entities or 
aspects of them (e.g., works) overlap among bibliographic aggregate contexts. However, the 
regime of axioms and definitions that Bittner and Donnelly have developed for the component-of 
relationship specifically exclude overlapping situations. This would seem to preclude the 
component-of relationship from our list of viable candidate part/whole relationships. It would not 
seem to be the case that when our bibliographic standards use a label like “component,” they 
actually mean the component-of relationship. This leaves only the member-of relationship as a 
candidate explanation for how the parts of bibliographic aggregates relate to the bibliographic 
aggregate as a whole. 
 
3.3.8. Formal Analysis of the Membership Relationship 
We will now examine Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-collection pairing, which we 
are calling the member-of relation. For Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann, the key metaproperty 
that this relationship possesses is separability. But we can also apply the metaproperties developed 
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by Bittner and Donnelly. To further distinguish the term “collection” from the way Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann and use it and the manner in which LIS professionals are accustomed to 
employing it, we will use the label “collective” to invoke the former’s use cases and retain the 
label “collection” for the latter’s. 
 
Let us consider two examples where the member-of relationship is likely to be employed: 
1. The novel Moby Dick is a member of the University Library’s collection, and 
2. The economics professor is a member of the University’s faculty. 
 
If we consider the density metaproperty, we find that there will always be some intervening, 
arbitrary sub-grouping (e.g., alphabetically, by year of membership start, by age, etc.) which in 
turn will have additional sub-groupings (e.g., before a particular letter, after a particular year, etc.) 
that Moby Dick and the economics professor will, respectively, be members of. Therefore, the 
member-of relationship indicates that some members will lack bona fide boundaries (Smith 2001). 
Hence, the membership relationship possesses the density metaproperty. 
 
It is also clear that either a member of a collective is an immediate member of that collective or it 
is a member of another collective, which itself is an immediate member of the original collective 
and so on. Hence, the membership relationship has the discrete metaproperty. 
 
However, when we consider whether the membership relationship has the NPO metaproperty, we 
can see that it is possible for a collective’s member to be simultaneously the member of another, 
different collective. For example, the book Moby Dick can be both a member of a library’s special 
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collection of 19th Century novels and a member of a library’s collection of books about whaling. 
Similarly, the economics professor might simultaneously be a member of the faculties of the 
business and the mathematics departments. So, the membership relationship lacks the NPO 
metaproperty. 
 
Considering whether collectives can possess only a single member, it does not seem to be the case 
that they do. Library collections always seem to have more than a single bibliographic resource in 
them, and groups like faculties always seem to have more than a single member. Hence, the 
membership relationship possesses the NSIP metaproperty. 
 
But, because the membership relationship lacks the NPO metaproperty, it also lacks the SIS 
property. This makes sense since any particular member can be in more than one collective 
simultaneously. 
 
We can represent the membership relationship through the following axioms and definitions. We 
will again add letters (“MO” in this case) to differentiate these axioms and definitions from those 
for the general part-of case. 
 
D.5-MO (Definition of Overlapping Members): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝ℎ(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.5-MO states that for all entities x and y, entity x has an overlapping-member-with 




A.3-MO (Transitive Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.3-MO states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is a member-of 
entity y and entity y is, in turn, a member-of entity z then it is also the case that entity x is a 
member-of entity z. 
 
D.7-MO (Immediate Membership): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧  ~∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)��
� 
 
Definition D.7-MO states that for all entities x and y, entity x is an immediate-member-of entity y 
if and only if it is the case that entity x is a member-of entity y and there exists no entities z such 
that entity x is a member-of entity z and entity z, in turn, is a member-of entity y. 
 
A.12-MO (Discrete Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
�
∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�  ∧ 
∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)�
�� 
 
Axiom A.12-MO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is a member-of entity y, then it is the 
case that there exists an entity z such that entity x is an immediate-member-of entity z and entity z, 
in turn, is a member-of entity y, and it is also the case that there exists an entity z such that entity x 
is a member-of entity z and entity z, in turn, is an immediate-member-of entity y. 
 
A.9-MO (Intransitive Immediate Membership): 




Axiom A.9-MO states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is an immediate-
member-of entity y and entity y, in turn, is an immediate-member-of entity z, then it cannot be the 
case that entity x is an immediate-member-of entity z. 
 
Here, we need to recall that we established through two examples above that the member-of 
relationship is a dense relationship. Thereby, we need an adaptation of axiom A.13. 
 
A.13-MO (Dense Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →  ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.13-CO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is member-of entity y, then there 
exists some entity z such that entity x is member-of entity z and entity z is member-of entity y. 
 
We also want to establish that collectives with only one member (or no members) do not seem to 
be collectives at all. So, we will need an adaptation of axiom A.15. 
 
A.15-MO (NSIP Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~(𝑧𝑧 = 𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
Axiom A.15-MO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is an immediate-member-of entity y 
then there exists some entity z such that entity z is also an immediate-member-of entity y and it is 




Finally, we need to represent that the members of collectives seem perfectly separable from the 
collective. Removing a tree from a forest neither causes the tree to stop being a tree nor the forest 
to stop being a forest. 
 
A.17-MO (Separable Members): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
~𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)�  
 
Axiom A.17-MO states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is a component-of entity y then it is 
also the case that entity x is not an inseparable-component-of entity y. 
 
Here, we seem to have finally arrived at one possible explanation for the part/whole relationships 
in our bibliographic standards. When IFLA (1998) and Bekiari et al. (2015) use a label like 
“component,” the part/whole relationship they might be invoking is the Winston, Chaffin, and 
Herrmann’s member-of relationship. More broadly, it seems that we have arrived at an initial 
answer for research question 1a, which asks if our standards mean distinct part/whole relationships 
when they use terms like “container” or “component” (they do not), and research question 1b, 
which asks which part/whole relationship is being referred to by these labels. As we have seen in 
this chapter, what they really seem to mean is Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of 
relationship.  
 
3.4. Chapter Summary 
As we have shown, part/whole relationships have received a great deal of close study by both 
philosophers and computer scientists. Each part/whole term corresponds to a particular part/whole 
relationship which possesses particular characteristics in the form of metaproperties that can be 
used to distinguish it from other part/whole relationships. By examining the examples used in our 
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bibliographic conceptual standards, we were able to identify several metaproperties that seem to 
play key roles for distinguishing bibliographic aggregates from other kinds of aggregates. These 
were:  
• The possibility for bibliographic aggregates to possess overlapping parts (such as a digital 
item being in more than one digital collection or a comic book issue being in more than 
one comic book series [such as in the case of cross-over issues]).32 
• The ability to identify existing hierarchical structures in a bibliographic aggregate, i.e., 
possession of the discreteness metaproperty (which also requires the concept of immediate 
parts). 
• The ability to apply arbitrary hierarchical structures to a bibliographic aggregate, i.e., 
possession of the denseness metaproperty. 
• The necessity that a bibliographic aggregate possess more than one part, i.e., the NSIP 
metaproperty. 
• And, the need for parts to be separable from the bibliographic aggregate. 
 
Through these metaproperties, we were able to discount the contained-in relationship as being a 
successful candidate for the part/whole relationship possessed by bibliographic aggregates, on 
account of the contained-in relationship precluding the possession of the denseness metaproperty. 
Therefore, bibliographic aggregates are not the same as containers. Similarly, we were able to 
discount the component-of relationship as being a successful candidate for the part/whole 
relationship possessed by bibliographic aggregates, because it requires the NPO metaproperty, 
                                                 
32 Marvel Comics’ Age of Apocalypse is a good example of this multiple series membership phenomenon. 
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and would thereby exclude those examples of bibliographic aggregates that possess overlapping 
parts. Finally, we confirmed that the member-of relationship is a good candidate for the part/whole 
relationship possessed by bibliographic aggregates, since all of its instances seem to possess those 
metaproperties thought necessary to account for the various examples of bibliographic aggregates 
used in our bibliographic standards. 
 
In the following chapter, we will be developing additional adaptations of the axioms and 
definitions from our established mereological framework as part of the process of analyzing the 
relationships used in the mereological aggregate models. We will specifically focus on the 
following relationships: DC-CAP’s is-gathered-into, FRBR’s part-of, and a trio of relationships 
defined in FRBROO. Unlike the rote process we have gone through here, accepting each proposed 
axiom, or definition more-or-less whole cloth for the sake of developing a framework of 
distinguishing characteristics for part/whole relationships, we will instead interrogate (i.e., 
analyze) each axiom and definition with real-world examples to determine if the part/whole 
relationship being analyzed actually possesses a particular metaproperty or stands in a particular 
relationship to other part/whole relations. Where we find that strong counter-examples exist 
precluding one of the part/whole relationships we are examining from possessing a particular 





4. Analysis of Mereological Aggregate Models 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, we closely examine the part/whole relationships employed in the aggregate models 
set forth in three high-level conceptual standards: DC-CAP, FRBR, and FRBROO. We begin with 
a brief discussion of the type of aggregate model all three of the mentioned conceptual standards 
employ—the mereological aggregate model. This is a model that depends on conceptualizations 
of parts and wholes. We argue that all the mereological aggregate models employed by these three 
conceptual standards are in fact the same mereological aggregate model. Further we argue that the 
part/whole relationships employed by these conceptual standards are either synonymous with 
Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relationship or are sub-properties of it. 
 
4.2. Mereological Aggregate Models 
Recall from Chapters 1 and 2 that we want to discuss the way our bibliographic standards 
conceptualize bibliographic aggregates. The primary reason for doing this is to see what 
opportunities there are among the various bibliographic standards to describe bibliographic 
aggregates as first-class bibliographic entities, directly alongside more familiar bibliographic 
entities like books. Among other things, we want to as Jett, Fenlon, and Downie (2018) point out, 
capture the topicality or theme of composite bibliographic entities like collections.  
 
While the members of the LIS and allied domains might disagree on the precise nature of a 
collection as a bibliographic entity (Lagoze and Fielding 1998; Lee 2000, 2005; Currall, Moss, 
and Stuart 2004; Gonçalves et al. 2004; Palmer 2004; Palmer et al. 2006; Galton 2010; Yeo 2012), 
there is general acknowledgement that they are bibliographic entities and, as such, require 
metadata to aid users in accomplishing the essential user tasks of finding, identifying, selecting, 
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and obtaining (Brack, Palmer, and Robinson 2000; Sweet and Thomas 2000; Foulonneau et al. 
2005; Palmer et al. 2006). Similarly, other kinds of bibliographic aggregates, such as serials 
(Antelman 2004, Krier 2008), series (Jett et al. 2017), video games (Lee, Jett, and Perti 2015), and 
overarching “superworks” (Kiryakos and Sugimoto 2018, Sugimoto et al. 2018, Lee et al. 2018) 
also require sufficient metadata for users to find, identify, select, and obtain them. 
 
In this chapter, we will set aside specifics of what each of the bibliographic entities named above 
are and accept that in general, each of them is a kind of bibliographic aggregate. Thereby, we will 
analyze the mereological aggregate models set forth in three specific high-level bibliographic 
standards (i.e., the Dublin Core Collections Application Profile [DC-CAP], FRBR, and Object-
Oriented FRBR [FRBROO]) as case studies of how our standards model bibliographic aggregates 
in general. Our analysis here reexamines the initial findings we set forth in Chapter 3 in order to 
confirm our intuition that all three of the standards examined in this chapter really mean Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relationship. By doing this, we will be able to demonstrate if 
the aggregate models used in DC-CAP, FRBR, and FRBROO are comparable with one another, or 
even exactly the same as one another.  
 
One important factor for us to acknowledge is that our three conceptual model cases evolve from 
different intellectual traditions and are intended to provide similar metadata solutions for different 
computational environments. In particular, DC-CAP is a digital library-focused model that extends 
the Dublin Core metadata standard. As Dublin Core is by intent, designed to provide a simple, 
highly general “lingua franca” for communicating metadata about a wide variety of objects both 
digital and physical it should come as little surprise later in the chapter when we show that the DC-
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CAP aggregate model generalizes beyond the digital library use cases it was initially designed to 
accommodate. Similarly, it is important to recall from our literature review in Chapter 2, that the 
FRBR conceptual model arises from the normalization of MARC records from library OPACs in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite this, it adopts a similar approach to modeling aggregates 
by employing the use of part/whole terms to define aspects of the aggregate model. Finally, we 
should also note that FRBROO is the result of a harmonization effort (a kind of specialized 
mapping/interpretation activity) designed to produce an ontological vision of FRBR that is 
compliant with the worldview of the CIDOC Conceptual Reference Model (Le Bœf et al. 2018).  
 
Despite the different origins and intended use contexts of these three high-level conceptual models, 
all three of them employ an approach to modeling bibliographic aggregates that relies on 
part/whole concepts. The part/whole relationships they employ as aggregating relationships are 
central to our analysis in this chapter. More specifically, we will focus on Winston, Chaffin, and 
Herrmann’s member-of relationship as a point of comparison for each of the aggregating 
relationships used in the mereological aggregate models, since we found it was a good candidate 
explanation for what various part/whole terms and labels used in the standards actually mean. Also 
recall that, in the previous chapter, we found that the member-of relationship necessarily possesses 
the following metaproperties: 
• Irreflexivity – Collectives are not members of themselves. 
• Asymmetry (and thereby Antisymmetry) – Collectives are not members of their individual 
members. 
• Transitivity – If a (sub)collective is a member of a collective, then that (sub)collective’s 
members are also members of the parent collective. 
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• Discreteness – A collective has an existing hierarchy of identifiable members (which may 
be collectives in their own right). 
• Denseness – The nature of a collective is such that arbitrary internal hierarchies may be 
applied to it without affecting its status as a collective. 
• No Single Immediate Predecessors (NSIP) – Collectives have at least two immediate 
members (no empty or singleton member collectives). 
• Separability – The identifiable members of a collective may be separated from the 
collective without damaging the existence of either the collective or the former member. 
 
The member-of relationship does not necessarily possess any of the following meta-properties:33 
• Reflexivity – The metaproperty of being both the subject and object of a relation. The 
member-of relationship necessarily lacks this metaproperty since it is exclusive with the 
irreflexivity metaproperty.  
• Symmetry – The metaproperty of a relationship that indicates that both entities are objects 
of the relationship (e.g., marriage). The member-of relationship necessarily lacks this 
metaproperty since it is exclusive with the asymmetry metaproperty. 
• Individual Functional Dependency (IFD) – It is not typically the case that collective’s 
members serve particular functions that are dependent upon one another for their 
functionality (such as the heart and lungs in a living human body would be). 
• Not Partially Overlapping (NPO) – Distinct collectives do not partially overlap with one 
another through their members. As we note above, we can show that sometimes collectives 
                                                 
33 Recall also that the lack of all instances necessarily possessing a metaproperty does not imply that no instances possess that metaproperty. 
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do partially overlap with one another because they share members and so, it is not always 
the case that the members of collectives never partially overlap. 
• Single Immediate Successors (SIS) – The immediate members of a collective are not also, 
simultaneously, immediate members of another collective. Requires that collectives do not 
share members. 
 
Our goal here is to determine if these aggregating relationships have the same or similar meta-
properties to the member-of relationship, or if their meta-properties are more similar to another of 
Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s meronymic relationships, or, if the relationships are more 
similar to the more familiar set-membership relationship as set out in Frænkel and Bar-Hillel’s 
(1958) Zermelo-Frænkel (ZFC) axomization of the [set-]member-of relationship. An initial 
comparison of the last is made to the Dublin Core Collections Application Profile’s is-gathered-
into relationship by Wickett, Renear, and Furner (2011).34  
 
We also want to compare the aggregating relationships set forth by FRBR and FRBROO. In FRBR’s 
case, the relationship used is a rather broad and general sounding “part-of” relationship. However, 
it is narrowly scoped such that its domain and range are always the same kinds of things. 
Specifically, the kinds of things in FRBR aggregates are always works, expressions, 
manifestations, or items. And, it is always the case that the wholes and parts spoken of in FRBR 
are the same kind of thing (e.g., works are part-of a (larger) work, and so on and so forth). FRBR’s 
“part-of” relationship does not cross the large boundaries set by the individual work, expression, 
manifestation, and item. Similarly, FRBROO uses a trio of relationships (has-component, has-
                                                 
34 This exploration is both discussed further and extended below. 
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member, and incorporates) that narrowly link together FRBR works with (larger) FRBR works 
and FRBR expressions with (larger) FRBR expressions. At a first glance, from the above 
description of scope alone, it appears that FRBROO aggregating relationships might be specialized 
cases of FRBR’s aggregating relationship. 
 
The implications from the analysis will inform our metadata practices by clarifying which “parts” 
are members-of an aggregate and thereby require their own distinct metadata records and which 
“parts” fall under the purview of a different mereological relationship (e.g., component-of) and 
thereby might better be modeled as an attribute (or property) of the aggregate or one of its 
members. 
 
4.3. Aggregates in the Dublin Core Collection Application Profile 
4.3.1. DC-CAP Aggregate Model 
The Dublin Core Collection Application Profile (DC-CAP [DCCDTG 2007]) provides a 
conceptual model for collections that uses a unique relation—is-gathered-into. The intended goal 
of this model is to allow metadata describing collections in general as opposed to a specific 
conceptualization as set forth by more technical authors like Lagoze and Fielding (1998), 
Gonçalves et al. (2004), or Galton (2010), or domain-specific authors such as Lee (2000, 2005), 
Currall, Moss, and Stuart (2004), Palmer (2004), Palmer et al. (2006), or Yeo (2012).  
 
As the DC-CAP’s documentation remarks in its footnotes, the is-gathered-into relationship is 
directly based upon one employed in the United Kingdom’s Office for Library and Information 
Networking (UKOLN) collections model (Heaney 2000). Interestingly, while the DC-CAP reuses 
Heaney’s is-gathered-into relation, it never goes so far as defining it. Presumably, this implies that 
113 
 
those using the DC-CAP model are expected use Heaney’s definition for the is-gathered-into 
relationship (below). 
 
“[Is-Gathered-Into:] A relationship between Items or Item-Components and a 
Collection specifying the manner in which Items or Components are or have been 
gathered into the Collection” – Heaney 2000, p 17. 
 
Examining the definition further, we find that Heaney has defined or noted several additional 
things that could prove problematic should we adopt his definition. One issue is that he names 
several attributes for this relationship:  
 
• accrual method 




The presence of attributes for a relationship in a conceptual model developed using Chen’s ER 
model (1976) is typical. But, one question it raises for us is whether or not we should understand 
is-gathered-into as a property of an entity (e.g., A has the property of being gathered-into-B), or 
if we would better understand the is-gathered-into relationship as a specialized kind of entity (e.g., 
an Event) that depends on other entities (A and B) for its existence.35 In so far as Chen’s ER model 
                                                 
35 Entire standards, such as the W3C’s Web Annotation standard have been written to expand relationships, like annotates, into entities of their 
own, such as annotation. See for example: https://www.w3.org/TR/annotation-model/  
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is concerned, both entities and relationships are sets of tuples (typically stored as tables),36 and so, 
the ER diagram provided in the DC-CAP documentation (Figure 4.1 above) is not actually as 
informative as we might hope, as we have lingering questions regarding the conceptual 
connections between the tables. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: DC-CAP Data Model37 
 
 
The DC-CAP conceptual model attempts to sidestep this potential problem with Heaney’s 
definition by leaving it to implementers to specify the definition of the is-gathered-into 
relationship (assuming they don’t reference the footnote in the documentation and adopt Heaney’s 
definition directly). This leaves the door open to researchers like Wickett, Renear, and Furner 
(2011) to model is-gathered-into as a (more generic) relationship (sans attributes) rather than the 
                                                 
36 A confounding factor here is that the Chen model forms a continuum of tabular relationships which run the gamut from entity to relationship 
with the entity-like/relationship-like “associative entity” falling in the middle. Associative entities are even symbolized by the diamond shape 
(typically used for relationships in diagrams that use Chen notation) bound within an entity’s box-shape. 
37 Image retrieved from http://dublincore.org/groups/collections/collection-application-profile/   
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relationship (set of tuples) set forth by Heaney, and thereby interrogate its nature using first-order 
logic. This same process also allowed Wickett et al. to develop an understanding of the is-
gathered-into property as a sub-property of Dublin Core’s is-part-of relationship (2013, 2014) for 
the Europeana Data Model (EDM [Europeana 2016]). 
 
4.3.2. Initial Analysis of “is-gathered-into” Relationship 
An initial formalization of this model appears in Wickett, Renear, and Furner (2011) and is further 
refined in Wickett et al. (2013, 2014) and Jett et al. (2016a). We only provide a brief gloss of its 
formalization here. Taking the entity collection to be a primitive one, Wickett, Renear, and Furner 
provide the following formal definition that says that when something is gathered into something 
else, then that something else must be a collection. 
 
D.11 (Collections Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)�� 
  
Definition D.11 states that for all entities x, x is a collection if and only if there exists some entity 
y, such that entity y is gathered-into entity x. 
 
From the definition that Wickett, Renear, and Furner provide us, we can see that nothing would 
logically prevent entity y from being a collection in and of itself. Similarly, with regard to 
cardinality, it would seem that nothing would prevent us from having collections consisting of 
only a single item. Importantly, we can see that it is also the case that collections are defined by 
the relationship is-gathered-into. And so, a formal understanding the scope and nature of the is-




In their analysis, Wickett, Renear, and Furner set forth an initial formalization of the is-gathered-
into relationship by matching it the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZFC) axomization of the [set-]member-of 
relationship by Fraenkel & Bar-Hillel (1958). ZFC narrowly scopes the membership relation’s 
range to sets. In other words, whatever thing is a member of a collection, is also a member of a set. 
This is a narrower account of membership than Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s (1987) member-
collection pairing, unless we accept that the latter’s collection is conceptually synonymous with 
ZFC’s notion of set. However, we already accepted in the previous chapter (noted above) a 
strongly transitive sense of Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s membership relation. So, we will 
use a slightly different label (set-member-of) to differentiate the ZFC-sense of membership from 
the one we have already established. 
 
The task set before us is to develop a similar set of axioms, definitions, and theorems for the is-
gathered-into relation. Wickett, Renear, and Furner (2011) tell us that “the relationship properties 
of isGatheredInto align with the relationship properties of the set theoretic relationship memberOf” 
– p 4. 
 
Regarding their “memberOf” relation, they tell us: 
 
“The set membership relationship memberOf is irreflexive (no set can be a member 
of itself), asymmetric (if x is a member of set y then y cannot be a member of x), 
antisymmetric (again, a trivial consequence of asymmetry) and not transitive.” – 




This allows us to take the first step in applying the framework of metaproperties set forth in the 
previous chapter to the is-gathered-into relation. We can reproduce the axioms and theorems that 
Wickett, Renear, and Furner use for their analysis. 
 
Set membership is irreflexive. Or for our purposes no aggregates can be gathered into themselves. 
 
A.6-G (Irreflexive Gathering): ∀𝑥𝑥�~𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Axiom A.6-G states that no entity x can be gathered-into itself. 
 
Set membership is asymmetric. Or for our purposes nothing gathered into an aggregate, gathers 
the aggregate into itself. 
 
A.20 (Asymmetric Gathering): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
~𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Axiom A.20 states that for all entities x and y, if it is the case that entity x is gathered-into entity 
y, then it is not the case that entity y is gathered-into entity x. 
 
Trivially, set membership is also antisymmetric (and our aggregates too). 
 
T.1 (Antisymmetric Gathering): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)�  → (𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)� 
 
Theorem T.1 follows trivially from axiom A.20. Theorem T.1 states that for all entities x and y, if 
it is the case that entity x is gathered-into entity y and it is also the case that entity y is gathered-
into entity x, then it is the case that entities x and y are the same entity. 
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Finally, set membership is intransitive. Here, we have a distinction between our approach which 
focuses on Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s membership relationship and the set membership 
used by Wickett, Renear, and Furner for their initial analysis of the is-gathered-into relation. What 
we are saying here is that if we treat aggregations as though they are sets, then the members of 
sub-collections are not members of the parent collection that gathers the sub-collection. 
 
A.21 (Intransitive Gathering): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
~∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.21 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is gathered-into entity y, then there exists 
no entity z such that entity x is gathered-into entity z and entity z, in turn, is gathered-into entity 
y. 
 
Ultimately, Wickett, Renear, and Furner reject the notion that aggregates (or more specifically the 
collections they are examining) are the same as sets and also reject axiom A.21, instead adopting 
a weak notion of transitivity for collections. One of the reasons for doing this is to match our 
anecdotal accounts of collections wherein various arbitrary sub-collections are frequently 
discussed. However, in this case, transitivity is not a metaproperty that the is-gathered-into 
relationship necessarily possesses. 
 
It is important to note here that we have already discussed axiom A.21 at some length in Chapter 
2 during our initial study of Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s work and concluded that it is safe to 
reject axiom A.21 as we can employ additional tools (developed in Chapter 3) to help clarify the 
situations in which it seems as though instances of the is-gathered-into relationship possesses the 
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quality of intransitivity. However, for the sake of our analysis here, we will proceed for the time 
being by accepting that the is-gathered-into relationship is not necessarily a transitive relationship. 
 
Table 4.1 (below) reproduces Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s table comparing relationship 
properties. We have added a partial account of our previous understanding of Winston, Chaffin, 
and Herrmann’s member-collective pairing (i.e., the member-of relation) to the table. Note that the 
member-of relation, unlike the set-member-of and is-gathered-into relations, necessarily possesses 
the metaproperty of transitivity. For now, we are going to set aside this distinction and focus on 
any other evidence that there are distinctions between the member-of and set-member-of 





Table 4.1: Comparison of Relationship Properties38
 
Metaproperty part-of proper-part-of member-of set-member-of subset-of is-gathered-into 
Reflexive + - - - + - 
Irreflexive - + + + - + 
Symmetrical - - - - - - 
Asymmetrical - + + + + + 
Antisymmetrical + + + + + + 
Transitive + + + - + - 
 
                                                 
38 Adapted from Wickett, Renear, and Furner (2011), p 4. 
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4.3.3. Homogeneity Among Collection Members 
At this point, we have to admit that Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-collection pairing 
possesses a number metaproperties common to both the ZFC sense of set membership (ZFC-
member-of) and ZFC’s subset-of relation. However, looking at Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s 
examples (Figure 4.2 below) we can see that they are narrowly focusing on groupings whose 
memberships can be represented by sets at particular points in time, but which otherwise fluctuate 
over time. 
 
They enjoin us not to confuse this kind of membership with membership in a class, saying: 
 
“Collections39 must be distinguished from classes. The class-member relationship 
is not a meronymic relationship because it is not expressed by ‘part’ but by ‘is,’ as 
in,  
 
(2d) The Nile is a river. 
(2e) Fido is a dog. 
 
Classes differ from collections in that membership in a class is determined on the 
basis of similarity to other members, while membership in a collection is 
determined on the basis of spatial proximity or by social connection.” – Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann 1987, p 423. 
 
                                                 





Figure 4.2: Winston et al.’s Member-Collective Examples (1987, p 423) 
 
Accepting that collective-membership is completely disjoint with class-membership, we must 
consider the two bases that Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann set forth. Social connection seems an 
obvious enough connective force. As does spatial proximity, but producing axioms, definitions, 
and theorems to enforce them seems difficult.  
 
We might be better served by observing that the item-members of Winston, Chaffin, and 
Herrmann’s collective-member relationship (i.e., member-of in the table above) are all 
homogenous in some aspect of their nature. For example, if we define a forest as a group of trees 
then we can see that all of the forest’s parts are also members of the same class of things, i.e., they 
are all trees. The same will be true of the ships in a fleet. So, while the forest is not the class of 
trees, all of its members, trees, do in fact share a kind of class membership. 
 
Homogeneity across some particular aspect or aspects shared by the members of the collective 
seems to be the hallmark that differentiates the member-of relationship from the set-member-of 
and subset-of relationships, as it appears to be present in every example of collective-membership 
that we typically encounter.  
 




This homogeneity clearly extends to the kinds of aggregates this dissertation focuses on—
bibliographic aggregates. For instance, the things in an anthology are all short stories. The things 
in a journal issue are articles. The things in a journal series are journal issues. The things in a 
library collection are media objects. The things in an archival collection are also media objects but 
are simply organized according to different principles (i.e., they are fonds). The things in a museum 
collection depend on the museum type, but they also form a homogeneous mass across one or more 
dimensions. For example, the items in a geology collection are all geological objects. 
 
We have additional evidence that supports the idea that the items gathered into collections are all 
homogenous with regard to some criteria in the form of accrual and collection development 
policies. These policies frequently spell out, at least, the general nature of the things being gathered 
into a collection, if not the precise nature of a collection’s members. These same policies also 
provide further anecdotal evidence that collections are not sets, because they frequently also 
include information regarding when things cease being members of a collection (such as through 
deaccession policies). 
 
We can use an axiom to help analyze this concept. What we want to say is that all the things in a 
collection are the same kind of thing. We can do this with the following axiom which takes the 
classified-as relationship to be primitive. 
 
A.22 (Homogeneous Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → ∃𝑋𝑋∃𝑌𝑌 ���𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋)  ∧
  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧,𝑌𝑌)�  ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧)��� 
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Axiom A.22 states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is gathered-into entity 
z and it is also the case that entity y is gathered-into entity z then there exists some class X such 
that it is the case that entities x and y are both classified-as class X and entity z is a classified-as 
class Y, and it is also the case that none of the entities are the same entity. 
 
Here, we likely need to be clearer about what class Y in axiom A.22 is. Taken together, definition 
D.11 and axiom A.22 imply that class Y must be Collection.40 We can represent this with the 
following axiom (note that we have started our variable assignments over from x and X, as is 
common practice). 
 
A.23 (Collection is a Class): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑋𝑋 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋)�  → �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋) = 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)��� 
 
Axiom A.23 states that for all entities x and y and classes X, if it is the case entity x is gathered-
into entity y and it is also the case that entity y is classified-as [an instance of] class X, then it is 
the case that that classification is the same as claiming that entity y is-a Collection. Or in simpler 
words, our class X, is the class, Collection. 
 
It is important to note that axiom A.22 and axiom A.23 seem to satisfy both the examples of 
Collections that Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann are examining and also those typical of the 
mereological aggregate models being examined here. Unfortunately, the label, “Collection” is 
doing double duty. Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann are using it to refer to collections in general, 
                                                 
40 Here we will deviate from our use of the label “collective” and use “Collection” in the general sense that Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann 
mean, as it figures predominately in the example here at the bottom of the page. 
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and Wickett, Renear, and Furner are using it to refer more specifically to the kinds of bibliographic 
collections that are the true focus here. 
 
However, both uses suffer from the same practicalities injected by natural language usage. For 
instance, we sometimes speak of sub-groupings within larger groupings such that the following 
membership examples will also be true. 
 
1. A grove of trees is part of a forest. 
2. A squadron of ships is part of a fleet. 
3. A special collection is part of a collection. 
 
In these cases, “a grove” can easily be interpreted to mean “a tiny forest,” “a squadron” can be 
interpreted to mean “a small fleet of ships,” and a special collection can be interpreted to mean “a 
small collection.”  
 
To some extent, this should not be a problem for axiom A.22 because there are no additional 
axioms that would prevent the classes X and Y from being the exact same class. Or as is implied 
by axiom A.23, our xs and ys might also be collections, exactly as Wickett, Renear, and Furner 
(2011) observe with regards to definition D.11. So, the three examples above should be accounted 
for by axiom A.22, exactly how it is. 
 
However, it is frequently the case, especially with regard to collections in archives, libraries, and 
museums, that we describe them as gathering together both resources and smaller collections 
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simultaneously. For instance, the library’s collections might consist of [“adult”]-fiction, [“adult”]-
non-fiction, children’s, young adult, and reference collections. In turn, the library’s reference 
collection may consist of the media objects in it, and additional special collections such as a 
microfilm collection and a genealogy collection. 
 
We will adjust the scope of our axiom A.22 to accommodate this mixed aggregate model where 
both individual whole media objects are collected and aggregates like collections are collected. 
So, a collection may consist of both collection-members (i.e., “items”) and other collections or all 
of one or the other of them.41 
 
A.22’ (Collection-Inclusive Homogeneous Collection Membership): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  →
∃𝑋𝑋∃𝑌𝑌 ���𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑌𝑌)�  ∨
�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑌𝑌)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑌𝑌)�  ∨
 �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑌𝑌)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑌𝑌)�  ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧)��� 
 
Axiom A.22’ states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is gathered-into 
entity z and it is also the case that entity y is gathered-into entity z, then there exists some classes 
X and Y such that it is the case that entities x and y are both classified-as class X and entity z is 
classified-as class Y, or entity x is classified-as class X and both entities y and z are classified-as 
                                                 
41 We should note that in some sense this revised axiom A.22’ could also be applied to sets where class X is understood to be the class of Set-
Members and class Y is understood to be the class of Sets. We should also note that the first part of the preceding observation is a trivial implication 
of Parthood and mereological relationships in general, and thereby is not informative in the same way that all of the members of the collection 
being trees or forests (where the overarching collection type is forest) would be. This is because of the things one finds in forests that are excluded 
from participating in the collection ‘forest’, e.g., animals, fungi, bacteria, plants, and other things that one finds exclusively in forest settings. 
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class Y, or entity y is classified-as class X and both entities x and z are classified-as class Y, and it 
is also the case that none of the entities are the same entity. 
 
Axiom A.22’ seems to match our intuitions about collection membership—i.e., that collections 
can be members of (larger) collections in the exact same manner that individual items are members 
of collections. And so, we have an axiom that satisfies the counter-examples we raised against the 
initial version (axiom A.22).  
 
4.3.4. Transitivity with Regard to Collection Membership. 
Now that we have addressed both the homogenous nature of the things gathered into collections 
and the capacity of collections to simultaneously gather other collections into their whole, we need 
to more closely inspect the notion of transitivity with regard to the is-gathered-into relationship. 
 
Recall from Chapter 2 that transitivity and intransitivity were a stumbling block for the analysis 
Wickett, Renear, and Furner carried out. Recall also that when we initially examined it, we 
employed an example of a common phenomenon in the library domain—the book Moby Dick is 
both a member of a library’s special collection of 19th Century literature and a member of the 
library’s collection. In turn, the library’s special collection is also a member of the library’s 
collection.  
 
An obvious question is, if the book Moby Dick is a member of the library’s special collection of 
19th Century literature, then how is it also a member of the library’s collection if it is also the case 
that the is-gathered-into relationship is not a transitive relation? We know from a stewardship 
perspective that the library maintains the objects that have been gathered into its collection, 
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regardless of ownership status and regardless of how many of those things are gathered into special 
collections. 
 
A.3-G (Transitive Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  → 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.3-G states that for all entities x, y, and z, if it is the case that entity x is gathered-into 
entity y and it is also the case that entity y is gathered-into entity z, then it is the case that entity x 
is gathered-into entity z. 
 
Similarly, we can equip ourselves to analyze the hierarchy within collections and thereby respond 
to one of Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s arguments against the is-gathered-into relationship being 
a transitive relationship with the following definition and axiom. 
 
D.7-G (Immediate Collection Membership): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
~∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)��� 
 
Definition D.7-G states that for all entities x and y, entity x is immediately-gathered-into entity y 
if and only if it is the case that there exists no entity z such that entity x is gathered-into entity z 
and entity z, in turn, is gathered-into entity y. 
 
A.9-G (Intransitive Immediate Collection Membership): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →




Axiom A.9-G states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is immediately-gathered-into entity y, 
then there exists no entity z such that entity x is immediately-gathered-into entity z and in turn, 
entity z is immediately-gathered-into entity y. 
 
Regarding Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s second argument against transitivity for the is-gathered-
into relationship (that it might injure the intentions of curators when they gather a whole collection 
rather than cherry-pick certain objects for inclusion in their collections), we can observe that in 
some instances curators do seem to reject gathering a whole collection in preference for gathering 
particular items. Indeed, the entire practice of artifact lending among museums is a strong example 
that this kind of preferential selection of items from collections frequently occurs. It is likely the 
case that where a curator has chosen to gather an entire collection into an existing collection, the 
inclusion does, in fact, meet a particular curatorial goal. 
 
This is not to say that Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s analysis is incorrect. Rather, these 
observations serve as further evidence for their conclusion that collections are not sets because 
they change over time. It is also the case that collections are not sets because the is-gathered-into 
relationship necessarily possesses the metaproperty of transitivity rather than intransitivity and for 
the same reasons as they give for assuming collections change over time—because we anecdotally 
speak of them as though it were the case. Thereby, the is-gathered-into relationship being transitive 
in nature matches our commonsense understanding of collections.  
 
We should further note that nothing about the perspective on collections laid out here damages a 
view that collections are sets in a role and that at different times t, different sets fulfill the role of 
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being a particular collection. However, at this point, we must admit that the is-gathered-into 
relationship is beginning to resemble Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relation. 
Indeed, for the rest of this analysis, we will consider Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s is-gathered-
into relationship to be synonymous with Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relation. 
 
4.3.5. Separable Collection Membership 
Recall from the development of our analytical framework in the previous chapter that Bittner and 
Donnelly were concerned with the separability of both things in containers and components of 
things. Similarly, in library and similar cultural heritage settings we often anecdotally speak of 
particular members of collections (or aggregates) in terms of them being separable members from 
the collection as a whole.42  In this sub-section we will probe whether or not our intuitions about 
the is-gathered-into relationship allow this kind of affordance. 
 
We know from actual collections in actual archives, libraries, and museums that collections change 
over time. Not only are members added but members are also removed. This last practice is a 
particular feature of circulating fiction collections in public libraries. Because physical-shelf space 
is limited,43 older works whose copies circulate with great infrequency are often deaccessioned to 
provide room for new works that might circulate more frequently. In these cases, should the 
deaccessioned material still be in good physical condition, it is a common practice to resell to 
consumers. The important part to note here is that neither the former member of the collection nor 
the collection itself cease to exist. 
                                                 
42 Indeed, this is the whole point of Tillett’s (1987) rather confusing “extractive [part/whole] relationship” in her analysis of bibliographic 
relationships.  
43 This is likely going to eventually be true for digital collections of digital resources too, because storage solutions are not infinite (or cost free). 
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We can probe this by defining what it might mean to be an inseparable member of a collection by 
adapting definition D.10 (inseparable parts) from the previous chapter. 
 
D.10-G (Inseparable Collection Membership): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  �𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ˄ 
□𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.10-G states that for all entities x and y, entity x is inseparably-gathered-into entity y 
if and only if it is the case that both entity x is existentially-dependent-on entity y and entity x is 
necessarily gathered-into entity y. 
 
We can safely reject definition D.10-G on both counts. From the commonplace examples of 
collections and their former members, we can see that said former members are not existentially-
dependent-on the collection. But we also note that the fact that any given member of a collection 
being a member of that collection is a contingent fact. It is not going to be the case that that 
particular collection member is a member of that particular collection in all possible worlds. 
Instead, we can firmly say that the members of collections are separable from those collections 
and represent this with the following axiom. 
 
A.17-G (Separable Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
~𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)�  
 
Axiom A.17-G states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is-gathered-into entity y, then it is the 




We might be tempted to object to axiom A.17-G. Say, for example, we have created something 
expressly for inclusion in our collection. We might be tempted to say that since it is intended for 
the collection it is necessarily gathered-into the collection. This might be true; however, it is still 
not the case that this new collection member is existentially-dependent-on the collection. The 
collection might cease to exist, but the former collection member remains and vice versa. 
 
We can take this proposed counter-example a step further. Suppose that it is something that is 
functionally dependent on the collection for its existence, for instance, say it is the table of contents 
for an anthology. Even so, the short stories that comprise the anthology are still not functionally 
dependent upon one another.44 Indeed, the short stories that are members of the anthology and the 
table of contents for that anthology actually seem to be participating in different relationships with 
respect to the anthology. In the former case, that relationship is clearly is-gathered-into; however, 
in the case of the table of contents, since it is functionally dependent upon the anthology and its 
members, another of Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s relationships is suggested, one that Bittner 
and Donnelly spend a great deal of effort refining, namely the component-of relation. 
 
Moreover, it is going to be the case that we can remove particular members from an aggregate 
without destroying either the aggregate or the former member. Wickett, Renear, and Furner (2011) 
speak of this anecdotally in their conclusion, that collections are not sets. And we have previously 
noted that there exist deaccession policies that govern when an item is no longer a member of a 
                                                 
44 We should note that we could spend some time and space here reproducing specialized versions of the definitions, axioms, and theorems that 
Vieu and Aurnague (2007) set forth in their mediation on Individual Functional Dependency (IFD), but we would not normally ascribe particular 
functions to the various members of collections, especially with respect to and dependent upon, one another. That seems contrary to our everyday 
intuitions with respect to what membership in a collection entails. 
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collection. Similarly, we can observe that the particular articles in a journal issue, short stories in 
an anthology, or songs on an album would not necessarily cease to exist if that journal issue, 
anthology, or album ceased to exist, nor would those journal issues, anthologies, or albums cease 
to exist if particular articles, short stories, or songs did not exist. Indeed, we know from common 
publication practices that articles, short stories, and particularly songs, are often aggregated anew 
as members of other media objects or made available as individual selections (Tillett 1987).45 And 
so, it necessarily seems to be the case that the members gathered-into collections are separable 
from those collections. As such, we have no reason to reject axiom A.62 and accept that collections 
and collection members are separable from one another. 
 
Now that we have answered whether the members of collections can be separated from the 
collection, we want to return to the matters of internal hierarchy that Wickett, Renear, and Furner 
want to preserve. Bittner and Donnelly approach modeling internal hierarchy using to very 
different means: discreteness and density.  
 
4.3.6. Discrete and Dense Collection Membership 
4.3.6.1. Discrete Collection Membership 
Discreteness as Bittner and Donnelly set it forth is an attempt to scope our examinations of the 
apparent hierarchy of elements within wholes. They examine containers and components 
specifically, but their approach will also work for collections. To some extent, this is because we 
often speak of collections using terms that imply that they are interchangeable with containers.  
 
                                                 
45 And as evinced by the existence of the entire article database industry. 
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The axiom that Bittner and Donnelly provide allows for a stepwise consideration of container and 
component hierarchies. Put simply, it is a check to verify that the things in a container are 
immediate containees or immediate (sub-)containers that contain more immediate containees. We 
should note here that nothing prevents the containees of immediate containers from being (sub-
sub)-containers themselves.46 The axiom provided by Bittner and Donnelly only examines a single 
two-step of hierarchy at a time. Below is an axiom that adapts Bittner and Donnelly’s discreteness 
axiom for our collections case. In simple terms, it says that the things gathered-into a collection 
are either items or (sub-)collections with their own items (which very well might be sub-sub-
collections). 
 
A.12-G (Discrete Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∨  ∃𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�  ∧  �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)���� 
 
Axiom A.12-G states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is gathered-into entity y, then it is the 
case that either entity x is immediately-gathered-into entity y, or there exists an entity z such that 
entity x is immediately-gathered-into entity z and entity z, in turn, is gathered-into entity y, and it 
is also the case that there exists an entity z such that entity x is gathered-into entity z and entity z, 
in turn, is immediately-gathered-into entity y.  
 
                                                 
46 We should keep in mind that they also have a version of this example that works with components. 
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As we would only expect collection-members or (sub-)collections at any given place in a collection 
hierarchy, axiom A.12-G seems plausible. However, we should also note that this may imply that 
collections are synonymous with containers47 since so far, other than homogeneity, collections and 
containers have all of the same metaproperties. This is significant because it might be the case that 
collection membership is simply a specialized version of containment. At this point, it might also 
be the case that collection membership is a specialized version of componenthood. 
 
4.3.6.2. Dense Collection Membership 
A much more difficult question to answer is whether or not Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s 
collection membership relationship (is-gathered-into) is dense (i.e., possesses fiat parts) in the 
same manner that Bittner and Donnelly put forth. The goal that Bittner and Donnelly have in mind 
is whether or not it seems possible to apply an external and arbitrary hierarchy to a whole that has 
components. They use the example of a car where it is possible to divide the car arbitrarily into 
halves, quarters, and so on and each component of the whole (i.e., each half, quarter, so on) has 
the components that it has (and still functions). 
 
Importantly, this application of arbitrary hierarchy does not work for containers. It is not the case 
that we can simply call the left half of a container a container in its own right. If we simply tilt the 
container to the right, then, with a little help from gravity, we will find that the left half has failed 
to contain anything at all. This is an extremely important distinction to Bittner and Donnelly who 
hold it up as one of the key differences between the containment and componenthood cases.  
 
                                                 
47 Recall also that “container” is a term that Tillett (1987) invokes through her “containing [part/whole] relationship.” 
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Beginning our argument from the same place that Bittner and Donnelly begin theirs: if we consider 
the members of a collection to be proper parts, then it does seem that whatever proper part x we 
choose from the collection, there will exist another slightly bigger proper part of the collection that 
has our x as a proper part too.  
 
For example, consider a university faculty. We can apply a number of different fiat sub-groupings 
to the faculty. We might, for instance group faculty members alphabetically according to their 
surnames. In this case there might be a sub-grouping for faculty members whose names begin with 
the letter “A.” This sub-grouping also belongs to the sub-grouping of all faculty members whose 
surnames begin with the letters “A” or “B.” And this second sub-grouping belongs to the sub-
grouping of all faculty members whose surnames begin with a letter from the first quarter of the 
alphabet, and so on, and so forth.  
 
Similarly, say we have a digital collection mounted in a content management system. It is possible 
using the tuples describing the various items in the collection to formulate arbitrary queries such 
that arbitrary sub-collections can be fashioned out of the digital collection. In some cases, these 
arbitrary sub-collections might actually be gathered into a new collection for some purpose the 
curator has in mind. Many digital libraries, especially those that support digital humanists and 
similar scholars, such as the HathiTrust Research Center’s (HTRC) workset-centric48 (Jett 2015, 
Jett et al. 2016a) scholar support systems, already have infrastructure that support taking advantage 
of our capacity to apply arbitrary hierarchies to collections. 
 
                                                 
48 As Jett (2015) and Jett et al. (2016a) note, worksets are a specific kind of scholar-built thematic research collection. 
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It seems as though the is-gathered-into relationship is a dense relationship in the manner that 
Bittner and Donnelly think of dense relations. We can represent this through the following axiom. 
 
A.13-G (Dense Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.13-G states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is gathered-into entity y, then it is the 
case that there exists some entity z such that entity x is gathered-into entity z and entity z, in turn, 
is gathered-into entity y. 
 
We have already discussed many of the relevant examples that make us believe that it is possible 
to apply arbitrary hierarchies to collections, but digital collections provide some additional 
confirmation that axiom A.13-G is difficult to refute. As Lagoze and Fielding (1998) note, 
collection processes in digital libraries are no less reliant on the important role of selecting the 
members of the collection according to some criterion. However, an advantage that digital library 
collections enjoy is that it is easier to apply arbitrary hierarchies to them. This is because the 
metadata describing the members of digital collections (and often the members themselves) are 
stored in some form of (often relational) database system. Database systems, in turn, possess 
manifold tools for applying additional criteria that can be used to arbitrarily divide and sub-divide 
a digital collection into arbitrary sub-collections, thus making the application of arbitrary 
hierarchies much easier to illustrate.  
 
However, this is not to say that axiom A.13-G is not without some important implications. First 
and foremost, we should interpret axiom A.13-G as remarking on something that we necessarily 
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require metadata to describe, unlike axiom A.12-G. Axiom A.12-G can specifically be used to give 
us a sense of the extent of a bibliographic aggregate (i.e., how many things are in the aggregate). 
Instead, what axiom A.13-G is intended to articulate is that an agent, like an end user can apply 
arbitrary hierarchies that facilitate two important activities: 
1. Exploration of the aggregate’s contextual mass by creating arbitrary groupings within it 
(e.g., grouping items by date, topic, etc.) as is demonstrably done by library OPAC faceted 
search features and,  
2. Creating new bibliographic aggregates from portions of old bibliographic aggregates as 
is demonstrably done by collection building tools like those provided by the HathiTrust 
digital library (see https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/mb?a=listcs&colltype=featured). 
 
Equally important is that axiom A.13-G does not exist in a vacuum from the other axioms used to 
describe bibliographic aggregates. It is true that it provides an alternate view of bibliographic 
aggregates than axiom A.12-G but, the provided view must still obey the limitations established 
for Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relationship (i.e., the is-gathered-into 
relationship). Of these limitations, we have already discussed one in section 4.3.3. through axiom 
A.22’ and we discuss the other fully in section 4.3.8. below (where we will re-examine axiom 




With regards to axiom A.13-G, we can see that axiom A.22’ (reproduced in the footnotes for 
convenience49) implies that there is a minimal unit which is aggregated by a bibliographic 
aggregate.50 Thereby, there are limitations to what kinds of entities can actually be included in the 
hierarchy.51 For example, if our class Y is the class of “anthologies” (i.e., “anthology”) and our 
class X is the class of “short stories” (i.e., “short story”) then it is not the case that we can arbitrarily 
divide the instances of the class of “short story” so that they were in effect instances of the class 
of “half of a short story” and so on and so forth and in effect create an infinite number of sub-
anthologies out of our initial anthology.  
 
However, we should also note that nothing would prevent us from adding additional classes to 
axiom A.22’. We could thusly add the class of “half of a short story” and facilitate the creation of 
additional combinatorials producing sub-anthologies. The limitation is that we in effect must name 
(and in essence, number) the classes whose instances are valid members of any putative hierarchy 
that we can build by employing axiom A.13-G. In practice, we might expect such an expansion of 
classes to be used to name similar but distinct entity types that are allowed to participate as 
members of a bibliographic aggregate rather than finer-grained portions of an already named 
                                                 
49 A.22’ (Collection-Inclusive Homogeneous Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)�  →
∃𝑋𝑋∃𝑌𝑌 ���𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑌𝑌)�  ∨ �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑌𝑌)  ∧
 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑌𝑌)�  ∨  �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑌𝑌)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧,𝑌𝑌)�  ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧)��� 
50 There are actually a number of more general implications from this axiom for the entire mereological approach on the whole but, as we are 
focused on bibliographic aggregates here we do not discuss them beyond the mention in this footnote as they require a more philosophy-oriented 
context to discuss more fully (i.e., further discussion is simply out-of-scope here and one imagines would require an entire dissertation or similar 
effort to give adequate treatment to). 
51 We should note that this is also an issue for Bittner and Donnelly’s analysis that provides something of a counter-example since they in part are 
missing an axiom like axiom A.22’ and in part because they do not discuss the interaction between density and the NSIP concept discussed in 
section 4.3.8 below. 
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entity type. For example, we might expand a version of axiom A.22’ designed expressly to model 
anthologies with classes for novelettes and novellas such that an anthology comprises a 
combination of short stories, novelettes, novellas, and (sub)-combinations (i.e., sub-anthologies) 
of instances of these three classes. 
 
Since it is always going to be the case that we can apply additional grouping criteria to a collection 
(within the limitations set forth by axiom A.22’ and axiom A.15-G [below]), there seem to be no 
valid instances where we cannot apply an arbitrary hierarchy to it. Hence, we are not in a position 
to reject axiom A.13-G. This is important because density is not a metaproperty the Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann’s containment relationship possesses. Recall that its lack of density was 
one of the hallmarks that Bittner and Donnelly (2005) used to showcase the containment 
relationship’s difference from the componenthood relationship. In the same way, since the is-
gathered-into relationship does seem to necessarily evince this metaproperty then we can no longer 
propose that collection membership is a specialized version of the containment relation. As this is 
the case, and since the is-gathered-into relationship also necessarily possesses the metaproperty of 
separability which the componenthood relationship lacks, it is clear that the is-gathered-into 
relationship (i.e., Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s collection membership relation) is a distinct 
relationship from both the containment and componenthood relationships. 
 
4.3.7. Overlapping Collection Members 
The next question to consider is whether or not the members of collections partially overlap with 
one another. At first, it does not seem very likely that collections have overlapping items. However, 




One example [of item overlap] is of an Art Nouveau vase, Vaas met pauwen en 
bladeren, delivered by the Rijksmuseum to Europeana. [Vaas met pauwen en 
bladeren is aggregated into a virtual exhibition on Art Nouveau.] As part of the data 
aggregation process the vase is represented as a new Europeana object, which is 
then featured in a Europeana Pinterest Board dedicated to Art Nouveau cultural 
heritage objects focusing on the theme of Nature. Later, this Pinterest Board 
aggregated in the [same] virtual exhibition on Art Nouveau.—Valentine Charles, 
2017.52  
 
From this example, it seems clear that, especially for digital objects, it can be the case that one can 
gather the same item into a single collection on separate occasions. In the example above, the vase, 
or more precisely an image of it, is first gathered into both a virtual exhibition and a Pinterest 
Board. Later the Pinterest Board is gathered into the virtual exhibition. Two collections, the virtual 
exhibition and the Pinterest Board, partially overlap through the vase’s image. It does not seem to 
be the case that the is-gathered-into relationship possesses the no-partial-overlap (NPO) 
metaproperty. At this point, we can also definitively say that the is-gathered-into relationship is a 
distinct relationship from the component-of relationship as components do not overlap with one 
another. 
 
4.3.8. Immediate Predecessors and Immediate Successors 
For Bittner and Connelly, the consideration of how many components a whole has and how many 
wholes a single component can be a part of is vital to any analysis of components and wholes. It 
                                                 
52 This text was provided as part of a still unpublished article on bibliographic aggregates that compares the FRBR and LRM models. 
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is important to them that anything that has components, always has at least two of them. It is 
equally important to them is that components are not shared by wholes. They develop two meta-
properties to help them enforce these rules: no-single-immediate-predecessor (NSIP) and single-
immediate-successor (SIS). An axiom for NSIP appears below. In layman’s terms it simply states 
that all collections have at least two members. 
 
A.15-G (NSIP Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
 ∃𝑧𝑧(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧,𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~𝑥𝑥 = 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
Axiom A.15-G states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is immediately-gathered-into entity y 
then there exists some entity z such that entity z is immediately-gathered-into entity y and entities 
x and z are not the same entity. 
 
If we accept axiom A.15-G, then the NSIP metaproperty would entail that all collections have at 
least two members. While content management systems (which treat collections as though they 
were sets) and some library scholars speak of collections with single (or even no) members, we 
wonder if such concepts have any value beyond aligning collection models with set models.  
 
Since Wickett, Renear, and Furner (2011) note in their findings that collections are not sets, and 
since we have shown that the is-gathered-into relationship has the metaproperty of being transitive, 
there seems to be no advantage in accepting a view of collections that promotes single-item or 
empty collections. 
 
Indeed, we know from sources like Palmer (2004) and Palmer, Zavalina, and Fenlon (2010) that 
researchers (and likely all users) benefit from the unified context that a collection of multiple items 
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brings into existence by being gathered together. Palmer and her collaborators call this unified 
context, contextual mass. We suspect that this notion of contextual mass both matches our 
commonsense understanding of collections and generalizes beyond the specific thematic research 
collections that Palmer et al. are examining.  
 
We suspect this because of the existence of aphorisms like, “The whole is more than the sum of 
its parts.” It is frequently difficult to qualify, let alone quantify what the moreness resulting from 
gathering things together is. However, we can best preserve our commonsense intuitions about this 
moreness by accepting that the is-gathered-into relationship possesses the NSIP metaproperty and 
not rejecting axiom A.15-G.  
 
Accepting that axiom A.15-G holds true for collectives has additional implications for axiom A.13-
G. Specifically, when axiom A.15-G is true then axiom A.13-G necessarily fails when we name 
the collective as the sub-collective and sole member of that collective. This would also violate 
axiom A.6-G (collective membership is an irreflexive relationship) as the collective and its sub-
collective are identical in this case. We can interpret this as a pragmatic limiting factor on the 
number of possible arbitrary hierarchies that can be produced through axiom A.13-G. This number 
is directly proportional to the number of members in a collection. In the case where a collective 
has only the minimum number of members required by axiom A.15-G then we can see that there 
are no combinatorials which are valid for axiom A.13-G. Every possible combinatorial either 




Thereby, the minimum number of members required for a collective before we can even begin to 
apply axiom A.13-G is three. If we name the members of our collective as A, B, and C then we 
can see it is only possible to produce four hierarchies: the given hierarchy where the collective’s 
members are named A, B, and C (per axiom A.12-G; i.e., the discrete hierarchy) and the three 
putative hierarchies we can create using axiom A.13-G. 
• Putative Collective 1 with members: A and sub-collective B-C (with members B and C) 
• Putative Collective 2 with members: B and sub-collective A-C (with members A and C) 
• Putative Collective 3 with members: C and sub-collective A-B (with members A and B) 
 
It is possible for the number of combinatorials to grow very quickly. A collective (i.e., a 
bibliographic aggregate) like the HathiTrust digital library’s corpus has (at the time of writing) a 
discrete hierarchy (per axiom A.12-G) of some 17 million members and thereby possesses a 
number putative hierarchies somewhere around 3.5 x 1049 according to axiom A.13-G (as 
constrained by axioms A.22’ and A15-G). Obviously, where an axiom like axiom A.12-G directly 
informs the kind of metadata we want to record, axioms like A.13-G and A.15-G speak more 
towards specific functionalities we would want bibliographic aggregate-oriented user systems 
(like OPACs) to support. For instance, if a user wants to craft a digital collection of their own from 
a digital library’s corpus they should be required to group at least two items of interest together in 
order to build their digital collection (so as not to violate axiom A.15-G). Similarly, we want our 
system to support the ability of users to build arbitrary hierarchies from the existing corpus as an 
aid in crafting their own digital collections (or to refine their search results, etc.) but, since it is 
going to be both computationally challenging and resource intensive to represent the myriad 
putative hierarchies that exist under the purview of axiom A.13-G we should not capture the a 
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priori metadata that describes these putative hierarchies. Instead, it is better to support recording 
the metadata for those instances that users determine are specifically of interest to them (and which 
are likely to number in much more manageable orders of magnitude than the true number of 
putative instances for any given corpus). 
 
With regard to the SIS metaproperty, the example given by Valentine Charles (in Section 4.3.7 
above) neatly showcases that, in fact, it can be the case, especially for digital objects, that overlap 
between collections that an item is gathered into can and does occur. And so, the SIS metaproperty 
is not one that the is-gathered-into relationship necessarily possesses. Since we lack clear cases 
showing a need for further analysis, we will not propose an axiom for SIS simply to reject. 
 
4.3.9. Initial Findings 
At this point we can produce a table (Table 4.2 below) that showcases the metaproperties possessed 
by the is-gathered-into relation. Notice that Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s is-gathered-into 
relationship has all of the same metaproperties that Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of 
relationship possesses. 
 
From this analysis, we can conclude that not only is Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s is-gathered-
into (collection membership) not the same as the set-member-of (ZFC set membership) relation, 
but also that it is exactly the same, with regard to metaproperties, as Winston, Chaffin, and 
Herrmann’s member-of (membership) relation.  
 
The only clear distinction between the is-gathered-into and member-of relationships that we can 
potentially draw is one of scope. Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann are speaking in general about 
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all types of collections (or collectives as we have been saying) while Wickett, Renear, and Furner 
are focused more narrowly on “curated” collections.53  
 
Table 4.2: Collection Membership (isGatheredInto) Relationship Metaproperties 
Metaproperty member-of is-gathered-into 
Reflexive - - 
Irreflexive + + 
Symmetrical - - 
Asymmetrical + + 
Antisymmetrical + + 
Transitive + + 
Dense + + 
Discrete + + 
NPO - - 
NSIP + + 
SIS - - 
Separable + + 
Homeogeneous + + 
 
 
A key consideration is whether or not we would say that the forest example that Winston, Chaffin, 
and Herrmann give could be considered “curated.” At first, we might be tempted to reject the 
notion that a forest is actually a “curated” collection but consider the trees at the forest’s edge. 
There is certainly some amount of distance from some imaginary boundary after which some agent 
describing the forest decides which trees are within the forest and which trees are outside of the 
forest. Under no circumstances will it be the case that the forest will tell us such information of its 
own accord. Which trees are within the forest and which trees are outside of the forest is a result 
of a curatorial decision that some decision-making agent (i.e., a “curator”) has made. 
 
                                                 
53 Their intent, and Dublin Core’s, is likely to only remark upon cultural heritage and scientific collections (including data collections), but 
nothing in their analysis or the Dublin Core definitions actually requires or implies that the is-gathered-into actually has so narrow a scope. 
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Hence, we conclude that all of Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s findings generalize to the cases that 
Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann were examining, and the is-gathered-into relationship is 
precisely the same as the member-of relation. 
 
4.4. Aggregates in the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Entities 
4.4.1. FRBR Aggregate Model 
In this next section, we examine the mereological aggregate model set forth in IFLA’s Functional 
Requirements for Bibliographic Entities (FRBR) conceptual model (1998). Through our analysis 
we will consider whether or not FRBR’s aggregating relation, part-of, is actually related to the is-
gathered-into relation.  
 
FRBR is a high-level bibliographic conceptual model. Revised by IFLA in 2009, the FRBR 
standard sets forth an aggregate model that is both simple and easy to use. Unlike DC-CAP’s 
agnostic collection model (2007), the FRBR model clearly links its aggregate model to four 
primary entities—work, expression, manifestation, and item. Together, these four entities comprise 
FRBR’s Work-Expression-Manifestation-Item (WEMI) model. This model is a response to and an 
extension of the kinds of content-artifact conceptualizations that Verona (1959), Wilson (1968), 
and Lubetzky (1969) were all remarking upon. 
 
An important factor for FRBR’s aggregate models is that aggregates never comprise entities that 
cross the boundaries between the WEMI entities. Or, as the IFLA author group of FRBR tells us: 
 
“For the purposes of the model, entities at the aggregate or component level operate 
in the same way as entities at the integral unit level.” – IFLA 1998, p 29. 
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Thus, works compose aggregate works, expressions compose aggregate expressions, 
manifestations compose aggregate manifestations, and items compose aggregate items. 
Consequently, any analysis of FRBR’s aggregates relies upon formalization of the WEMI model 
and its relationships if for no other reason than to demonstrate that FRBR’s model for 
bibliographic aggregates actually operates at the levels of bibliographic extension proposed by 
WEMI. These are exactly like Tillett’s “container” and “abstract” part/whole relationships (1987). 
 
Fortunately, formalization of WEMI has already been described by Wickett and Renear (2009). 
They approach the formalization from what might be thought of as a constructivist point of view, 
rooted from the most abstract entity, FRBR’s work, and building up to the most concrete entity, 
FRBR’s item, using three relationships: realizes, embodies, and exemplifies. 
 
4.4.2. Formal Account of FRBR WEMI Model   
Wickett and Renear set forth the following three formal definitions (D.12-D.14) in their account 
of the constructed WEMI entities. 
 
The first definition tells us that if something realizes a work, then that something is an 
expression. 
    
D.12 (FRBR Expressions Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 




D.13 (FRBR Manifestations Defined): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
The third definition tells us that if something exemplifies a manifestation, then that something is 
an item.  
    
D.14 (FRBR Items Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Only the three relationships (realizes, embodies, and exemplifies) and the work entity are taken to 
be primitive by the formal analysis here. 
  
As Wickett and Renear go on to point out, “there is an existence dependency between each defined 
entity type and the entity type that appears in its definition.” - [p 4]. The implication of this 
formalization is that while there might exist unrealized works, unembodied expressions, and 
unexemplified manifestations, every item has a corresponding chain of manifestation-expression-
work that it is directly related to. 
 
Wickett and Renear also formalize the one-to-many cardinality restraints set forth by the WEMI 
model with regard to the realizes and exemplifies relationships for their analysis (p 5). We reprise 
them here in axioms A.24 and A.25 below. 
 
The first axiom tells us that an expression realizes exactly one work. 
 
A.24 (Realization Relationship Cardinality): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)�  → (𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧)� 
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The second axiom tells that an item exemplifies exactly one manifestation. 
 
A.25 (Exemplification Relationship Cardinality): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)�  → (𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
As Wickett and Renear say of the embodies relation, “a many-to-many relationship may be 
view[ed] as unconstrained in terms of its cardinality, there is no corresponding cardinality axiom 
for the embodiment relationship.” -- [p 5]. The embodies relationship occupies a special place in 
the WEMI model. Its implications give rise to IFLA’s new Library Reference Model’s aggregate 
model (Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017). A much fuller analysis of the embodies relationship 
appears below. 
 
Next, Wickett and Renear provide additional axioms (A.26-A.28) formalizing the domain and 
range of each of the three relationship primitives which I reprise here: 
 
This first axiom states that only expressions realize something, and they only realize works. 
 
A.26 (Domain & Range of Realization): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧
 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
This next axiom states that only manifestations embody something, and they only embody 
expressions. 
 
A.27 (Domain & Range of Embodiment): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →




This third axiom states that only items exemplify something, and they only exemplify 
manifestations. 
 
A.28 (Domain & Range of Exemplification: ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
As Wickett and Renear point out, given axioms A.26-A.28, the final clause of each of the 
definitions D.12-D.14 is redundant and can be removed, simplifying definitions D.12-D.14 into 
the definitions below (D.12’, D.13’, and D.14’). 
 
The first revised definition tells us that if something realizes anything, then that something is an 
expression. 
 
D.12’ (Expressions Redefined): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
The second revised definition tells us that if something embodies anything, then that something 
is a manifestation. 
 
D.14’ (Manifestations Redefined): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
The final revised definition tells us that if something exemplifies anything, then that something is 
an item. 
 




Finally, Wickett and Renear provide three final axioms formalizing the assumption that the WEMI 
entities are disjoint from one another based upon discussions of the WEMI entities at that time 
(e.g., Tillet 2005). They are reprised here as axioms A.29-A.31: 
 
The first axiom tells us that works are not the same as expressions, manifestations, or items. 
 
A.29 (Work Disjointness): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  → ~�𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∨
 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∨  𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
The second axiom tells us that expressions are not the same as works, manifestations, or items. 
 
A.30 (Expression Disjointness): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  → ~�𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  ∨
 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∨  𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
The third axiom tells us that manifestations are not the same as works, expressions, or items. 
 
A.31 (Manifestation Disjointness): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  → ~�𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  ∨
 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∨  𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)�� 
 
While this trio of axioms seems incomplete because there is no corresponding axiom for items, as 
Wickett and Renear point out (p. 6), if x is an item then as entailed by axioms A.29-A.31, x cannot 
be a work, expression, or manifestation.54 So, an additional axiom formalizing the entailment 
would be redundant. 
 
                                                 
54 It seems likely that axioms A.73 and A.74 could also be reduced for the same reasons but we do not labor to do that here. 
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4.4.3. Formal Analysis of FRBR Aggregates 
Having accepted a particular formalization of the WEMI model, we will now produce an initial 
formalization of the FRBR aggregate model. 
 
FRBR’s Section 5.3.1.1 (pp 66-8) defines whole/part relationships at the WEMI work level. These 
parts come in two kinds, “dependent parts” (e.g., chapters, sections, issues, illustrations, etc.) and 
“independent parts” (e.g., monographs in a series, journal articles, etc.). 
 
FRBR’s Section 5.3.2.1 (p 71) defines whole/part relationships at the WEMI expression level. 
Like WEMI works, these parts also come in “dependent” and “independent” parts. The examples 
are like those used for works, but with regard to dependent parts, textual objects like tables of 
contents and amendments are said to also be examples of dependent parts in WEMI expressions. 
 
FRBR’s Section 5.3.4.1 (pp 75-6) defines whole/part relationships at the WEMI manifestation 
level. No distinction is made at this level with regard to examples but the text notes, “Physical 
content as represented by [a] manifestation can be divided in much the same way that intellectual 
content can be divided in the case of work and expression” -- p 75. Examples showcased in the 
text include singular volumes from a multi-volume manifestation, the soundtrack for a film on a 
separate medium, and the soundtrack for a film embedded in the film. 
 
Finally, FRBR’s Section 5.3.6.1 (p 78) defines whole/part relationships at the WEMI item level. 
Here again the examples do not detail any dependency or independency, like in the examples at 
the WEMI work and expression levels, but again the text notes that, “Parts of items can be discrete 
components or integral parts” -- p 78. The examples given include the physical components of a 
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copy and the binding of a book. Presumably, these examples encompass the after-market binding 
of journal issues together into bound volumes (or in some cases monographic items containing 
multiple volumes), which is common practice in many academic library settings to aid in their 
long-term preservation and shelving. Note that we don’t believe that the intent was to include 
physical components such as the spine of a book, the end papers, etc., but the focus is on the 
physical section that bears inscriptions that correspond to particular units of media, such as the text 
in a singular volume, the soundtrack for a film, etc. 
 
There is nothing in the text to suggest that there are whole/part relationships existing across 
multiple levels of the WEMI model. Any text supporting their existence is absent from the relevant 
sections describing Work-Expression and Manifestation-Item relationships.  
 
It is also interesting to note that any text supporting the existence of any Expression-Manifestation 
relationships is absent from the FRBR document altogether. It may have been the case that the 
authors believed either that there are no such relationships beyond the embodiment relationship or 
that any such relationships were not important enough to merit inclusion in FRBR. 
 
The representational information relating parts and wholes thereby seems to be unrelated to the 
representational information describing levels of intellectual abstraction (i.e., that something is a 
work, expression, manifestation, or item), beyond the fact that those relationships that we are given 





One might then begin a formal account of bibliographic aggregates by adding an additional 
primitive relationship to those we already have, the binary predicate partOf(x,y). 
 
The account above suggests that a partial definition of aggregates might then be formalized along 
these lines. 
 
D.15 (FRBR Aggregate Definition): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)  ∧
~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.15 states that for all entities x, x is an aggregate, if and only if, there exists an entity 
y such that entity y is part-of entity x and it is not the case that entities x and y are the same entity.   
 
A potential problem with definition D.15 is that part-of as FRBR sets forth might be confused with 
more generic mereological parthood. However, we know from the examples from the sections of 
FRBR cited above, that in actuality, we are dealing with a narrowly-scoped set of aggregates. 
Specifically, we are examining anthologies, collections, journal issues, and bibliographic series, 
or more precisely, we are examining bibliographic aggregates.  
 
Since all of our examples are going to be the same, we have reason to suspect that FRBR’s part-
of relationship (hereafter referred to as bibliographic-part-of [bPartOf] to avoid confusion with 
general mereological parthood) possesses the same or similar metaproperties to the is-gathered-




We know from our examples that we would not normally say that an anthology is 
bibliographically-part-of itself, nor would we say that an anthology is bibliographically-part-of 
any of the short stories that form its parts. Hence, the bibliographically-part-of relationship seems 
to be both irreflexive and asymmetric.  
 
We know from examples of bibliographic series that the articles that are bibliographically-part-of 
a journal issue are also regarded as bibliographically-part-of a journal volume and the journal 
series as a whole. The same is true from the short stories that are bibliographically-part-of an 
anthology which in turn is bibliographically-part-of a monograph series. Jim Butcher’s anthology, 
Side Jobs, is an example of this, as it and the short stories in it are both part of Butcher’s Dresden 
Files series. Hence, the bibliographically-part-of relationship seems to be transitive. 
 
Similarly, we have already established that bibliographic aggregates both already have established 
hierarchies of identifiable members and can have arbitrary hierarchies applied to them. And so, 
the bibliographically-part-of relationship seems to be both discrete and dense in the same manner 
the is-gathered-into relationship was. 
 
As it does not seem to be the case that we call individual short stories anthologies, journal articles 
journal issues, songs albums or items collections, there do not seem to be any instances where 
bibliographic aggregates are empty or possess only one member and so, the bibliographically-




All of the bibliographic parts of our bibliographic aggregates are such that they do not necessarily 
rely on the existence of the bibliographic aggregate for their own existence. Short stories, journal 
articles, songs, and bibliographic objects all exist on their own. Since this is the case, it seems that 
the bibliographically-part-of also possesses the metaproperty of separable. 
 
Finally, all of the bibliographic parts of bibliographic aggregates are all part of their respective 
wholes for some curatorial (or editorial) reason. They are all carefully selected (and in some cases 
arranged) according to a curatorial (or editorial) criterion, which in many cases is set forth, e.g., 
through an accrual policy for instance. Thereby, it seems that the bibliographically-part-of 
relationship possesses the metaproperty of being homogeneous as we have defined it in the 
preceding section. 
 
At this point, the bibliographically-part-of relationship resembles the is-gathered-into relationship 
to a great extent. However, from FRBR’s text we see that its scope is much narrower. The 
homogeneous entities being aggregated are limited to WEMI’s works, expressions, manifestations, 
and items. Let us propose then that the relationship we are speaking of is actually a narrower sense 
of Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s is-gathered-into relation.  
 
We will begin our formalization by noting that it is a sub-class of the is-gathered-into relation. 
 
A.32 (Bibliographic Parthood as a kind of Collection Membership): 




Axiom A.32 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is bibliographically-part-of entity y then 
it is also the case that entity x is gathered-into entity y. One merit of this axiom is that we can reuse 
the axioms we have already developed for our analysis of the is-gathered-into relation. 
 
For instance, we can adapt axioms A.26-A.28 to communicate the narrower domain and range of 
the bibliographically-part-of relation. 
 
A.33 (Domain & Range of Bibliographic Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
��𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑦𝑦)�  ∨ �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�  ∨
�𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�  ∨ �𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦)��� 
 
Axiom A.33 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is bibliographically-part-of entity y then 
it is also the case that entities x and y are both works, both expressions, both manifestations, or 
both items. 
 
This constrained primitive can be substituted back into definition D.15 to provide a refined version 
of it (and here we introduce a new label for aggregates in our context to differentiate them from 
general mereological cases—“bAggregate” [bibliographic aggregate]): 
 
D.15’ (Bibliographic Aggregates Defined): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥) ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
D.15’ states that for all entities x, entity x is a bibliographic-aggregate, if and only if there exists 
an entity y such that entity y is bibliographically-part-of entity x and it is not the case that entities 




This allows us to produce another table (Table 4.3 below). We will add an additional row to capture 
the narrow domain and range of the bibliographically-part-of relation, calling it “WEMI-
Homogenous.” For clarity’s sake we will remove, with the exception of the is-gathered-into 




Our conclusion here hinges upon whether or not we suspect that there are any reasons to reject 
axiom A.32, which states that the bibliographic-part-of relationship is a sub-property of the is-
gathered-into relation. One potential argument against accepting axiom A.32 is on the grounds 
that some works are dependent works (i.e., we will also reject axiom A.17-G regarding 
separability). Common examples are (so-called) expression-level features of works like indices 
and tables of contents that are commonly held to be dependent on their parent work for their 
existence.  
 
The problem with this line of thought is that, as a text-free conceptual entity, works are not likely 
to be the kind of entity that one can compose an index or table of contents for and so these 
expression-level features are hardly dependent on the work for their existence. If anything, they 












Table 4.3: Bibliographic Parthood (bPartOf) Relationship Metaproperties 
Metaproperty is-gathered-into bibliographically-part-of ZFC-member-of subset-of 
Reflexive - - - - 
Irreflexive + + + + 
Symmetrical - - - - 
Asymmetrical + + + + 
Antisymmetrical + + + + 
Transitive + + - + 
Dense + + + + 
Discrete + + - - 
NPO - - + + 
NSIP + + + + 
SIS - - + + 
Separable + + - - 
Homeogeneous + + - - 




As we know from digital documents and various publication practices (especially among academic 
journals), both indices and tables of contents can be published separately from the bibliographic 
entities they remark upon. And so, it is also not the case that we have any reason to reject axiom 
A.17-G (separability) from our account of the bibliographically-part-of relation.  
 
Since bibliographic aggregates in the FRBR sense are primarily concerned with the gathering of 
the same kinds of things that Wickett, Renear, and Furner were looking at in their examples, and 
none of the counter-examples seem to negate our assumptions, we propose that there is no reason 
to reject axiom A.32 and accept that FRBR’s bibliographically-part-of relationship is, in fact, just 
a narrower version of the is-gathered-into relation.  
 
This greatly simplifies matters as the kinds of aggregates we are examining becomes quite focused 
and narrow. We are limited to things like library collections, archival collections, journal issues, 
monograph series, music compilations, and the like. In the specific case of FRBR, we are also 
somewhat concerned with their representation at the various WEMI models. But since the FRBR 
document has aggregate models at each corresponding level, there is no reason to suspect that any 
unusual problems will occur when selecting and recording metadata for their representation, at 
least not in the general case. When we begin to distinguish the different kinds of bibliographic 
aggregates from one another, we expect that FRBR’s WEMI model will break down as the FRBR-
WGA alludes to in their final report (2011) and as has been shown to be the case for other kinds 
of bibliographic entities (Jonsson 2005, Miller and Le Bœuf 2005, Nicolas 2005, Baca and Clarke 




4.5. Aggregates in Object-Oriented FRBR [FRBROO] 
4.5.1. FRBROO Aggregate Model 
In this final section, we examine the aggregate model set forth by the FRBR harmonization effort 
for CIDOC’s Conceptual Reference Model (CIDOC-CRM)—the Object-Oriented FRBR 
(FRBROO) ontology (Bekiari et al. 2015). Oddly, Bekiari et al. do not employ CIDOC-CRM’s 
existing E78 (Collection) entity for the purposes of modeling aggregates in FRBROO. We speculate 
that this might be because E78 (Collection) is defined in the following manner:  
 
“This class comprises aggregations of instances of E18 Physical Thing that are 
assembled and maintained (“curated” and “preserved,” in museological 
terminology) by one or more instances of E39 Actor over time for a specific 
purpose and audience, and according to a particular collection development plan.” 
– Le Bœuf et al. 2018, p 166.55 
 
The implication here is that Collections in the CIDOC-CRM sense are made up physical objects. 
Since after-market binding of journal issues into book format for better long-term shelving and 
storage is an extremely common practice in (especially academic) library settings, E78’s absence 
from FRBROO is all the more remarkable. Given increasing evidence that metadata representing 
after-market bindings plays a valuable role in statistical analysis of digitized text, the absence of a 
ready method for capturing metadata at the FRBR item-level demonstrates at least one advantage 
that the FRBR aggregate model we analyzed in the previous section enjoys over the FRBROO 
aggregate model.  
 
                                                 
55 We should note that as of the 6th version of CIDOC-CRM, E78’s label has been changed from “Collection” to “Curated Holding.” 
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We might also remark that one easily extendable method to produce an aggregate model for FRBR-
compliant bibliographic aggregates has been passed over. 
 
Confusing the matter are the kinds of things which might be aggregates from FRBROO’s point of 
view. The FRBROO standard has several candidate aggregate entities which include: 
   
• F1 (Work) – can comprise multiple works 
• F2 (Expression) – can comprise multiple expressions 
• F14 (Individual Work) – can comprise multiple works 
• F15 (Complex Work) – always comprises multiple works 
• F16 (Container Work) – always comprises multiple works 
• F17 (Aggregation Work) – representing the intellectual effort of aggregating56 
• F18 (Serial Work) – always comprises multiple works 
• F19 (Publication Work) – can comprise multiple works 
• F20 (Performance Work) – can comprise multiple works 
• F22 (Self-Contained Expression) – can comprise multiple expressions 
• F25 (Performance Plan) – can comprise multiple expressions 
 
Examining this list of potential aggregate entity types, we should perhaps not be surprised that E78 
(Collection) was excluded. It would seem that the editors of FRBROO believe that only 
bibliographic aggregates at the FRBR work and FRBR expression levels need to be modeled. 
                                                 
56 Included in this list because it uses the word “aggregation.” 
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We have some reason to believe then, that the aggregation relationships that FRBROO sets forth 
narrower versions of the is-gathered-into relationship and perhaps even of the bibliographic-part-
of relationship analyzed in the previous section. After all, we are once again limited to things like 
anthologies, collections, journal issues, monograph series, music compilations, and the like. 
 
As FRBROO provides a much narrower account of bibliographic aggregates (hereafter referred to 
as the FRBROO account) several of the candidate entities (F1 and F14) can seemingly be dismissed 
out of hand since the focus in the FRBROO documentation is focused aggregating FRBR’s Works 
into aggregate FRBR Expressions. Despite this, several candidate entities remain at the work level.  
 
4.5.2. Formal Analysis 
The text of FRBROO is silent with regard to the specifics of F2 (Expression) acting as an aggregate 
entity. It does, however, provide details on aggregation through the last candidate entity F22 (Self-
Contained Expression). Here, an example from FRBROO is helpful. “The Italian text of Dante’s 
textual work entitled ‘Divina Commedia’ (F22) R5 has component the Italian text of Dante’s 
textual work entitled ‘Inferno’ (F22)” – p 74. The implication is that a specialized relationship 
hasComponent (R5) is used in cases where the aggregate Expression realizes comprises multiple 
individual “components.” We can formally analyze this through an additional axiom (A.34). 
  
A.34 (Expression Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.34 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x has-component entity y then it is also the 




However, this is a very different sense of componenthood than we have hitherto postulated. Using 
our pre-existing notion of componenthood (see Chapter 3), we would normally understand it to be 
the case that the symbols that comprise words are (functional) components of an expression (vis-
à-vis, expressions are textual objects). But it is not typically the case that any arbitrary symbol 
removed from its context can be said to realize a work, in whole or in part. So, the symbols that 
comprise the words that form an expression are not expressions in and of themselves. Hence, 
FRBROO’s R5 (hasComponent) relationship is not a componenthood relationship at all. 
 
Going back to the example that FRBROO’s authors give us, it is clear that the R5 relation’s purpose 
is much the same as FRBR’s bibliographic-part-of relation. The R5 relationship groups together 
expressions into composite expressions where the author of a work has intended that they be 
grouped together.  Since the R5 relationship behaves in a similar manner to FRBR’s bibliographic-
part-of relation, it is extremely likely that it evinces all of the same metaproperties that FRBR’s 
bibliographic-part-of possesses. To avoid confusion between FRBROO’s R5 relationship and our 
previously established formalization of the has-component relation, we will coin a new label for 
FRBROO’s R5 relation—has-expression-component.57 
 
Just by examining the example of Dante’s Divine Commedia, we can see that R5 is both irreflexive 
and asymmetric, as it is not the case that Dante’s Divine Commedia is a component of itself, nor 
is it the case that Dante’s Inferno has-expression-component Dante’s Divine Commedia (as it is 
the opposite case that would be true). Hence the R5 relationship is both irreflexive and asymmetric. 
                                                 
57 Note though, we are only continuing to use the “component” label because FRBROO uses it. The relationship itself is quite probably a version 
of Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relationship and not the component-of relationship at all. 
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Dante’s Inferno is itself divided into 34 cantos. Since each canto is itself a unique block of content, 
we might refer to them directly as expression-components of Dante’s Divine Commedia (e.g., 
Dante’s Divine Commedia has-expression-component Dante’s Inferno Canto X). As in our 
previous cases, we have no reason to believe that R5 is not transitive. Since there is a readily 
identifiable entity hierarchy in the aggregation, R5 is also discrete. We can also apply arbitrary 
groupings (as has been done in the Wikipedia article describing the Dante’s Inferno),58 and so R5 
is also dense. As we noted, we can easily separate the various parts of the Divine Commedia from 
one another without damaging their individual existence or the existence of Dante’s Divine 
Commedia itself, and so R5 is separable. Finally, this entire discussion would make little sense if 
there were not at least 2 portions of the Divine Commedia for us to link together with R5, thereby 
we should treat R5 as NSIP. 
 
R5 is also clearly homogeneous since it is limited in scope with regard to its domain and range. In 
fact, the R5 relationship possesses a narrower sense of homogeneity than FRBR’s bibliographic-
part-of relation. We can express this narrower sense of homogeneity through the following axiom.  
 
A.35 (Domain and Range of R5): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.35 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x has-expression-component entity y, then 
it is also the case that both entities x and y are expressions (in the FRBR sense). 
 
                                                 
58 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inferno_(Dante)  
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Because axiom A.35 is a narrower version of axiom A.33, and because FRBROO’s has-expression-
component relationship possesses all of the same metaproperties as FRBR’s bibliographic-part-
of, it follows that has-expression-component is actually a narrower sense of bibliographic-part-of. 
In turn, because bibliographic-part-of is a narrower sense of is-gathered-into, it trivially follows 
from A.32, that has-expression-component is also a narrower sense of is-gathered-into. We can 
express these outcomes through the following theorems. 
 
T.2 (Expression Componenthood as Bibliographic Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Theorem T.2 trivially follows from the combination of axioms A.32 and A.35. Theorem T.2 
states that for all entities x and y, if entity x has-expression-component entity y, then it is also the 
case that entity y is bibliographically-part-of entity x. 
 
T.3 (Expression Componenthood as Collection Membership): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Theorem T.3 trivially follows from the combination of axiom A.32 and theorem T.2. Theorem T.3 
states that for all entities x and y, if entity x has-expression-component entity y, then it is also the 
case that entity y is gathered-into entity x. 
 
If we accept that axioms A.34 and A.35 and theorems T.2 and T.3 are true, then it follows that one 
view of FRBROO’s sense of bibliographic aggregates might be formalized via the following 
definition. 
 
D.15-EC (Bibliograpgic Aggregrates defined as Aggregate Expressions): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
168 
 
Definition D.15-EC states that for all entities x, it is the case that entity x is a bibliographic 
aggregate, if and only if there exists some entity y such that entity x has-expression-component 
entity y and entities x and y are not the same entity. 
 
Definition D.15-EC suffices to account for aggregate expressions in the FRBROO sense. However, 
additional candidate aggregate entities exist at FRBR’s work level. The next one for this analysis 
is FRBROO’s Complex Work (F15) entity.  
  
The Complex Work entity is the complement to the aggregate expression that has just been 
described. It links an aggregate work to other works that comprise it. It links very closely to the 
kind of aggregate expression that is defined in definition D.15-EC in a complementary way. Here 
again we are given the example of Dante’s Inferno. In Bekiari et al.’s own words, “Dante’s textual 
work entitled ‘Divina Commedia’ (F15) R10 has member Dante’s textual work entitled ‘Inferno’ 
(F15)” – pp 76-7. The implication here is that another specialized relationship is used to aggregate 
multi-part works (potentially unrealized) together.  
  
It would be necessary to do some conceptual gymnastics to fully align this relationship with the 
earlier expression-level use case but, as Bekiari et al. tell us, “This property [R10] associates an 
F2 Expression X with a structural component Y that conveys in itself the complete concept of a 
work that is member of (R10) the overall work realized by X” – p 74. It is important to note that 
hasMember (R10) does not directly associate an Expression (F2) with a Complex Work (F15). 
Rather the hasMember (R10) relationship links a Work (F1) that is realized by an Expression (F2) 
with the Complex Work (F15) that is realized by an “aggregate” Expression (F2). 
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Here FRBROO seems to be ascribing to the formal definition set forth by Wickett and Renear in 
definition D.31’ and thereby establishes a model for two things: 
 
• Works realized by corresponding expressions (aggregate and otherwise) and, 
• Unrealized aggregate works. 
   
For our formalization of the FRBROO account to be complete, we must extend definition D.35 to 
encompass both aggregate expressions and aggregate works.  
 
Bekiari et al.’s use of Dante’s Inferno indicates that FRBROO’s R10 relationship serves the same 
purpose as the R5 relationship (has-expression-component). Even though Bekiari et al. use 
language that describe the member works as “structural components” for a complex work, the label 
used—has-member—seems more correct (since the is-gathered-into relationship was shown to be 
the same as Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relationship in the first section of this 
chapter). To differentiate the R10 relationship from our existing (Winstonian) membership 
relation, we will apply the following label to R10—has-work-member. 
 
Since, as we noted, R10 serves the exact same purpose as R5, using the exact same examples, we 
have no reason not to accept that R10 is also irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, discrete, dense, 
separable, NSIP, and homogeneous. It also possesses all of the same metaproperties as FRBR’s 
bibliographic-part-of relation. The primary difference between FRBROO’s R5 and R10 
relationships is with regard to their domain and range. Whereas the R5 relationship is a 
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homogeneous relationship with respect to expressions, the R10 relationship is homogenous with 
respect to works. We can use the following axiom and theorems to showcase this.  
 
A.37 (Domain and Range of R10): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.37 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x has-work-member entity y, then it is the 
case that entity x is a complex-work and entity y is a work.  
 
As was the case with the R5 relationship (has-expression-component), the R10 (has-work-
member) relationship is not a kind of componenthood relation. We can demonstrate that this is 
the case when we consider that characters, settings, and climaxes are all (functional or structural) 
components of a work but are not typically considered to be works in and of themselves. We 
should note, though, that axiom A.37 does not prevent entity y from being a complex-work itself.  
 
Like the R5 relation, the R10 relationship is actually a specialization of FRBR’s bibliographic-
part-of relation. In turn, it is also trivially the case that the R10 relationship is also a 
specialization of the is-gathered-into relation. We can express this through the following 
theorems which follow from axioms A.32, A.33, and A.37. 
 
T.4 (Work Membership as Bibliographic Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Theorem T.4 is a trivial consequence of the combination of axioms A.33 and A.37. Theorem T.4 
states that for all entities x and y, if entity x has-work-member entity y, then it is also the case that 
entity y is bibliographically-part-of entity x. 
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T.5 (Work Membership as Collection Membership): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Theorem T.5 is a trivial consequence of the combination of axiom A.32 with theorem T.4. 
Theorem T.5 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x has-work-member entity y, then it is also 
the case that entity y is gathered-into entity x. 
 
From axiom A.37 and theorems T.4 and T.5, we can now craft an initial formalization to define 
Complex Works through means of the hasWorkMember relationship. 
 
D.16 (Complex Works Defined): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦�ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧  ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
   
Definition D.16 states that for all entities x, entity x is a complex-work, if and only if it is the case 
that there exists some entity y, such that entity x has-work-member entity y, and it is not the case 
that entities x and y are the same entity. 
 
It seems unclear at first if this bibliographic object, Complex Work is, in fact, a bibliographic 
aggregate. It is important to recall the intention of Complex Work is to represent works that are 
intended to be aggregate works by their creators, e.g., Dante’s ‘Divine Commedia.’ In this case, it 
seems safe to equate Complex Works with bibliographic aggregates. We can represent this using 
the following axiom. 
 





Axiom A.38 states that for all entities x, if entity x is a complex work then it is also the case that 
entity x is a bibliographic aggregate. 
   
We can use axiom A.38 to rework our definition for complex works into one that defines 
bibliographic aggregates. 
  
D.15-WM (Complex Works Redefined as Bibliographic Aggregates): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦∃𝑧𝑧�ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
The next candidate aggregate entity in FRBROO is Container Work (F16). The label that Bekiari 
et al. have used here would normally indicate that the entity is an aggregate of some kind in 
ordinary English. However, the text of FRBROO makes it clear that our ordinary everyday concept 
of “container” is not what the FRBROO authors intend. Instead the give us the rejoinder that: 
  
“This class is an ‘abstract class,’ in that it only serves as an umbrella for its three 
subclasses. As a consequence, it can only be instantiated by instances of any of its 
subclasses: nothing can be an instance of it, unless it is an instance of either F17 
Aggregation Work, F19 Publication Work, or F20 Performance Work.” – Bekiari 
et al, p 54. 
   
The implication here is that Container Work (F16) is an abstraction which serves only to 
conceptually link Aggregation Works (F17), Publication Works (F19), and Performance Works 
(F20) together into a class/subclass hierarchy, i.e., it isn’t actually a container and so the 




As such, an instance of Container Work (F16) can only be viewed as an aggregate entity if an 
instance of any of its subclasses is an aggregate entity. Considering each of Container Work's (F16) 
subclasses in turn, we will see that none of them could be interpreted as bibliographic aggregates 
in and of themselves.  
  
Bekiari et al. define Aggregation Work (F17) as, a work that, “comprises works whose essence is 
the selection and/or arrangement of expressions of one or more other works” – p 54. They go on 
to say that, “This does not make the contents of the aggregated expressions part of this work, but 
only part of the resulting expression” – p 54. The implication is that F17 captures only the 
intellectual effort of the act of aggregating and therefore is not an aggregate entity of its own 
accord.  
  
Bekiari et al. define Publication Work (F19) as a work that “comprises works that have been 
planned to result in a manifestation product type or an electronic publishing service and that pertain 
to the rendering of expressions from other works” – p 55. At first it is not clear how this is to be 
interpreted but the examples tellingly all begin with the noun, “concept.” The implication here too, 
is that F19 only captures the intellectual effort of designing a manifestation of one or more works. 
  
Bekiari et al. define Performance Work (F20) as a work that “comprises the sets of concepts for 
rendering a particular or a series of like performances” – p 55. The talk of sets makes this entity 
sounds suspiciously aggregate-like, but, Bekiari et al. provide a detailed account of the 




“F20 Performance Work is declared as a subclass of F16 Container Work. This 
implies that the incorporated expressions (such as the text of the staged play, the 
text of the argument for the ballet, the recorded music to be used for the ballet, or 
the content of the musical score to be used for a concert, etc.) are not by themselves 
a part of the expression of this F1 Work. Rather, an expression (F25 Performance 
Plan) of the instructions the stage production, choreography or musical 
performance consists of incorporates (P165) that textual or musical content. In 
other words, the text of ‘Hamlet’ is not a component of the concepts that underlie 
a given mise-en-scène of ‘Hamlet,’ but any staging directions (F25 Performance 
Plan) that convey a given director’s vision of ‘Hamlet’ must necessarily incorporate 
the text of ‘Hamlet.’” – Bekiari et al. pp 55-6. 
 
From this paragraph it is clear that the set of concepts is to be treated as a whole work (i.e., a 
special kind of work) which is realized by a special kind of expression (F25 Performance Plan). 
Since FRBROO’s Performance Plans (F25) are a subclass of FRBROO’s Self-Contained Expressions 
(F22), which in turn are a subclass of FRBROO’s Expressions (F2), we can safely say that definition 
D.35 (which we previously defined) accounts for this very specific case. However, we must also 
note that the relationship through which aggregation occurs with respect to Performance Plans 
(F25) is labeled—incorporates (P165). If we accept that definition D.35 accounts for this usage of 
P165, then we should accept that P165 is also irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, discrete, dense, 




This alternate account of bibliographic aggregation can be modeled by developing an additional 
axiom (below). 
 
A.39 (Domain and Range of Incorporation): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
  
Axiom A.39 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x incorporates entity y, then it is also the 
case that entity x is a performance plan and entity y is an expression. 
 
What axiom A.39 is trying to communicate is that the Performance Plan (F25), a special kind of 
expression, incorporates the contents of other Expressions (F2). However, Bekiari et al. also use 
the incorporates (P165) relationship a second means to aggregate Expressions (F2) and Expression 
Fragments (F23) into Self-Contained Expressions (F22). To accommodate these other use cases 
for the incorporates relationship, axiom A.81 must be broadened to include them. 
 
A.39’ (Expanded Domain and Range of Incorporation): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → ��𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�  ∨
�𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧ �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)  ∨
 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)���� 
 
Axiom A.39’ states that for all entities x and y, if entity x incorporates entity y, then it is the case 
that either entity x is a performance plan and entity y is an expression, or entity x is a self-contained 




Axiom A.39’ can be simplified if one resorts to FRBROO’s class/subclass hierarchy which is 
expressed via the following axioms. 
  
A.40 (Expression Fragments as Expressions): ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)  →
𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Axiom A.40 states that for all entities x, if entity x is an expression fragment, then it is also the 
case that entity x is an expression. 
 
A.41 (Performance Plans as Self-Contained Expressions): 
∀𝑥𝑥�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  → 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)�   
 
Axiom A.41 states that for all entities x, if entity x is a performance plan, then it is also the case 
that entity x is a self-contained expression.  
  
Axioms A.40 and A.41 allow a further revision to A.39’, distilling it down to the simpler form 
expressed below. 
 
A.39’’ (Refined Domain and Range of Incorporation): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)� 
  
Axiom A.39’’ states that for all entities x and y, if entity x incorporates entity y, then it is also the 
case that entity x is a self-contained expression and entity y is an expression. 
   
Once again though, we can see from the examples that have been used, that FRBROO’s 
incorporation relationship matches the R5 relation’s usage. The only substantial difference is a yet 
narrower domain and range. Thereby, we can state that FRBROO’s incorporation relationship is 
actually a narrower sense of FRBROO’s R5 (hasExpressionComponent) relation. It trivially follows 
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that incorporation is also a narrower sense of the gathered-into relation. We can express this 
through the following theorems. 
 
T.6 (Incorporation as Expression Componenthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)� 
 
Theorem T.6 trivially follows from the combination of axioms A.33 and A.39’’. Theorem T.6 
states that for all entities x and y, if entity x incorporates entity y¸ then it is also the case that entity 
x has-expression-component entity y. 
 
T.7 (Incorporation as Collection Membership): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)� 
 
Theorem T.7 trivially follows from the combination of axiom A.32 with theorem T.6. Theorem 
T.7 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x incorporates entity y, then it is also the case that 
entity y is gathered-into entity x. 
 
One potential formalization of this account of bibliographic aggregates might appear as an 
alternate definition for bibliographic aggregates as aggregate expressions. 
 
D.15-I (Alternative Definition of Bibliographic Aggregates as Aggregate 
Expressions): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)��  
 
Definition D.15-I states that for all entities x, entity x is a bibliographic aggregate, if and only if, 
there exists some entity y, such that entity x incorporates entity y and it is not the case that entities 




Given theorem T.6 though, we can see that definition D.15-EC subsumes the conceptual space 
defined by definition D.15-I, and so, definition D.15-I has only been provided here for the sake of 
completeness. 
 
One final candidate aggregate entity remains to be accounted for: FRBROO’s Serial Work (F18). 
Bekiari et al. state that: 
   
“This class comprises works that are, or have been, planned to result in sequences 
of Expressions or Manifestations with common features. Whereas a work can 
acquire new members during the time it evolves, Expressions and Manifestations 
are identified with a certain state achieved at a particular point in time. Therefore[,] 
there is in general no single Expression or Manifestation representing a complete 
serial work, unless the serial work has ended.” – pp 54-5. 
   
It seems clear that that Serial Works are to be understood as a special kind of Complex Work that, 
“may or may not have a plan for an overall expression” – Bekiari et al, p 55. Since plans for 
expressions are captured through FRBROO’s Publication Works (F19), the following axiom can be 
used to situate Serial Works (F18) within the formalization that has already been constructed. 
 
A.42 (Serial Works as Complex Works): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  →
�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  ∧ �𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  ∨ ~𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)���  
 
Axiom A.42 states that for all entities x, if entity x is a serial work, then it is also the case that 
entity x is a complex work and it may also be the case that entity x is or is not a publication work. 
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Since the disjunctive part of axiom A.42 results in a tautology, i.e., it is always the case that x is a 
Publication Work (F19) or not a Publication Work (F19), axiom A.42 can be reduced to the 
following implication: 
 
A.42’ (Serial Works as Complex Works [simplified]): ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  →
𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)�  
 
Axiom A.42’ states that for all entities x, if entity x is a serial work, then it is also the case that 
entity x is a complex work. 
 
As Complex Works have already been described (through axioms A.37, theorems T.4 and T.5, and 
definition D.15-WM), it appears to be the case the Definition D.15-WM adequately accounts for 
FRBROO’s Serial Works (F18). The three FRBROO definitions can be now be merged together to 
provide a singular account of bibliographic aggregates from the FRBROO perspective. 
  
D.15-FBA (FRBROO’s Bibliographic Aggregates Defined): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦 ��ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∨
 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∨  𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)�  ∧ ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Taken altogether, we can now produce a table (Table 4.4 below) that showcases how these three 
FRBROO relationships are situated among their sibling relations. 
 
Once again though, the crux of the analysis rests upon our acceptance of theorems like T.3, T.5, 
and T.7. However, as in FRBR, FRBROO is extremely focused on providing a model for just the 
following kinds of aggregates: collections, anthologies, journal issues, monograph series and 
similar bibliographic aggregates. Since the scope and intent is the same we can see no compelling 
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reason to reject theorems T.3, T.5, and T.7 and find that like FRBR’s bibliographic-part-of 
relationship, FRBROO’s has-expression-component, has-work-member, and incorporates 
relationships are all specialized versions of Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of 
relationship. Which is to say, they are specialized versions of Wickett, Renear, and Furner’s is-
gathered-into relationship, despite the rather misleading labels that FRBROO’s authors have given 
them.  
 
4.5.3. Initial Findings 
Examining Table 4.4 (below) one thing becomes apparent—our intuition that mereological 
aggregate models are independent of concerns regarding specific definitions for bibliographic 
entities that are bibliographic aggregates is mostly correct. We have to say mostly here because 
the FRBROO model lacks support for two of the kinds of things in FRBR’s WEMI model (i.e., 
manifestations and items). It does not appear that Bekiari et al.’s effort to harmonize the FRBR 
and CIDOC-CRM standards was fully successful.  
 
This is of some concern because FRBROO does not support aggregates as the artifact level (i.e., for 
WEMI’s items). Such an outcome is troubling because it would appear to miss half of the 
conceptual conversation that Verona (1959), Wilson (1968), Lubetzky (1969), Svenonius (2000), 
and Smiraglia (2001) were having. Support for bibliographic entities at what WEMI calls the item-
level is a must. The point these authors were all trying to make is that we need a balance between 





Table 4.4: FRBROO Bibliographic Parthood (bPartOf) Relationship Metaproperties 
Metaproperty is-gathered-into bibliographically-part-of has-expression-component incorporates has-work-member 
Reflexive - - - - - 
Irreflexive + + + + + 
Symmetrical - - - - - 
Asymmetrical + + + + + 
Antisymmetrical + + + + + 
Transitive + + + + + 
Dense + + + + + 
Discrete + + + + + 
NSIP + + + + + 
SIS - - - - - 
Separable + + + + + 
Homeogeneous + + + + + 
WEMI-Homogeneous - + - - - 
W-Homoegeneous - - - - + 
E-Homogeneous - - + - - 




We also must note that when we move from the minimal metadata necessary to describe 
bibliographic aggregates in general to the minimal metadata needed to articulate the more specific 
differences among particular kinds of bibliographic aggregates, then we fully expect the 
description process to break down. This is a fatal flaw in the WEMI model and not caused by the 
mereological aggregate model itself. 
 
4.6. Findings on Mereological Aggregate Models 
Despite the incompleteness of the bibliographic aggregate model set forth in FRBROO, we can 
conclude several things which definitively answer research question one, “How comparable are 
the mereological aggregate models used by the standards in our case studies?” They are 
completely comparable. We further note that: 
 
1. All the mereological aggregate models are, in fact, all the same aggregate model. They all 
conform to Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s notion of membership (i.e., they are all 
examples of the member-of relationship). 
 
2. So long as practioners stick to the general case of bibliographic aggregates, then adequate 
basic metadata allowing users to perform FRBR’s find, identify, select, and obtain tasks 
should be achievable, at least within the limitations of the particular bibliographic standard 
they are employing. Where basic metadata is found inadequate to meet these needs, then 
the focus should be on extending the model and not rewriting it to better match intuitions. 
In the case of FRBR and FRBROO, extension will be a difficult process because, as has 
been shown, the WEMI model breaks down when we move from general features of 
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bibliographic entities to more specific features possessed by specific kinds of bibliographic 
entities like video games, serials, series, etc. 
 
3. The FRBROO standard is also clearly deficient in being capable of providing minimal 
metadata for the general case as it only succeeds in harmonizing one half of FRBR’s 
original aggregate model. However, FRBROO has several benefits that can be realized 
through its much clearer semantics and easier to implement ontology,59 which may indicate 
that its detrimental aspects can be overlooked in certain cases where its overall benefits 
outweigh its disadvantage for adequately describing bibliographic aggregates. It remains 
unclear however, if it is possible to manage the flaws in the WEMI model regarding the 
minimal metadata needed for more specific kinds of bibliographic entities. 
 
4. The specifics of what collections, serials, series, compounding entities, or even 
“superworks” (or anthologies, journal issues, music compilations, etc.) are not necessarily 
pertinent for the application of any of these standards as their aggregate models are general 
enough to accommodate all of these bibliographic entities. Even the WEMI model provides 
sufficient minimal metadata for bibliographic entities in general. 
 
The upshot of all of this is that we do not seem to need to come to definitive answers to questions 
that Lagoze and Fielding (1998); Lee (2000, 2005); Antelman (2004); Currall, Moss, and Stuart 
(2004); Gonçalves et al. (2004); Palmer (2004); Palmer et al. (2006); Krier (2008); Galton (2010); 
Yeo (2012); Lee, Jett, and Perti (2015); Jett et al. (2017); Kiryakos and Sugimoto (2018); Sugimoto 
                                                 
59 FRBR is a relatively informal and vague standards document, even by LIS practices. 
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et al. (2018); Lee et al. (2018) are all trying to answer.60 So long as we treat bibliographic 
aggregates as our bibliographic standards suggest, at least for those using the mereological 
aggregate model, then the essential metadata required for users to accomplish FRBR’s user tasks 
can be assured to be included in our IR systems. 
 
Starting from that point, we can ask and consider answers for the questions regarding how each 
specific kind of bibliographic aggregate is distinct from the other, and thereby suggest extensions 
for our standards with additional metadata at various levels along the content-artifact continuum 
that will help users accomplish FRBR’s user tasks better than they already are. However, as we 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the WEMI model almost immediately begins to break down as soon as 
we begin to try extending it with attributes intended to highlight the finer-grained differences 
among different kinds of bibliographic entities. This is also true for specific kinds of bibliographic 
aggregates and, to a great extent, it is the casus belli, the raison d’être for why we even possess 
an alternative to the mereological aggregate model. So, in the case of FRBR and FRBROO, 
extension from the general case to encompass more specific cases necessitates addressing the 
WEMI model’s inherent flaws. 
 
4.7. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we closely examined the mereological aggregate models employed by three high-
level conceptual standards: DC-CAP, FRBR, and FRBROO. Through our analysis we were able to 
show that all of the mereological aggregate models are the same model by virtue of Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relationship, or a sub-property of it, being the core part/whole 
                                                 
60 At least from the point of view of producing a general overarching models for bibliographic entities and bibliographic aggregates. 
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relationship being employed by each of the conceptual standards’ aggregate models. However, we 
also found that the aggregate model employed in the FRBROO standard is an incomplete one since 
it lacks the ability to articulate part/whole differences for artifacts (i.e., the WEMI item-level). 
 
We also noted that while this aggregate model is sufficient for the creation of minimum-level 
bibliographic metadata describing bibliographic aggregates in general, it is also too coarse to 
capture the particular differences between different kinds of bibliographic aggregates (e.g., 
anthologies, digital collections, journal issues, monograph series, etc.). To some extent, a content-
artifact model like the WEMI model should be expected to help make some of these distinctions 
clear; however, in practice the WEMI model has experienced problems when moving from the 
coarse-grained descriptive needs of bibliographic entities in general to the finer-grained 
distinctions required to distinguish particular kinds of bibliographic entities (e.g., video games, 
novels, movies, music albums, etc.) from one another. This situation has led to the development 
of a new kind of aggregate model, one that focuses not on part/whole differences but on content-
artifact differences. 
 
In the next chapter, we closely examine this new aggregate model, which we call the content-
artifact aggregate model, within the context of IFLA’s LRM conceptual standard. LRM is a new 
standard (not yet even two years old at the time this dissertation was written), and it makes a series 





5. Analysis of the Content-Artifact Aggregate Model 
5.1. Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, we are going to closely examine an alternate aggregate model to the one we 
examined in the previous chapter. This alternate aggregate model specifically exploits features of 
the WEMI model, which we have previously noted is a model that describes information objects 
on a continuum from content to artifact, i.e., it is a content-artifact model. Since the alternate 
aggregate model analyzed in this chapter employs features particular to content-artifact models, 
we call this alternate aggregate model the content-artifact aggregate model.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: LRM Aggregate Model 
 
As we noted previously, this model focuses on differences along the content-artifact continuum of 
aspects describing bibliographic entities, i.e., it requires an attendant content-artifact model in 
order for it to be understood. We begin then by discussing how these two models, aggregate model 
and content-artifact model, relate to one another. In this case the primary content-artifact model is 
the WEMI model. However, as we noted in the previous chapter, LRM’s WEMI model is quite 
different than the one originally published with FRBR. Hence, LRM’s WEMI model is also 
analyzed in order to make better sense of LRM’s aggregate model. Through the analysis we are 
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able to argue that the changes to WEMI are significant enough to both invalidate the figure 
typically used to illustrate it (i.e., the Group 1 Entities figure [Figure 5.2 below]) and to cause 
serious deficiencies in LRM’s aggregate model. 
 
5.2. IFLA’s Library Reference Model 
5.2.1. The Content-Artifact Aggregate Model 
The content-artifact aggregate model situates bibliographic aggregates as a particular conceptual 
aspect of a bibliographic entity. Specifically, bibliographic aggregates are equated with WEMI’s 
notion of manifestations (see Figure 5.1 above). A very early form of this kind of model appears 
in Barbara Tillett’s dissertation (1987) in the form of her “extractive” part/whole relationship.61  
 
The earliest forms of the specific version of this model that we are analyzing were published by 
the FRBR-WGA (2011) and Žumer and O’Neill (2012) and specifically defined bibliographic 
aggregates as kinds of WEMI manifestations. Recently though, this model has been codified in 
LRM, which defines an all-new WEMI model, which we call WEMI2 here. As we will see through 
this analysis, WEMI2 has a profound effect when bibliographic aggregates are defined as WEMI2 
manifestations.62 
 
                                                 
61 In Tillett’s case, unlike the one we will closely examine, the aggregate whole is the work and the part is the item. This is an interesting model 
because one thing that it immediately implies is that when a part, like a short story, an article, a photograph from a collection, etc., is separated 
from the whole, it loses some (or perhaps all) of its meaning. This is rather a different state of affairs from the content-artifact aggregate model we 
are about to closely examine. However, we should note, outside of some anecdotal considerations for how serials are represented in MARC records 
(and on catalog cards) this particular conceptualization does not appear in any of our high-level conceptual models (such as FRBR, FRBROO, LRM, 
etc.). 
62 We will also see that there are some interpretations of WEMI2 that are going to find it much more robust than the original WEMI model when 
it comes time for extending LRM to articulate minimal metadata for particular kinds of bibliographic entities like video games, serials, series, etc. 
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While we will still be proposing various axioms, definitions, and theorems to help with our 
analysis, much of the analysis is going to be focused on WEMI2 directly and the illustrative 
diagrams—ER-diagrams—that help us understand it. Thus, the analysis is also going to call on the 
common symbol system employed in ER-diagrams (Chen 1976) to aid in the analysis. However, 
in the end, we will still be examining the roles and participation constraints of the entities and 
relationships in the model. We will see as a result of this analysis that the content-artifact 
aggregate model is extremely sensitive to variations in the definition of WEMI’s manifestation 
and that in the LRM case, the manifestation entity is semantically overloaded. 
 
5.2.2. Bibliographic Entities and FRBR 
The FRBR approach to describing bibliographic entities (IFLA 1998) has become a widely 
accepted one among libraries as evidenced by the general “FRBRization” of library catalogs 
worldwide (Salaba and Zhang 2007) and more recently, the advent of OCLC’s WorldCat Work 
Descriptions (OCLC 2015). It has also made some inroads into conceptual models for entities 
within archives and museums (Nimer and Daines 2013) through conceptual model harmonization 
efforts like FRBROO (Le Bœuf 2012, Bekiari et al. 2015).  
 
Its central model—WEMI—has brought the conceptual tension between content and artifacts 
(Verona 1959, Wilson 1968, Lubetzky 1969, Svenonius 2000, Smiraglia 2001) to the fore of 
considerations for metadata. Unfortunately, as we saw in the analysis of FRBR in the previous 
chapter, the original WEMI entities are poorly defined in terms that are easy to understand 
(Taniguchi 2002, 2003; Renear and Choi 2006) and the relationships between them are not defined 
at all. This last issue put Wickett and Renear (2009) in the position of considering WEMI’s 
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relationships (realizes, embodies, exemplifies) to be primitive for their analysis of the WEMI 
model. 
 
When the scope of an information retrieval (IR) system is primarily the works expressed through 
the mediums of books or journal articles, and where the focus is equivalence relationships, then 
FRBR’s WEMI model works very well. However, as we previously mentioned, several studies 
have demonstrated that the FRBR approach begins to break down when confronted by works that 
are expressed through kinds of media other than text. Specifically, conceptually adequate 
mappings for entities running the gamut from medieval (and older) manuscripts to video games to 
live performances of various kinds seem to elude us at every turn (Jonsson 2005, Miller and Le 
Bœuf 2005, Nicolas 2005, Baca and Clarke 2007, McDonough et al. 2010, Lee et al. 2012). In 
part, this is because the selection of attributes ascribed to WEMI’s entities are a poor fit for entities 
that are not primarily communicated through text-bearing formats.  
 
Recently, IFLA has deployed their LRM standard (Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017) in an effort to 
respond to FRBR’s critics and better inform the emerging shape of new cataloging standards like 
RDA. Importantly, LRM does two things which are beneficial for its adopters: 
 
1. It provides clear, ontology-like, documentation defining and explaining all of the entities, 
attributes, and relationships that IR systems built in accord to the models it sets forth should 




2. It provides an important revision to FRBR’s WEMI model in the form of its own work-
expression-manifestation-item model, which we call WEMI2 for clarity’s sake. 
 
However, as we will see in the analysis that follows, while LRM provides its adopters with a 
clearer picture of the bibliographic universe in general, it still contains a great deal of confounding 
factors. So, while it presents an important refinement to the conceptual space initially explored by 
the FRBR framework, a great deal of additional work remains to done at the conceptual and related 
levels. 
 
5.2.3. FRBR, LRM, and Bibliographic Aggregates 
As with the cases for so many non-text-based bibliographic entities, many practitioners also found 
the FRBR conceptual model to be a poor fit for bibliographic aggregates (FRBR-WGA 2011). 
For this reason, a working group—the FRBR Working Group on Aggregates (FRBR-WGA)—was 
instituted in 2006 with the express goal of developing a conceptual model for aggregates that fit 
within the existing FRBR framework. This working group’s effort ended with in 2011 when they 
issued their final report.  Like FRBROO, that final report focuses on a particular intellectual level 
of abstraction. Whereas FRBROO focuses primarily on the work and expression levels, the FRBR-
WGA arrived at a model that focused on the manifestation level. 
 
As we previously noted, there were dissenting opinions (Tillett et al. 2014) regarding the need for 
an alternate aggregate model for FRBR. Nonetheless, the model suggested by the FRBR-WGA’s 
final report (2011; Žumer and O’Neill 2012) was adopted for use in LRM (Riva, Le Bœf, and 
Žumer 2017) as one of the many changes it deploys to better clarify how one represents various 
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aspects of bibliographic entities and thereby capture a minimal amount of metadata sufficient for 
fulfilling FRBR’s user tasks of finding, identifying, selecting, and obtaining.  
 
The specifics of the content-artifact aggregate model focus on the following definition for 
aggregates: 
 
“An aggregate is defined as a manifestation embodying multiple expressions” – 
Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 93. 
 
There appears to be two things being communicated by this succinct definition: 
 
1. Bibliographic aggregations are WEMI2 manifestations and 
2. WEMI2 manifestations aggregate WEMI2 expressions. 
 
Unlike the approach taken in the previous chapter, the content-artifact aggregate model used in 
LRM does not seem to take a mereological approach. Aggregates in the LRM sense are not 
“wholes” in the typical “whole-part” sense. Instead, they are manifestations that embody multiple 
expressions.63 
 
The model’s authors attempt to clarify what they mean by noting that there are three distinct types 
of aggregates: 
                                                 
63 And this is despite clear instances of part-talk in the descriptions for LRM’s aggregates (e.g., “Manifestations may contain [emphasis added] 
multiple expressions as indicated by the many-to-many relationship between expressions and manifestations.” – Riva et al. 2017, p 93). 
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1. Aggregate Collections of Expressions 
2. Aggregates Resulting from Augmentation 
3. Aggregates of Parallel Expressions 
 
Much of the focus appears to be on recording metadata about particular units of publication. 
However, it is somewhat unclear what the boundaries of a unit of publication is. With regard to 
“aggregate collections of expressions,” we are told that “Collections include selections, 
anthologies, monographic series, issues of serials, and other groups of resources.” – Riva, Le Bœf, 
and Žumer 2017 p 93. Immediately afterwards we are told that “Examples include journal issues 
(aggregates of articles), multiple novels published together in a single volume, books with 
independently written chapters, complications on CD’s (aggregates of individual songs), and 
various collected/selected works.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017 p 93. 
 
Almost immediately, we see that there is some discontinuity within the definition. A monographic 
series is typically published over a long period of time and through multiple individual novels. But 
the example given specifically notes “multiple novels published together in a single volume.” 
Hence, we are unsure that monographic series are actually intended for inclusion.  
 
There are other potential problems for this model. Coyle (2016b) notes that this model has issues 
when one considers paratext. For instance, when paratext is considered significant enough, then 
there seems to be an issue of combinatorial explosion. We come back to this issue in the ultimate 
chapter of this dissertation. For now, we can observe that if paratext has an impact on the content 
of a bibliographic entity, then it is likely that a new bibliographic entity has come into existence. 
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Conversely, if the paratext does not have an impact on the content of the bibliographic entity, then 
quite possibly it is either not important enough to record any metadata about at all or its role in any 
particular aspect of a bibliographic entity is not as a member of a bibliographic aggregate. For 
example, a table of contents might be a functional component of a novel or the spine might be a 
structural component of a book, but neither are members of a bibliographic aggregate in the same 
manner in which a short story is a member in an anthology or a digital image is a member of a 
digital image collection. 
 
We should also note again, as we did in the early chapters of this dissertation, that something seems 
to be lost in the content-artifact aggregate model’s account of bibliographic aggregates. For 
example, we could consider a digital collection of digitized photographs. Let us reuse the specific 
example of a collection of digitized photographs depicting various scenes from the Meiji Era that 
Jett, Fenlon, and Downie (2018) use. As they note, the individual photographs have content that is 
specific to them individually, but when grouped together additional content—their shared 
context—is brought into being such that the digital collection itself has a topicality that is quite 
different from its individual members. We might be tempted to object that a digital collection does 
not seem to be the same kind of publication unit that the examples given in LRM (on p 93) seem 
to be. However, it is quite possible to move the files comprised by the digital collection as a 
singular unit. Indeed, we might store them in an off-the-shelf digital library product such as 
Greenstone,64 and move the entire digital library as a singular product. And on this account, it 
seems as though digital collections at least are exactly the kind of production units that the content-
artifact aggregate model is designed to describe. 




It appears that some of the information that can be captured using mereological aggregate models 
is missing from the picture that the content-artifact aggregate model draws. To be certain, we need 
to get a better sense of what the content-artifact aggregate model is trying to do.  
 
5.2.4. Initial Analysis 
If we take the content-artifact model’s embodies relationship to be primitive, then an initial 
formalization of Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer’s account might be as follows: 
 
D.17 (LRM Bibliographic Aggregate Definition): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦∃𝑧𝑧�𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧
~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)  ∧  ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑧𝑧)  ∧ ~(𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧)�� 
 
Definition D.17 states that for all entities x, entity x is a [bibliographic] aggregate, if and only if 
there exists some entities y and z such that entity x embodies entity y, entity x also embodies entity 
z, and it is not the case that entities x, y, and z are the same entity. 
 
If we consider the examples given, i.e., selections, anthologies, monographic series, issues of 
serials, supplementary dependent works, and parallel expressions, they conform to the examples 
used in the preceding chapter. As such, we would normally apply the metaproperties we have 
already developed and situate the embodiment relationship among our existing meronymic 
relationships. However, those metaproperties are specific and appropriate for well-defined 
part/whole relationships. Unfortunately, FRBR’s embodies relationship is not well-defined 
(Wickett & Renear 2009), and as we shall see the version of the embodies relationship employed 
by LRM is not much better defined. Further, there are aspects of the LRM document that imply 
that we are not meant to interpret WEMI relationships like embodies as meronymic relationships. 
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With regard to serials65 Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer tell us that, “Serials are complex constructs that 
combine whole/part relationships and aggregation relationships” – p 94. So, from the perspective 
of the editors of LRM, the WEMI relationships (i.e., aggregation relationships) are apparently not 
the same as whole/part relationships. Therefore, we will need to develop a different explanation 
for the WEMI relationships regarding what they are attempting to communicate. 
 
However, the LRM WEMI model (WEMI2) is actually quite different than the one set forth in 
FRBR and so we may not be able to take the embodies relationship to be primitive as Wickett and 
Renear (2009) did in their analysis.  
 
5.3. Formal Analysis of the LRM WEMI Model—WEMI2 
Since LRM sets forth a new model of the WEMI entities, we may not be able to use the definitions 
from the formal analysis of FRBR’s WEMI entities set forth by Wickett and Renear (2009) as the 
basis for our analysis. Instead we will have to begin anew.  
 
Like Wickett and Renear, we are concerned with producing a first order theory that will help us 
better understand, in this case, what the content-artifact aggregate model is trying to accomplish. 
Before we can attempt to unpack what is happening with the content-artifact aggregate model, we 
need to understand what the WEMI2 (i.e., LRM’s central content-artifact model) is trying to 
explain.  
 
                                                 
65 Which are oddly excepted from IFLA-LRM’s aggregate model. 
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Examining the LRM text, we find that the natural language definition of a WEMI2 work is similar 
to what was in FRBR—a work is defined to be:  
 
“The intellectual or artistic content of a distinct creation.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and 
Žumer 2017, p 21.  
 
Similarly, Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer tell us that: 
 
• An expression is, “A distinct combination of signs conveying intellectual content” – Riva, 
Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 23. 
• A manifestation is, “A set of all carriers that are assumed to share the same characteristics 
as to intellectual or artistic content and aspects of physical form. The set is defined by both 
the overall content and the production plan for its carrier or carriers” – Riva, Le Bœf, and 
Žumer 2017, p 26. 
• An item is, “An object or objects carrying signs intended to convey intellectual or artistic 
content” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 27. 
 
These natural language definitions are substantially different from those Wickett and Renear were 
working with from the original FRBR WEMI model. We reprise the original definitions below: 
 
• A FRBR work is “a distinct intellectual or artistic creation.” – IFLA 1998, p 17. 
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• A FRBR expression is “the intellectual or artistic realization of a work in the form of alpha-
numeric, musical, or choreographic notation, sound, image, object, movement, etc., or any 
combination of such forms.” – IFLA 1998, p 19. 
• A FRBR manifestation is “the physical embodiment of an expression of a work.” – IFLA 
1998, p 21. 
• A FRBR item is “a single exemplar of a manifestation.” – IFLA 1998, p 24. 
 
Comparing these two groups of definitions we can see that the WEMI2 entity definitions are 
actually considerably different from those used for the original WEMI model. The rather specific 
lack of the verbs “realizes,” “embodies,” and “exemplifies” in the definitions suggests that we 
might not be able leverage the Group 1 ER-diagram (Figure 5.2 below) as Wickett and Renear did 
to give us clues as to which things might be taken as primitive and thereby help us kick start our 
formalization of the WEMI2 model.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: WEMI/WEMI2 ER-Diagram 
 
 




• The realizes relationship “links a work with any of the expressions which convey the same 
intellectual or artistic content.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer p 65. 
• The embodies relationship “links an expression with a manifestation in which the 
expression appears.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer p 65. 
• The exemplifies relationship “connects a manifestation with any item that reflects the 
characteristics of that manifestation.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer p 66. 
 
The linking relationships of realizes, embodies, and exemplifies cannot be interpreted as primitives 
since they are defined in terms of what role they play. Since WEMI2 works are defined as 
intellectual or artistic content, we should be relatively safe using works as a primitive. However, 
we can see from the quotations that WEMI2 expressions “convey” WEMI2 works and so the “is 
realized through” relationship in the figure does not seem to play a direct role in the work-
expression relationship (unless it is identical with the “conveys” relation).  
 
More specifically, the definition for the “is realized through” relationship tells us that “This 
relationship links a work with any of the expressions which convey the same intellectual or artistic 
content” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 65, and does not clarify the role that the “is realized 
through” relationship plays in the WEMI2 model. Linking is rather a different conceptual 
relationship than conveying and so it does not seem that Figure 5.2 has a role in telling us exactly 




We might push on and try anyway using the following as an initial definition and supporting axiom 
to provide an initial formal account of WEMI2 expressions and the WEMI2 realizes relationship. 
We will take the concepts of WEMI2’s work and conveys to be primitive. 
 
D.18 (WEMI2 Expressions Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
A.43 (Realization of Works): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  → �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Examining the scope note on the same page, we find additional information clarifying what is 
meant by “content”—“A work is an abstract entity that permits the grouping of expressions that 
are considered functional equivalents or near equivalents.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 21.  
 
It seems like we might be on the right track as the scope notes indicate that WEMI2 works are 
intended to inform criteria through which WEMI2 expressions are grouped. 
 
Rather importantly, we are also told: 
 
“A work comes into existence simultaneously with the creation of its first 
expression, no work can exist without there being (or there having been at some 
point in the past) at least one expression of the work.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 




Now we have a worry. It might be the case that WEMI works are not primitives as they are 
burdened with constraints. We might formalize this constraint of a WEMI2 work through the 
following axiom. 
 
A.44 (LRM Work Existential Constraint): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑥𝑥)  →  ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)  ∧
 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Compare this account to the one for FRBR that Wickett and Renear provide for Expressions 
(definition D.12 below; which takes works to be primitive). 
 
D.12 (FRBR Expressions Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Two things immediately become apparent. First, where FRBR was vague enough that Wickett and 
Renear could take WEMI works to be primitive entities, LRM seems to close that door by requiring 
WEMI2 works to depend upon WEMI2 expressions for their existence. This implies the second 
thing—under the WEMI2 regime, there can be no unconveyed works (or any such works are 
outside of the model’s scope).  
 
While this seems rather trivial at first, it is clear that WEMI2 is fundamentally different in 
contextual scope from FRBR’s WEMI. In the latter case, we would not be wrong to make an open-
world assumption regarding the model’s context. Here, while there might be unrealized works 
somewhere out in the open world, such works are outside of the WEMI2 conceptual model’s scope. 
Only a closed world of works that have actually been realized will be accounted for by the WEMI2 
model. These closed world constraints extend to the other aspects of bibliographic entities. 
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For instance, examining the scope notes for WEMI2 expressions, we are told that, like WEMI2 
works: 
 
“An expression comes into existence simultaneously with the creation of its first 
manifestation, no expression can exist without there being (or there having been at 
some point in the past) at least one manifestation.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 
2017, p 23. 
 
There seems to be an additional existence constraint on WEMI2 expressions but, notice the lack 
of any references to verbs like “embodies.” We might formalize this constraint for WEMI2 
expressions using the following axiom. 
 
A.45 (LRM Expression Existential Constraint): ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  →
 ∃𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)� 
 
Examining the definition for the “is embodied in” relationship from Figure 5.1, we see that Riva, 
Le Bœf, and Žumer tell us, “This relationship links an expression with a manifestation in which 
the expression appears” – p 65. Rather like the “is realized through” relationship, the “is embodied 
in” relationship would seem to be a conceptually weaker role in the model (i.e., “linking”) than 
that suggested by the definition’s other verb—“appears.” However, as we did with the realizes 
relationship, we can suggest an initial formalization of the embodies relationship through the 
following axiom. 
 




At this point, it is tempting to replace the consequent in axiom A.45 with the antecedent in the 
above axiom. But since we cannot take the relationship named by that antecedent, it will likely be 
more informative if we reuse the consequent in the above axiom as the consequent of axiom A.45 
so that the role that WEMI2 manifestations play with regard to WEMI2 expressions is much 
clearer.  
 
A.45’ (LRM Expression Existential Constraint): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  →
 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
However, the fact that we needed to make the clarification at all is signal that our approach is not 
going to be as smooth as the one take by Wickett and Renear (2009). The problems for us coalesce 
when we consider how we might formalize the WEMI2 account of manifestations. 
 
We are told that a WEMI2 manifestation is: 
 
“A set of all carriers that are assumed to share the same characteristics as to 
intellectual or artistic content and aspects of physical form. That set is defined by 
both the overall content and the production plan for its carrier or carriers[.]” – Riva, 
Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 25. 
 
This definition is difficult to formalize in the same manner that we took for WEMI2 
expressions. One of the problems is scope. While works and expressions are constrained 
through additional axioms, WEMI2 manifestations do not seem to be and sets certainly 
cannot be. And so, any formalization making a strong use of a bidirectional connective 
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here would seem to be false, unless the domain of discourse described by WEMI2 is limited 
to such an extent that when the term “set” is invoked, Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer really mean 
“manifestation.” It is doubtful that this is actually the case and so we will propose softer 
axioms instead. 
 
We might then formalize this account of WEMI2 manifestations through the following 
axiom. 
 
A.47 (LRM Manifestations Semi-Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  →  𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)� 
 
Unfortunately, the above axiom does not account for the part of natural language definition that 
tells us that manifestations are not just sets, they are curated sets, grouped together through specific 
criteria. Unlike the collectives Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann describe, or the bibliographic 
aggregates we discussed in the previous chapter, the parts of a manifestation are grouped together 
through the ZFC set-member-of relation, which does not imply that the set members are all 
homogenous according to some curatorial criteria. We will need to modify axiom A.47 to account 
for this by making the following formalization. 
 
A.47’ (LRM Manifestations Semi-Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  →
 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)� 
 
From here, things get quite complex. We might try to gain further traction by examining the “is 
exemplified by” relationship, which Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer define as one that connects a 
manifestation with any item that reflects the characteristics of that manifestation” – Riva, Le Bœf, 
and Žumer 2017, p 66. This natural language definition seems extremely peculiar since it is highly 
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focused on something called characteristics. We can turn to the scope notes for WEMI2 
manifestations for more information. One of them tells us: 
 
“A manifestation results from the capture of one or more expressions onto a carrier 
or a set of carriers. As an entity, manifestation represents the common 
characteristics shared by those carriers, in respect to both intellectual content and 
physical form.” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 25. 
 
Similarly, the scope notes for WEMI2 items tell us that: 
 
“In terms of intellectual or artistic content and physical form, an item exemplifying 
a manifestation normally reflects all the characteristics that define the manifestation 
itself.” 
 
So, it would seem that WEMI2 manifestations, a kind of set, represent characteristics which are 
shared among the carriers that are elements of the manifestation and that, when in the role of 
exemplifying the manifestation, reflect those characteristics. Unfortunately, here Riva, Le Bœf, 
and Žumer chose to introduce a new term, “carriers.” Before proceeding further, we need to equate 
this term to WEMI2 items, which are the entities that Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer mean to invoke. 
We can do this by examining the definition provided for WEMI2 items. Recall that Riva, Le Bœf, 
and Žumer tell us that WEMI2 items are “objects carrying signs intended to convey intellectual or 




D.19 (LRM Items Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Quite literally, WEMI2 items are carriers that carry WEMI2 expressions. The scope notes 
discussing items provide important additional information, telling us that WEMI2 items are 
specifically physical objects that carry signs which are intended to convey content. Having 
clarified what is meant by the term “carriers,” we can now attempt to formalize the WEMI2 
account of manifestations through the following axioms. 
 
A.48 (Manifestations as Representations): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  →
 ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
A.49 (Items as Reflections): ∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)  →  ∃𝑦𝑦�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
A.50 (Exemplification of Manifestations): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
 ∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧)�� 
 
There is a further constraint when manifestations have more than two members. From the first 
scope note, we see that the members are said to share characteristics. To properly formalize this 
sharing relationship, we would normally want to employ a three-place predicate (e.g., a shares b 
with c). However, we can employ axiom A.47’ to produce a serviceable, if cumbersome work 
around. 
 
A.51 (Manifestation Members Share Characteristics): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦∀𝑧𝑧 ��𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧)�  →




Despite this further complication, we can propose a formal definition for Manifestations through 
the following biconditional. 
 
D.20 (Manifestations Defined): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦∃𝑧𝑧�𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧)�� 
 
Now though we have a further question regarding how WEMI2 manifestations are to be defined. 
Specifically, we know that WEMI2 expressions play a particular role with regard to WEMI2 
manifestations. We likely need to account for this role by modifying definition D.20. 
 
D.20’ (Manifestations Redefined): 
∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∃𝑦𝑦∃𝑧𝑧∃𝑤𝑤�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑤𝑤, 𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ∧
 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑧𝑧, 𝑦𝑦)  ∧  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧, 𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑤𝑤)  ∧  𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧)�� 
 
We also now have a worry about our definition (D.19) for WEMI2 items. Specifically, how 
important are their characteristics? With regard to their role in WEMI2 manifestations (beyond the 
set-member-of relationship), the fact that WEMI2 items reflect characteristics which are 
represented by WEMI2 manifestations provides the curatorial glue that distinguishes WEMI2 
manifestations from any other arbitrary set. However, the existence of characteristics themselves 
does not seem to be necessary for a formal definition of WEMI2 items because the natural language 
account never invokes WEMI2 manifestations. Since we already have axiom A.48, and now 
definition D.20’, the role that WEMI2 items play regarding WEMI2 manifestations is accounted 




In the next section, we discuss the implications these peculiarities have for metadata infrastructure. 
However, before we proceed, we will produce an illustration (Figure 5.3 below) that will allow us 
to take stock of all of the new entities and properties that we have introduced. This illustration uses 
Chen’s method for ER-diagrams with some notable exceptions. As in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, we are 
neglecting to use the proper (diamond) symbol to represent relationships. Furthermore, we are 
electing to, for the time being represent concepts like manifestation, curated sets, and 
characteristics as though they are (first-class) entities. However, we are also going to shade them 
in as a means to indicate that all three entities seem to be doing something relationship like among 
the other entities. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Illustration of Entities and Relationships Involved in WEMI2 Model 
 
As we can see from Figure 5.3 (above), we are dealing with a model that has both more and 
different primitives than the initial WEMI model that appeared in FRBR. Relationships such as 
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realizes, embodies, and exemplifies are can no longer be taken as primitive when other primitive 
relationships, that more clearly distinguish the roles of the entities involved, appear in the model. 
And so, with regard to relationships, we take the following ones to be primitive: conveys, appears-
in, set-member-of, represents, reflects, and carries.  
 
Concerning entities, we must take the characteristics entity to be a primitive one for now, as other 
entities rely on it as a partial explanation for their nature. However, we have a choice regarding 
this model’s other primitive. We could take the work (or content since it is equivalent) entity to be 
primitive, as Wickett and Renear (2009) do. Or, we could take the item (or object since it is 
equivalent) entity to be primitive. 
 
This is a choice which affects the kinds of implications and overall world view orientation of the 
WEMI2 model, i.e., it is a sweeping interpretation. If we take items to be primitive, we will 
essentially be making an ontological commitment to an anti-realist position where entities like 
works are in fact roles played by objects. This position is actually consistent with reductionist 
models like Svenonius that liken works to sets of documents and the standard approach to 
cataloging which focuses on artifacts in hand. Several of the constraints, such as the injunction 
against unrealized works, also support this interpretation. Implications that might occur from this 
ontological position include manifestations that embody no expression and expressions which 
realize no work.66  
 
                                                 
66 Note that because of the intrusion of set theoretics through the entity of WEMI2 manifestation, there can be no items that do not exemplify some 




However, we have already produced definitions that take certain relationships into account that 
make the ontological commitment to the primitiveness of works and thereby a realist account of 
the bibliographic universe. This position is supported by the natural language definitions 
themselves. Of the definitions in LRM, only the definition of works references a singular entity, 
content, directly. All the other definitions are combinations of entities and relationships, e.g., an 
expression is “signs conveying content.” So, we will add a second primitive entity (beyond 
characteristics) to our account, and it is work. 
 
5.4. Discussion of the LRM Aggregate Model 
Now that we have established an understanding of the content-artifact model (WEMI2) set forth 
in LRM, we can finally explore its impact on the content-artifact aggregate model that LRM 
employs. One thing we should note is that the content-artifact aggregate model we will be 
discussing is not different from the one set forth by the FRBR-WGA (2011) and Žumer and O’Neill 
(2012), in the sense that both the one we will be discussing and the one set forth by these author 
groups both define bibliographic aggregates as manifestations. However, what is meant by 
manifestation is altogether different. In the case of the FRBR-WGA and Žumer and O’Neill, 
manifestation refers to WEMI manifestation as set forth in FRBR. In the case we are examining 
here, the LRM case, manifestation refers to WEMI2 manifestation, i.e., a curated set. 
 
The first and most immediate implication is that bibliographic aggregates in this case are exactly 
curated sets (and not merely sets in a particular role at a particular time). With regard to what kinds 
of things are allowed to members of a bibliographic aggregate, there are distinct limitations, and 
as we show presently, this causes this particular version of the content-artifact aggregate model to 
break down immediately. 
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We will take as an example an issue of a journal. The issue of a journal is a mass-produced object 
such that it has certain physical characteristics like the number of pages in it, the number of articles 
in it, and the like. In so far as the WEMI2 model is concerned, the manifestation of this particular 
journal issue is the set of all copies printed, i.e., the set of all objects sharing the same 
characteristics. This all seems quite reasonable. So far, so good. 
 
However, based on definition D.17 which tells us that bibliographic aggregates embody the 
individual expressions of what is, in this case, the articles in the journal issue. This would indicate 
that the items then are actually the articles in the journal issue. This would seem to follow from 
definition D.19 which tells us that items carry expressions and parts of definition D.20’ which tells 
us that items reflect characteristics that manifestations represent. Unfortunately, journal issues 
and articles do not share characteristics, and so axiom A.51 which articulates a constraint that the 
members of a manifestation must share characteristics, would seem to be violated. 
 
Now we have quite a conundrum, as it does not seem as though it is actually possible for our 
bibliographic aggregate to embody the individual articles in the journal issue on account that the 
characteristics reflected by the journal issue items are different than those reflected by the article 
items and thereby definition D.20’ is violated. 
 
We might try an easy repair by rejecting axiom A.51. This works, but it also defeats the purpose 
of the WEMI2 model, as we would no longer be able to distinguish items or manifestations based 
on characteristics. More pragmatically, we can confidently say that rejection of axiom A.51 makes 
the separation of editions whose differences are at the item-level, e.g., a mass-market paperback 
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edition versus a trade-paperback edition of the same expression, impossible to distinguish from 
one another—they all become members of the same manifestation.  
 
We might try a different repair by rejecting definition D.19 which tells us that items are carriers. 
However, this defeats the purpose of the content-artifact aggregate model, because now we only 
have items that correspond to the journal issues, but we have no way to relate them to the 
expressions of the articles because the articles no longer have items reflecting characteristics 
unique to them. This solution does not appear to be desirable either. 
 
We might try another repair by introducing a part-of (i.e., a mereological) relationship to the 
model. In fact, we can see upon further examination that Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer have already 
done this for the manifestation entity. The domain and range of this part-of relationship is quite 
specifically limited to WEMI2 manifestations.67 Since WEMI2 manifestations are curated sets, we 
would expect that this particular part-of relation, which we will hereafter refer to as 
[manifestation]-part-of, is the same as the ZFC subset-of relation.  
 
Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer define [manifestation]-part-of, by telling us: 
 
“This is a relationship between two manifestations where one is a component of the 
other” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer, p 75.  
 
                                                 
67 We should note here that LRM also defines part-of relationships whose collective domains and ranges are constrained to works and expressions 
respectively, i.e., there are [work]-part-of and [expression]-part-of relationships. We discuss these further in section 5.7 below. 
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So far, interpreting [manifestation]-part-of as a relationship equivalent to ZFC subset-of seems 
within the realm of possible and charitable interpretations. However, in the scope notes Riva, Le 
Bœf, and Žumer say: 
 
“In some cases[,] the components of a manifestation are based on physical 
considerations relating to the carrier in which the manifestation is intended to be 
issued (for example, a recording is too long to fit on a single disc and is issued in a 
two-disc boxed set). An alternate manifestation on another carrier may not display 
the same components.” – p 75. 
 
The scope note does not seem to be talking about subsets. In fact, it seems to be talking about 
aggregate items (or items that are sets). This is an odd state of affairs. We were expecting 
something to do with subsets. So, this existing [manifestation]-part-of relationship does not help 
us since it actually captures situations where a journal issue itself is a multi-item entity, such as the 
case of a journal issue and a supplementary issue specific to it. In this case the manifestation would 
be the set of all issue/supplement pairs. 
 
We could try a fourth repair by introducing an [item]-part-of relationship which LRM does not 
actually possess. This allows us to draw direct links between the characteristics of the articles and 





At this point, we could go on and try a fifth repair by resorting to set theoretic rules directly and 
supposing that the item-sets representing the characteristics of the articles are actually subsets of 
the journal issue manifestation. Unfortunately, this still does not work because the characteristics 
reflected by subsets are not the same as the characteristics represented by the manifestation of the 
journal issue. While our analysis here is not exhaustive, after five failed attempts to find a 
satisfactory repair for this issue, we feel that we have demonstrated the severity of this modeling 
issue. This is not a minor flaw that is easy to fix, but rather is indicative of a fundamental flaw that 
occurs through the pairing of the content-artifact aggregate model used in LRM with the particular 
WEMI entity definitions used in LRM. 
 
We should note that quite importantly, since the content-artifact aggregate model breaks down in 
the case of LRM precisely because of the manner in which manifestations are defined in LRM’s 
WEMI2 content-artifact model, we fully expect that application of the same content-artifact 
aggregate model in the context of a different content-artifact model, e.g., FRBR’s original WEMI 
model, does not experience this break down. However, there are still unresolved issues for content-
artifact aggregate model, regarding contextual mass and content (Jett, Fenlon, and Downie 2018) 
and for paratext (Coyle 2016b). At least the first of these two issues can be overcome by using 
FRBR’s existing mereological aggregate model, which we analyzed in the previous chapter. 
 
5.5. The WEMI2 Content-Artifact Model 
5.5.1. Developing an Alternate Illustration 
As Figure 5.3 implies, the actual content-artifact model set forth in the pages of LRM is nothing 
like the content-artifact model suggested by Figure 5.2. In this section, we will endeavor to develop 
a refined illustration, employing as few non-primitive entities and relationships as possible. This 
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will be useful because it will further illustrate some of WEMI2’s idiosyncrasies in comparison to 
other content-artifact models, like the original WEMI. It will also highlight several of the 
idiosyncrasies of the original WEMI model.  
 
Since the realizes, embodies, and exemplifies relationships are not primitive ones, we will at first 
simplify the pseudo-model illustrated in Figure 5.3 by eliminating them in favor of primitive 
relationships. In the case of the realizes relationship, we can substitute the primitive conveys 
relationship. In the case of the embodies relationship, we will substitute the no less mystifying 
appears-in relationship.68 We also want to replace the exemplifies relationship, but because 
manifestations are sets whose members are items, this task is more onerous. It requires a 
decomposition of the exemplifies relationship into the primitive entity of characteristics and the 
primitive relationships of set-member-of, represents, and reflects. Finally, we will drop the 
equivalent entities of content, signs, curated sets, and objects so that we can maintain as much core 
terminology (i.e., works, expressions, manifestations, and items) as possible. 
 
5.5.2. Discussion of the “conveys” Relationship 
Definition D.18 (WEMI2 expressions convey WEMI2 works) and axiom A. (a WEMI2 work only 
exists if there exists a WEMI2 expression that conveys it) tell us how WEMI2’s works and 
expressions relate to one another. We know from Figure 5.2 that the “is realized through” 
relationship is intended also link WEMI2 works and expressions. The conveys relationship is more 
                                                 
68 Here though, it is tempting to claim that we still need the embodies relationship on account of the content-artifact aggregate model. However, 
we amply demonstrated that this model does not work in the context of WEMI2 and so we are safe (at least until someone offers a repair by means 
of strong counter-example) to exclude it altogether. In fact, for the moment we will table any further discussion of bibliographic aggregates until 
we arrive at a refined illustration for the WEMI2 model. 
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informative though because we know from the natural language definitions what it means in the 
context of WEMI2. More specifically, it tells us that the “signs” that are WEMI2 expressions have 
the role of conveying the “content” that are WEMI2 works.  
 
An open question is whether or not the conveys relationship should be interpreted as having the 
same cardinality that Figure 5.2 illustrates the “is realized through” relationship as having. Axiom 
A.43 takes a neutral stance by using the material implication connective rather than the equivalence 
biconnective. There is a good reason for Axiom A.43 to take a neutral stance. Specifically, 
intuitions that the realizes relationship should be restricted to many-to-one expression-to-work 
cardinality may be mistaken. Jett and Dubin (2018), examining the issue of whether expressions 
realize more than one work in the case of dependent works, provide an interesting discussion of 
one particular case. 
 
In their paper, “How are dependent works realized?”, Jett and Dubin consider seriously how the 
editorial contributions made by a humanities scholar transcribing and adding TEI markup to text 
relate to the text being transcribed. The specimen examined is Molly O’Hagan Hardy’s TEI 
transcription69 of Absolom Jones and Richard Allen’s 1794 A Narrative of the Proceedings of the 
Black People, During the Late Awful Calamity in Philadelphia, in the Year 1793. As Jett and 
Dubin point out, there is at least one account wherein it is possible to understand the text of the 
transcribed document playing two distinct expression roles. In one of these roles, the transcribed 
text realizes Jones and Allen’s work. In the other role, the transcribed text realizes Hardy’s 
scholarly work which makes claims about Jones and Allen’s work.  




A potential problem for Jett and Dubin might be that these different roles are actually different 
instances of the realizes relationship. However, the cardinality constraint on the realizes 
relationship entails that while a work might have the property of being the object of many different 
instances of the realizes relationship, an expression can only ever be the subject of a single instance 
of the realizes relationship. The entire point that Jett and Dubin are making is that, despite this 
limitation, it seems as though there are situations where expressions should participate in more 
than one realizes role. Hence, there seems to be a problem with this cardinality constraint. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Realizing Different Editions of Carey 
 
 
This can be further illustrated when we note that Jones and Allen’s work is itself something of a 
dependent work, as it was created in response to a pamphlet published by Mathew Carey, his 1793 
Account of the Malignant Fever Lately Prevalent in Philadelphia. During the months when the 
epidemic was occurring, and for some months afterwards, Carey published five editions of his 
pamphlet. What is of interest here is that each edition possessed expanded content, growing from 
some ~90 pages in the 1st edition to more than 160 pages in the 4th edition. It is obvious that we 
can account for the differences in intellectual content by claiming that the work that is each edition 
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is derived from the work of the previous edition. But it is also equally clear that the expression of 
each edition likely realizes not only the work of its edition but also the works that are the preceding 
editions. Figure 5.4 (above) illustrates this conundrum. 
 
As Jett and Dubin note with the case of Carey’s Account of the Malignant Fever Lately Prevalent 
in Philadelphia, enlargement of a document can entail an increasing of its intellectual content by 
100% or more. Can we truly say that Carey’s 1st edition shares “essentially the same information” 
as his 4th edition? Are they truly the same work? 
 
To some extent, traditional cataloging practice renders much of this discussion moot, since Carey’s 
Account of the Malignant Fever Lately Prevalent in Philadelphia would be treated as a monograph 
case, and thereby, each of its editions would receive a distinct catalog record. However, such is 
not the case for one of the cataloging traditions greatest exceptions to its own rules—serial 
publications. 
 
Serial publications are generally considered to be singular, ever-expanding (for so long as they are 
being published) works. The general theory made for this style of representation is that the nature 
of their content does not significantly vary over time, i.e., all of their issues, volumes, or editions 
share “essentially the same information.” In reality though, nothing could be farther from the truth, 
and Figure 5.4 is merely one example that showcases the problem.  
However, if we accept that our primitive conveys relationship possesses many-to-many cardinality, 
then this issue can be sidestepped altogether. Since we already have established that conveys and 
“is realized through” are not the same relationship, there seems to be no apparent problem if we 
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conjecture that it has many-to-many cardinality and thereby avoid the problem that Jett and Dubin 
showcase in the example above. We can illustrate this through the following ER-diagram. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: ER-Diagram Illustrating the conveys Relationship 
 
5.5.3. Discussion of the “appears-in” Relationship 
Axioms A.45’ (a WEMI2 expression only exists if there exists a WEMI2 manifestation that it 
appears-in) and axiom A.46 (something embodies something else when that something else is a 
WEMI2 expression that appears-in it [the first something]) are the only significant information 
that tells us how WEMI2’s expressions and manifestations relate to one another. We know from 
Figure 5.2 that the “is embodied in” relationship is intended also link WEMI2 expressions and 
manifestations. However, the appears-in relationship is somewhat more informative, because we 
know from the natural language definitions that it means more than just linking in the context of 
WEMI2. More specifically, it tells us that the “signs” that are WEMI2 expressions have the role 
of appearing-in the “curated sets” that are WEMI2 manifestations.  
 
Here, an idiosyncrasy from Figure 5.2 is helpful. We see that the “is embodied by” relationship 
has many-to-many cardinality. Like the conveys relationship, we have good reason to believe that 
the appears-in relationship has many-to-many cardinality. However, because the “is embodied by” 
relationship has many-to-many cardinality, we do not need to argue the appears-in relationship 
also has many-to-many cardinality. Having such cardinality would be consistent with the account 
of other relationships (i.e., “is embodied by”) that link WEMI2 expressions with WEMI2 





Figure 5.6: ER-Diagram Illustrating the appears-in Relationship 
 
5.5.4. Discussion of the “carries” Relationship 
Definition D.19 (WEMI2 items carry WEMI2 expressions) tells us how WEMI2 items relate to 
WEMI2 expressions. At first glance, this seems like an odd definition for us to have proposed in 
the first place since the original WEMI model has nothing like it. However, the natural language 
definition for WEMI2 items (“An object or objects carrying signs intended to convey intellectual 
or artistic content” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 27) mentions WEMI2 expressions directly 
(i.e., signs conveying content) and WEMI2 manifestations not at all. 
 
The question that faces us, once again, is what kind of cardinality should the carries relationship 
possess? Is it possible for an inscription to simultaneously carry text from more than one 
expression? 
 
Here, a commonplace example of after-market binding of journal issues into journal volumes (or 
partial journal volumes or occasionally journal multi-volumes) is helpful. We can observe that if 
the content-artifact aggregate model is correct, then there is no corresponding expression for the 
journal volume (indeed there is no corresponding expressions for the journal issues bound into the 
volume either) and so it must be the case that the bound journal volume is acting in the role of 
carrying the signs which are the WEMI2 expressions that correspond to the individual articles in 
the issues that have been bound into the volume. It seems to be the case that we have a single 
WEMI2 item which carries multiple WEMI2 expressions that correspond to the articles comprised 




From this example, we can see that our carries relationship should also possess many-to-many 
cardinality so that our model can accommodate the example we just showcased. We illustrate this 
through the following ER-diagram. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: ER-Diagram Illustrating the carries Relationship 
 
5.5.5. Discussion of “Manifestations” and Their Particulars 
5.5.5.1. Set Membership 
We know from Axiom A.47’ that WEMI2 manifestations are by definition sets (curated sets but 
sets nonetheless). We also know that their members are WEMI2 items. Therefore, there must be a 
set-member-of relationship that links them. Furthermore, we know from set theoretics that this set-




Figure 5.8: ER-Diagram Illustrating the set-member-of Relationship 
 
5.5.5.2. Discussion of the “Characteristics” Entity and its Linking Relationships 
From axiom A.48, we know that WEMI2 manifestations represent something called 
characteristics. Similarly, we know from axiom A.49 that WEMI2 items reflect the same 
characteristics that are represented by WEMI2 manifestations that they are in a set-member-of 
relationship to. It seems clear that many items might reflect many different characteristics, but are 
there some characteristics which are only represented by a single manifestation? In other words, 
does the combinatorial of the characteristics entity and the represents and reflects relationships 




Here, we will reintroduce the content-artifact aggregate model. We will ignore for the moment 
the problem of sets for this model to examine another peculiar problem. Let us consider author 
Terry Brooks’ long-running fantasy series Shannara as an example. Figure 5.9 below illustrates 
most, but not all, of the series. 
 
As we can see from the figure, Brooks’ Shannara series is itself broken into smaller sub-series. 
The question that begs to be answered is, if we are a library patron and want an item that is part of 
one of these series, e.g., Brooks’ Running with the Demon (because say, we have used its ISBN as 
our search criteria), what kind of search results will we receive?  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Brooks’ Shannara Series and Most of Its Members 
 
 
A faithful implementation of the content-artifact aggregate model should only display just one of 
the following bits of information to the end user (because we are using the “is exemplified by” 
relationship to manage the search results): 
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1. All the copies of the particular edition of Running with the Demon that we asked for, i.e., 
the manifestation-level representation of Running with the Demon that corresponds to our 
particular desired item. 
 
2. Metadata describing Brooks’ series, The Word and the Void, for which our particular 
desired copy of Running with the Demon corresponds to a particular expression of Brooks’ 
Running with the Demon that has been aggregated (i.e., embodied) into the manifestation, 
Brooks’ The Word and the Void. 
 
3. Metadata describing Brooks’ Shannara series, for which our particular desired copy of 
Running with the Demon corresponds to a particular expression of Brooks’ Running with 
the Demon that has been aggregated (i.e., embodied) into the manifestation, Brooks’ 
Shannara series.  
 
In the vast majority of cases, we would expect that we will only see result number one of the three 
possibilities listed above. We should expect this, because this is the exact use case that WEMI, 
WEMI2, and the “is exemplified by” relationship are designed to accommodate.  
 
In an ideal world, we would expect to get all three results. We can also observe that such links are 
made at least textually, if not digitally, through notes fields (e.g., in MARC records) in our existing 
(pre-FRBR) metadata systems. However, we can also observe that a faithful implementation of the 
FRBR model already supports all three of the use cases listed above. As we discussed in the 
previous chapter, the FRBR model can do this because its aggregate model is separate from its 
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version of the WEMI model. Not so with the content-artifact aggregate model that LRM employs. 
(And, also not so for any versions of FRBR that implement the content-aggregate model set forth 
by the FRBR-WGA [2011] and Žumer and O’Neill [2012]—the content-artifact aggregate model, 
even though not officially adopted by FRBR, was originally intended for FRBR, after all.) 
 
The above problem can be compounded if we consider one of the members of Brooks’ Shannara 
series that was not illustrated in Figure 5.9 (above)—Brooks’ Indomitable—a short story written 
for and published in Robert Silverberg’s (ed.) anthology, Legends II. Our desired item is the short 
story, but the corresponding manifestation does not describe it. Instead, it describes the anthology 
Legends II which aggregates (e.g., embodies) an expression that corresponds to the item required 
to read Brooks’ Indomitable. Here, we must admit that this search is unlikely to be successful 
unless there were notes listing Indomitable as one of the expressions embodied-by the 
manifestation, Legends II and it is also the case that we are full-text searching through our metadata 
records (as notes are not typically sufficient to create actionable digital links of their own accord). 
Once again, a faithful implementation of FRBR sidesteps this issue because the FRBR aggregate 
model is separate from its version of the WEMI model. 
 
For our discussion here, we can also sidestep the issues showcased by the example simply by 
accepting that both the represents and reflects relationships possess many-to-many cardinality. We 
represent this with the following ER-diagram. Since the characteristics entity appears to play a 





Figure 5.10: ER-Diagram Illustrating the Manifestation Entity Complex 
 
Unfortunately, we have one potentially vexing issue from Section 5.3 that is illustrated in Figure 
5.2—manifestations also seem to play an associative role. This is especially true in light of the 
aggregate model illustrated in Figure 5.1 wherein the manifestation is intended to associate a group 
of different expressions with a group of items that correspond to those expressions. In that light, 
we should really use the symbol for associative entity for WEMI2 manifestations also. However, 
since the intention of LRM’s authors is to provide as much backward compatibility with WEMI 
and FRBR, and since they likely envision WEMI2 manifestations as first-class entities in their own 
right, much the same as we tend to envision bibliographic aggregates, we do not use the symbol 
for associative entity to represent the manifestation concept in Figure 5.10. 
 
5.5.6. Simplified WEMI2 Illustration 
When we assemble the various ER-diagrams from Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, and 5.10 into a single 
Figure (5.11 below), we can see that the WEMI2 model is very different from the depiction of it 
in Figure 5.2. This is not so surprising. The natural language definitions which we were supplied 






Figure 5.11: WEMI2 Model According to Natural Language Definitions 
 
In the next two sections, we discuss the implications of this content-artifact model for 
bibliographic entities. We also strongly consider a simplification to it—removal of the 
manifestation complex—that sidesteps many of the issues faced by the content-artifact aggregate 
model. Sidestepping issues through simplification is possible because the overarching LRM model 
details a second, mereological aggregate model. We should note that removal of the WEMI2 
manifestation complex directly results in removal of the content-artifact aggregate model. This is 
likely beneficial, since we no longer have competing accounts for bibliographic aggregates. 
 
5.6. Initial Findings 
5.6.1. Trivial Implications 
There are several trivial conclusions that we can draw from the preceding two sections. For one 
thing, when applied to LRM’s WEMI2 content-artifact model, the content-artifact aggregate 
model developed by the FRBR-WGA ceases to be just a content-artifact aggregate model. It 
becomes a mixed mereological/content-artifact aggregate model. This occurs because sets are a 
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kind of mereological entity and obey their own specific mereological rules. By extension, this 
makes the bibliographic aggregates described in LRM mereological entities, at least in part. 
 
As this is the case, then it seems that LRM’s aggregate model (the content-artifact aggregate 
model) is not necessarily unjustified as WEMI2 is defined. Since WEMI2 manifestations are sets, 
i.e., they are aggregates, then deciding that all bibliographic aggregates are manifestations, rather 
than distinct bibliographic entities with distinct content (e.g., contextual mass), seems to be in 
accord to overall model for bibliographic entities. However, as we noted in Section 5.3, the 
approach breaks down because the content-artifact aggregate model wants to do things which sets 
are not designed to accommodate. 
 
Moreover, as Jett, Fenlon, and Downie (2018) point out, the content-artifact aggregate model itself 
can have consequences that negatively impact the ability of users to successfully find, identify, 
select, and obtain bibliographic aggregates like anthologies, journal volumes, digital collections, 
and so on. After all, bibliographic aggregates typically seem to be kinds of bibliographic entities, 
equal in status to more familiar ones like books. We have already seen arguments that creating 
metadata records, for digital collections at least, helps digital library users assess their fitness for 
their own purposes (Brack et al. 2000; Sweet and Thomas 2000; Foulonneau et al. 2005; Palmer 
et al. 2006), and a vital component of these kinds of metadata records is description of the digital 
collection’s overall topicality, or as Palmer (2004) and Palmer, Zavalina, and Fenlon (2010) would 




It is possible that some of reasons behind the FRBR-WGA’s decision-making process in arriving 
at the content-artifact aggregate model is due to a misunderstanding regarding the original WEMI 
model that occurred among researchers, developers, and practioners alike. For some reason, it 
seems as though WEMI’s concepts of work-expression-manifestation-item are confused as kinds 
of bibliographic entities (this is in fact a feature of Svenonius’s conceptual model [2000] that she 
touts), when in fact they express a particular decomposition of the concept of bibliographic entity 
into finer-grained component-like concepts (which is more obvious in Smiraglia’s treatment 
[2001]).  
 
Works, expressions, manifestations, and items are not bibliographic entities in their own right. 
Rather, each of them captures specific qualities that a bibliographic entity (like a book) possesses. 
They are all aspects of bibliographic entities. However, this misunderstanding is codified through 
the content-artifact aggregate model presented by Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer in LRM. 
 
5.6.2. Non-trivial Implications 
As Figure 5.11 illustrates, the WEMI2 model is actually quite convoluted compared to the original 
WEMI model set forth by FRBR in 1998. If we consider the things that the model articulates, they 
do not necessarily seem to go together. On one hand, we have a relatively strong account of a 
content-artifact continuum that speaks of content, signs that convey content, and objects that carry 
signs. On the other hand, we have sets of objects in which signs appear and which represent 
characteristics which are then reflected by the objects that are elements of those sets. And finally, 
we have an aggregate model that also reuses signs, objects, and sets to articulate an understanding 




We can state more strongly that since WEMI2 items are directly related to WEMI2 expressions, 
either it is the case the WEMI2 manifestations are playing a redundant role with respect to WEMI2 
items, or WEMI2 manifestations play no intermediary role in the content-artifact continuum 
described by the triumvirate of work-expression-item. In other words, WEMI2 manifestations have 
no impact on the conceptual model described by the phrase: objects carry signs that convey 
content. 
 
This is a rather important distinction, as it speaks to much of the real value of the LRM standard. 
If we choose to exclude manifestations from the model altogether, we arrive at a succinct and 
powerful content-artifact model, through which deduplication will be superior. It is superior 
because we can focus our efforts for deduplication along two narrow dimensions—objects carrying 




Figure 5.12: Different “manifestations” of [The Game of Chess] charting its reproduction 
cycle from the British Library through UC Berkeley to the HathiTrust Digital Library 
 
We can demonstrate this by reusing an example from Chapter 2. Recall that Nurmikko-Fuller et 
al. (2015) discovered a curious example of a book owned by the British Library that had been 
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copied five times across three different formats. Nurmikko-Fuller et al. illustrated the situation 
through the Figure above (reproduced from Chapter 2 for convenience’s sake). Figure 5.12 
illustrates a view of [The Game of Chess] that conforms to the manner in which the original WEMI 
model is defined. However, we can produce an updated version of this figure (Figure 5.13 below) 
that conforms to what the natural language definitions of LRM’s WEMI2 model tell us. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Different carriers of [The Game of Chess] charting its reproduction cycle from 
the British Library through UC Berkeley to the HathiTrust Digital Library 
 
We have simplified Figure 5.13 (above) somewhat by removing some of the extraneous entities 
from the account. However, a key thing to notice is that WEMI2’s manifestation is not present in 
Figure 5.13. Adding it would make the figure quite complex. We would need at least three 
manifestations in which the expression of [The Game of Chess] appears and in which the various 
items in Figure 5.13 reflect. We would also need three sets of characteristics upon which the items 
are aggregated through the set-member-of relationship. The question remains though: Do we need 
this kind of complexity in our conceptual model?  
 
The answer is: no, we do not. Everything that the concept of manifestation accomplishes in our 
conceptual model is better accomplished on the implementation side, when we build the queries 
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that will craft the various records out of the data for the various end users and stakeholders. 
Databases are expressly designed for just this kind of division of labor. 
 
In fact, a narrower account of bibliographic objects accomplishes the kind of functionality that 
Smiraglia, Svenonius, Tillett, and other conceptualizers of bibliographic entities had in mind all 
along. It suggests rather precisely what our metadata needs to describe—content, signs conveying 
it, and objects carrying the signs conveying it. This would also seem to confirm Taniguchi’s 
position (2002, 2003) that our focus should be on describing the text (i.e., the expression) more 
than the variations between sets of carriers (i.e., the manifestation) that items reflect through 
represented characteristics, because it is the text that plays the most important linking role in 
Figure 5.13. 
 
What we do not appear to need metadata about are manifestations (i.e., sets of objects in the role 
of carrying signs that convey content). This is only natural because the ability to arbitrarily group 
and regroup things into sets by reusing existing features and dimensions that have already been 
defined comes for free when we employ database technology. Indeed, the whole purpose of query 
languages like SQL and SPARQL are so that we do not need to define entities like manifestation 
to accomplish this task. This notion is borne out when we consider that the set of manifestations 
is a subset of the power set of items in the WEMI2 model (as is the set of characteristics); or in 
other words, we can dynamically derive both any arbitrary set of characteristics and any arbitrary 




We know from our analysis in Section 5.3 that the WEMI2 account of manifestations cannot be 
successfully employed as is to model bibliographic aggregates. However, verb phrases like 
appears-in and the complex linking chain of representing characteristics reflected-by items, taken 
along with the grouping property indicated by the set-member-of relationship, indicate that there 
are likely two additional entities being conflated into the manifestation entity. One of these entities 
is possibly metadata records in which expressions appear and which record descriptive information 
representing characteristics reflected-by the items being described. The other entity being 
modeled are sets of items themselves which have possess all of the properties of being a set and 
none of the properties that the individual elements of a set might possess. 
 
An additional odd notion presents itself. The NULL set has particular characteristics which can be 
reflected by a particular item and represented by a corresponding manifestation. As such is the 
case, it would seem that the NULL set is itself a bibliographic entity. The implication here is that 
works with no content exist. This is perhaps not so perplexing as we do have signs that are 
expressly intended to convey this concept. Whether or not this is actually a desirable outcome of 
a conceptual modeling effort for bibliographic entities remains to be seen. 
 
Whatever the case may be, WEMI2 manifestations being sets presents a complicating factor for 
search results because most IR systems will not be articulate enough to tell us when a manifestation 
is taking on the role of being a bibliographic aggregate, versus being a set of WEMI2 items, or 
being a metadata record that describes both WEMI2 expressions and WEMI2 items. As we have 
already alluded to, one potential solution would be to ignore WEMI2’s manifestation altogether, 
as everything it attempts to achieve appears to be achievable through other portions of either the 
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WEMI2 model or the LRM standard. As we will see in the next section, LRM even has alternatives 
to its own aggregate model. 
 
5.7. LRM’s Other Aggregate Model 
Silently and without fanfare, the pages of the LRM document contain a second model for 
bibliographic aggregates. LRM defines several part-of relationships. One of the two most 
pertinent to our closing discussion here is a part-of relationship whose domain and range are 
WEMI2 works. Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer define it in the following way: 
 
“This [part-of] is the relationship between two works, where the content of one is a 
component of the other” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 2017, p 72. 
 
They go on to say through the relationship’s scope note that: 
 
“This applies when the component-to-whole relationship is an inherent aspect of 
the works and holds for all the expressions and manifestations of the larger work 
and of its component works, whether the expression or manifestation comprises the 
full larger work or just one or more (but not all) of the component works. Examples 
include movements of concertos, poems within poetry cycles, multipart novels, 
triptychs.” – p 72. 
 
Finally, they give us as examples, “A wizard of Earthsea is part of the Earthsea trilogy by Ursula 
K. Le Guin,” and “Richard Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen has part Richard Wagner’s 
Götterdämmerung,” p 72.  
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These seem to be the very same kinds of examples we were looking at in Chapter 4. Noticeably, 
something we would normally call a component of a work, like a fictional person, does not seem 
to be within the scope of either the examples or the relationship. It would seem then that Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann’s component-of relationship (1987) is not actually intended to be invoked 
by the definition that Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer give. Instead, we are again looking a highly-
constrained version of their member-of relation. In fact, this part-of relation, which we will 
hereafter refer to as [work]-part-of bears such a resemblance to FRBROO’s [work]-member-of 
relation, that they are likely one and the same, and we should treat them as such. This is not as 
surprising as it may seem. The author-editors of LRM are actually the same group of people who 
produced FRBROO. 
 
Similarly, LRM gives us a WEMI2 expression-specific part-of relation. Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer 
define thusly: 
 
“This is a relationship between two expressions where one is a component of the 
other” – Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer p 74.  
 
They give us the following examples: 
 
“The music notation of Franz Schubert’s Ave Maria Op. 52, No. 6 is part of the 
music notation of Franz Schubert’s Sieben Gesänge aus Walter Scott’s Fräulein 




“The audio recording of Dante Alighieri’s La divina commedia read by Enrico de 
Negri has part the audio record of Dante Alighieri’s La divina commedia, Inferno 
read by Enrico de Negri” – p 74. 
 
These examples of expressions are actually clearer vis-à-vis what is an expression, but nonetheless 
appear to be the same as the previous examples we have examined in Chapter 4. Again, what we 
would take to be an actual component, e.g., a particular character or utterance, does not seem to 
be what is intended to be expressed by this part-of relationship, which we will hereafter refer to as 
[expression]-part-of. Instead, once again, Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of 
relationship would seem to be indicated. Unsurprisingly, this [expression]-part-of relationship 
seems to directly correspond to FRBROO’s [expression]-component-of relation. Unfortunately, 
LRM does not define a corresponding part-of relationship for WEMI2 items (recall that we are 
neglecting the existence of WEMI2 manifestations for the time being, that there is a 
[manifestation]-part-of relationship, and that it does not help resolve the issue of bibliographic 
aggregates that we noted in Section 5.4).  
 
5.8. Preliminary Conclusions about the Content-Artifact Aggregate Model 
It is clear from an illustration of the actual WEMI2 model (Figure 5.11 above) that manifestations 
have at least three, and perhaps as many as four, semantically distinct roles in the LRM conceptual 
model. This is clear evidence of semantic overloading. Computer systems, especially the RDF-
based, semantically-sensitive ones emerging today, require extremely clear semantics in order to 
operate at peak performance. With regard to RDF- or Linked-Data-based IR systems, that means 
metadata must be as clear, precise, and accurate as possible. As Jett et al. (2016b) point out with 
their exploration of mapping existing special collections metadata to the RDF-compliant 
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Schema.org vocabulary, in Linked-Data computing environments metadata records must be as 
accurate as possible with regard to what entity each assertion applies to. Metadata records that 
conflate things like play productions, play performances, and play scripts require significant 
reform to bring adequate distinctions out. 
 
An entity like WEMI2’s manifestation simply tries to be too many things for it to have full utility 
in RDF- or Linked-Data-based IR systems. At implementation time, each of its distinct roles will 
need to be carefully teased apart and extensions supporting them developed for the implementation 
to be successful. This will doubtless be an expensive and time-consuming task.  
 
Ultimately, as the preceding sections indicate, the content-artifact aggregate model is not easily 
separated from the WEMI2 model itself. The fact that the embodies relationship is defined in LRM 
as fulfilling a “linking” role, but that the same document defines bibliographic aggregates in a 
way that suggests that the same relationship plays an aggregating role in some specific situations, 
makes it difficult to reconcile both definitions qua formal definitions. One of them, likely 
definition D.17, needs to be weakened to mere implication. We can make this adjustment formally 
through the following axiom. 
 
A.52 (Bibliographic Aggregates Semi-Defined): ∀𝑥𝑥 ��∃𝑦𝑦∃𝑧𝑧 ��𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∧
 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦)�  ∧  �𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒(𝑧𝑧)�  ∧  ¬(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧)��  →
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)�  
 
Axiom A.52 has an interesting implication too. It implies is that not all bibliographic aggregates 
are accounted for by the “embodies multiple WEMI2 expressions” case. This implication may 
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satisfy some of the curious examples we showcased above that would have required many-to-many 
cardinality from the original WEMI model’s realizes and exemplifies relations. The model 
suggested by the natural language account (and illustrated in Figure 5.11) might suffice for this 
purpose; however, at least some bibliographic aggregates will be works that aggregate other 
works, expressions that aggregate other expressions and items which aggregate other items. 
Without the definition of additional mereological relationships to satisfy these use cases, it seems 
doubtful that a faithful implementation of LRM will result in an IR system that can adequately 
provide metadata for all of the bibliographic aggregates that users are likely to desire. 
 
Like all standards, LRM has its strengths and weaknesses. Among the former is the much clearer 
picture its text provides of the bibliographic universe. Unlike the original FRBR document, Riva, 
Le Bœf, and Žumer have taken many pains to provide adequate detail for developers and systems 
designers to more easily implement the standard in IR system settings. LRM’s only true failing is 
that its account of manifestations seems disconnected from its account of bibliographic entities. 
Thereby, we are uncertain exactly what role they are meant to play in any faithful implementation 
of LRM.  
 
If they are meant to specifically fulfill the role of providing a model for bibliographic aggregates, 
then they seem to fall short, as we demonstrated with the examples of expressions conveying more 
than one work and items carrying more than one expression. These happen because the model is 
not fully committed to representing bibliographic aggregates as the bibliographic entities they are, 




If manifestations are meant to be sets of items, then they become truly redundant parts of the model 
at implementation time because all implementations are already going to have query languages 
that can better fulfill users’ needs for arbitrarily grouping bibliographic entities or specific facets 
of bibliographic entities (e.g., by content, signs conveying content, or objects carrying signs 
conveying content) on the fly without needlessly wasting storage space or processing cycles on a 
conceptual entity that does those things. 
 
If manifestations are intended to represent existing metadata records, we should ask what role the 
rest of the model plays with respect to them. We see that expressions and items have role-specific 
links to manifestations through relationships like reflects and appears-in. But if the metadata 
record is to also faithfully represent a bibliographic entity’s content, then the WEMI2 model would 
seem to be missing a relationship that explicitly draws the link from works to manifestations and, 
it tells us what role is being played by one with respect to the other. 
 
Of course, providing a conceptual placeholder for metadata records in the model will also 
redundant at implementation time, because we should have document models that call upon 
existing queries in whatever query language our IR system is using to produce these records on 
the fly when users need them. 
 
Finally, if manifestations are intended to represent publication plans, we should ask ourselves what 
if, like bibliographic aggregates, publication plans are not actually bibliographic entities in their 
own right? If we write a publication plan on paper, then it becomes clear that there is an object 
which carries signs that convey the content of that plan. We might object that it seems to be the 
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case that the plan explicitly refers to some items, and so we might be tempted to think we need 
some special relationship to express this connection. However, LRM already accommodates this 
connection through the has-subject relationship defined on p 69. After all, it is not the signs or the 
object which are about some items, it is the content of the plan that enjoys topicality. And so, we 
do not need WEMI2 manifestations to arrive at a perfectly adequate model for publication plans. 
 
At this point, we have arrived at an answer for research question number 2, how does the content-
artifact aggregate model used by LRM differ from the mereological aggregate models examined 
in Chapter 4? For one thing, we can see that it possesses high context-sensitivity. Specifically, it 
is very sensitive to the manner in which WEMI’s (or WEMI2’s in this case) manifestation entity 
is defined. As we saw, defining manifestation as a kind of set provides a formidable barrier to 
successfully modeling bibliographic aggregates, since the characteristics of the sets and their 
aggregates are not the same. Further, in LRM’s case, the manifestation entity itself is semantically 
overloaded, making it difficult to tease apart when any particular manifestation is playing the role 
of being a bibliographic aggregate or playing one of the other roles that manifestations play in the 
LRM standard.  
 
5.9. Chapter Summary 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, the WEMI model employed by the LRM conceptual 
standard (i.e., WEMI2) is much more clearly defined than the WEMI model first issued in the 
original FRBR. Overall, this is a change for the better. However, as we also showed, the WEMI2 
definition for manifestations directly invokes set-theoretics. This causes problems for LRM’s 
aggregate model, as it is difficult to reconcile the characteristics of the set-elements of a journal 
issue manifestation (e.g., the characteristics of the individual issues) with those of the articles 
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embodied by them. This exemplifies an immediate semantic overloading of the manifestation 
entity concept, as it is no longer clear when a manifestation embodies an article (i.e., when are the 
elements articles) or when it embodies the articles in an issue (i.e., when are the elements journal 
issues). Employment of language suggesting that manifestations also represent entities like 
“production plans” or play a role similar to metadata records adds additional semantic complexity. 
As we noted above, the kind of aggregate model employed by LRM—a content-artifact aggregate 
model—is extremely sensitive to the content-artifact model employed with it (e.g., WEMI2 vs 
WEMI). In the next chapter, we compare the results of the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, summarize 





6. Findings & Next Steps 
6.1. Reprise of Research Goals 
Throughout the course of this dissertation, we have employed conceptual analysis as a means to 
reflect upon how bibliographic aggregates are treated in four high-level conceptual standards 
(DC-CAP, FRBR, FRBROO, and LRM). In many cases, we did this by proposing an informal 
formalization of one or more natural language sentences in first-order predicate logic, and then 
examining given examples to see if the formalizations were able to accommodate all of the given 
examples of bibliographic aggregates. From this analysis, we have identified several broad 
implications for the general description of bibliographic aggregates through high-level metadata. 
 
The ultimate goal of our analysis was to develop answers to the following research questions: 
1. How comparable are the mereological aggregate models employed by conceptual 
standards like DC-CAP, FRBR, and FRBROO? 
a. The texts of these standards often employ disparate part/whole terms like 
“container,” “component,” “member,” etc.; are we to take these terms at face value 
or are they being employed synonymously to indicate one specific part/whole 
relationship? 
b. In the event that they are being used to indicate one specific part/whole relationship, 
which part/whole relationship is it? 
2. How does the content-artifact aggregate model employed by LRM differ from the 
mereological aggregate models employed by our other three cases? 
 
By answering these questions, we hope to better inform choices regarding how these standards 
should be employed to capture general metadata describing bibliographic aggregates. In LRM’s 
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case, we can show that the application of the content-aggregate model fails due to the model’s 
highly context-sensitive nature. In this chapter, we summarize our findings, consider repairs for 
the LRM conceptual standard, and contemplate future avenues to expand upon the research that 
has been carried out here. 
 
6.2. Summary of Findings 
6.2.1. Finding 1 – Comparability of Mereological Aggregate Models 
In Chapter 4, we compared five part/whole relationships (is-gathered-into, [bibliographic]-part-
of, [expression]-component-of, [work]-member-of, and incorporates) from three different 
bibliographic standards (IFLA 1998, DCCDTG 2007, Bekiari et al. 2016) and found that they are 
all closely related. Based upon the sameness of the example aggregates that they are intended to 
be used with (e.g., anthologies, collections, journal issues, series, etc.), we determined that they all 
shared metaproperties and that their primary differences amounted to issues of scope.  
 
More specifically, the part/whole relationships we examined in our cases evinced increasingly 
narrower domains and ranges, to the point that the domains and ranges employed can be described 
as sub-domains and sub-ranges of the part/whole relationships employed by other standards. For 
instance, the domain and range of FRBR’s [bibliographic]-part-of was narrower than the DC-
CAP’s is-gathered-into relation. In turn, FRBROO’s [expression]-component-of, [work]-member-
of, and incorporates were all narrower than FRBR’s [bibliographic]-part-of. Based on the 
examples employed by the standards and other analyses of them, there seem to be no other 




Comparing these part/whole relationships to Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s collective-
member relationship (1987), i.e., the member-of relationship, we also found that they shared a 
common group of metaproperties with that relationship. And so, we find DC-CAP’s is-gathered-
into relationship is exactly the same as Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relation, and 
we also find that the remaining part/whole relationships used by FRBR and FRBROO are all sub-
properties of Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann’s member-of relation. 
 
This has the very practical benefit of allowing practioners to adopt any of the three standards (DC-
CAP, FRBR, or FRBROO) and expect to be able to accurately model bibliographic aggregates as 
general bibliographic entities within the established limitations of each of the standards. What this 
means is that in general, all three standards treat bibliographic aggregates exactly as general 
bibliographic entities. Therefore, each one of these is, in fact, missing some of the particular 
metadata facets that are often found to be desirable when one wants to differentiate between an 
anthology and an archival collection. 
 
Fortunately, this is not an uncommon problem at implementation time for standards, and the 
existing best practices would dictate that the standards be extended with anything missing, so that 
finer-grained distinctions among different kinds of bibliographic aggregates can be made. 
Unfortunately, extensions to FRBR’s WEMI model (also used in FRBROO) have proven difficult 
to construct as we have shown with examples like McDonough et al. (2010) and Jett et al. (2015). 
Through the former’s video game example, we can see that WEMI begins to break down when 
faced with the need to accommodate multiple language dimensions (e.g., computational language 
versus human language). In turn, Jett et al.’s solution for providing adequate metadata for video 
243 
 
games focuses on decomposing the fine-grained distinctions between what they call [video game] 
editions which are platform (i.e., computer-language) specific and local releases (or localizations) 
which are human-language specific entities. In more FRBR-specific language, Jett et al.’s solution 
calls for the decomposition of WEMI’s expression entity into two entities—edition and 
localization—for video games. 
 
6.2.2. Finding 2 – Gaps in FRBROO’s Aggregate Model 
With regard to the overall goals of FRBR’s WEMI model, its goal has always been to illustrate the 
differences in the continuum from the content of a bibliographic entity (e.g., topicality, etc.) to its 
physical characteristics (e.g., how much space it takes up, etc.). The fact that FRBROO apparently 
lacks part/whole relationships having to do with two particular entities on the content-artifact 
continuum, namely WEMI’s manifestations and items, is a limitation to what kinds of things can 
be said of the physical characteristics of bibliographic aggregates. We would expect that come 
implementation time, FRBROO will need supplementation with another existing model that 
describes bibliographic entities or extension with additional entities and relationships that ensure 
that metadata which would otherwise be missing can be recorded for bibliographic aggregates. 
Such supplementation is commonplace and to be expected at implementation time, because typical 
implementations possess more stringent constraints due to local contextual requirements than 
general models are required to address. 
 
6.2.3. Finding 3 – Failings in the Content-Artifact Aggregate Model 
Through counter-examples we were able to show that the content-artifact aggregate model set 
forth by the FRBR Working Group on Aggregates (2011) and codified into IFLA’s LRM standard 
(Riva et al, 2017) creates several problems. Chief among these is that it forms barriers to users 
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trying to accomplish FRBR’s user tasks (finding, identifying, selecting, and obtaining) when a 
particular item is both mass-produced and part of one or more bibliographic aggregates.  
 
We showed that this occurs because WEMI2’s manifestation entity is specifically defined as a 
kind of set. Since sets do not share characteristics with their elements or their sub-sets, it becomes 
difficult to reconcile the characteristics of an entity like a journal issue with the characteristics of 
the articles that are aggregated into it. From this analysis, it would seem that bibliographic 
aggregates are not successfully modeled with the LRM standard, and that the particulars of the 
content-artifact aggregate model, as defined through WEMI2, make it difficult to supplement with 
other vocabularies or extend with additional entities and relationships such that adequate metadata 
representing bibliographic aggregates can be recorded. However, we may be able to ignore 
WEMI2’s manifestation entity altogether as a means to repair this. Further discussion of this 
solution is the focus of the next section. 
 
6.2.4. Finding 4 – The WEMI2 manifestation Entity is Semantically Overloaded  
As we showed in Chapter 4, manifestations play at least four distinct roles in the WEMI2 model. 
This semantic overloading will complicate any implementation of the LRM standard. It may even 
make faithful implementations of the standard impossible when the implementation environments 
have strict requirements for clarity and precision as is the case in Semantic Web, Linked Data, and 
RDF-based computing environments. 
 
As we have already mentioned in Finding 2 above, it is not unusual for standards to be 
supplemented or extended (i.e., customized) at implementation time. Unfortunately, the semantic 
overloading here is so severe that proper supplementation or extension of the standard is likely 
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difficult. However, as we mentioned in Finding 3, one potential alternative is to remove WEMI2’s 
manifestation entity altogether. This is possible because several of the things it does, such as 
grouping WEMI2 items together according to special criteria, i.e., shared characteristics, are easily 
accomplished through traditional IR system infrastructures (e.g., relational database queries) 
without any need to model sets as full-fledged entities in our conceptual space. We provide more 
detail on this approach in the next section. 
 
6.3. Excising WEMI2 Manifestation from the LRM Standard 
In Chapter 5, we mentioned that portions of LRM’s WEMI2 model had the potential to be a 
superior model for the deduplication of bibliographic entities. The first step for realizing this 
model’s potential would be eliminating the manifestation entity and all relationships and attributes 
that rely on it from LRM and the WEMI2 model entirely. 
 
We think this is an achievable action, as all of the roles that a WEMI2 manifestation plays are 
redundant with those played by other entities and relationships in LRM or WEMI2, or which are 
part and parcel of actual implementation infrastructure.  
 
In particular, the ability to group entities into sets according to particular shared characteristics is 
better achieved by relying on the query languages that come with our data storage and IR systems. 
There is no need to model these sets as first-class members of our domain space. The only time 
we might want to model them is when we want to model the behaviors of those queries. Modeling 
such behaviors is well outside the scope (and norm) of bibliographic standards like LRM and 




We also do not need WEMI2 manifestations to arrive at a perfectly adequate model for 
bibliographic aggregates. WEMI2’s existing [work]-part-of and [expression]-part-of 
relationships already accomplish two-thirds of the task. All that is lacking is a comparable [item]-
part-of relationship. One easily accomplished approach to extending LRM with an [item]-part-of 
relationship is to simply rehabilitate LRM’s [manifestation]-part-of relationship by replacing 
instances of the word “manifestation” with the word “item,” and then eliminating all language 
referring to publication plans. After all, what we really want to account for here are differences 
among carriers that carry the same signs (conveying the same content). We do not need to refer to 
publication plans as some kind of intermediary between expressions and items. Like bibliographic 
aggregates, plans are themselves first-class bibliographic entities.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Further Simplified WEMI2 (or WEI) Model 
 
At this point the question becomes, do we need manifestations to model anything at all? If we have 
no manifestations, then we will have arrived at much leaner WEMI2 model (illustrated in Figure 
6.1 above). We can see that it appears very similar to a content-artifact model proposed by Richard 
Smiraglia some 18 years ago (Figure 6.2 below). While there is no comparable entity to 
“bibliographic entity” in Figure 6.1, we take it to be the case that WEMI2 is intended by Riva, Le 
Bœf, and Žumer to illustrate a particular view of bibliographic entities in general.70  
 
                                                 
70 Indeed, the entire thesis presented here hinges on the interpretation that WEMI and WEMI2 are describing aspects of bibliographic entities. 
247 
 
We note that Smiraglia’s “text” entity is playing the same intermediary role as WEMI2’s 
expression entity.71 Indeed, the definition for expression—“signs conveying content”—suggests 
that “text” is within its purview. However, we must contend with an objection one can have with 
these accounts: How does one differentiate between different items carrying the same expression 
and different items? Or more simply, how do we account for differences in format? 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Smiraglia’s Bibliographic Entity Model72 
 
Originally, the concept of manifestation was likely intended to help with this issue. But as we have 
seen from LRM, defining it so that it can accomplish this task is a tricky business. And where the 
item of a particular bibliographic entity is a singleton (e.g., a manuscript, a painting, a sculpture, 
etc.), we must confess the whole business is quite unnecessary. An intervening entity here only 
gets in the way in these cases. 
 
How then should we proceed? 
 
                                                 
71 It may be important to note that we are uncertain to what extent that Smiraglia is committed to the model he proposes. As early as 2002 he 
moves from defining works as “intellectual content” to sets of metadata records. 
72 Reproduced from Figure 1.1 in Smiraglia 2001, p 4. 
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One way is to make a conceptual interpretation of what we mean by “format.” One interpretation 
that might be justified is considering “format” to be a kind of “sign.” We know (from cryptography, 
among other sources) that it is possible for signs to have the role of carrying other signs (indeed, 
blockchain is a highly pertinent example). We also know that WEMI2 defines items as “[physical] 
objects carrying signs conveying content.” However, a further interpretation, that “objects” might 
in some circumstances mean “signs,” does not necessarily invalidate the given definition if we 
relax the constraints given by LRM’s scope notes concerning WEMI2 items. Finally, if it is the 
case that the carries relationship is a transitive one, then it seems possible that we might have a 
situation where an artifact is carrying signs which are carrying signs which are carrying signs, and 
so on, and so forth, until we reach some signs conveying content. We illustrate what this might 
look like below in Figure 6.3 (below). 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Modified WEMI2 (or WEI) Model 
 
The primary objection to the model in Figure 6.3 is that format-level differences do not seem like 
an expression-level differences. Formats do not intuitively seem to be signs.  
 
However, it seems to us that when an author, editor, curator, or other content creator determines 
to express their content in a particular format, then they are also ontologically committed to the 
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limitations dictated by that format. Many of these formats evince features, often reflecting best or 
common (and sometimes normative) practices of the time and place in which an expression is first 
created and which place certain limitations on the kinds and amounts of content which can be 
conveyed. Thus, format acts as a constraint upon the entity of work in our model, by limiting how 
much of a work can be conveyed by any given granule of an expression. Format is also suspiciously 
grammar-like in some instances. It may be a non-normative grammar, but it is an accepted 
grammar which conveys content nonetheless. It seems counter-intuitive but, considering the 
constraints that format places upon the conveying of content, it also seems quite rational to accept 
that format is, in fact, a kind of sign.  
 
This is not an unusual position. The original WEMI model used format as an attribute of work 
(defined there as a “creation” rather than content). If we accept that format is a kind of sign, then 
differences in formats are expression-level differences where the relationship between the 
expressions is that of one carrying the other exactly as Figure 6.3. illustrates. We can then leverage 
this modified WEMI2 model (really work-expression-item [WEI] at this point) to help us 
disambiguate all of the different copies of works that have resulted from mass-production and 
digitization. 
 
6.4. The Paratext Issue Revisited 
Whether we excise the manifestation entity from the WEMI2 model or not, there still remains one 
unresolved issue for bibliographic aggregates—paratext. Paratext is an extremely difficult 
problem for cataloging. That publishers include additional content in all manner of diverse forms 
as Coyle points out (2016b) is an incontrovertible fact. The question, again, is how to proceed? 
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Should we record metadata about paratextual features? If so, how does this impact the general 
conceptual model for bibliographic aggregates?  
 
To some extent, the answers to these questions have serious implications for the entire cataloging 
endeavor. If we answer, “yes, paratextual features need to be recorded, especially at the 
manifestation level,” then the result for bibliographic aggregates will be a combinatorial explosion 
in metadata for and about them.  
 
Let us take the Shannara series (Figure 6.4 below) as an example once again. For the works that 
compose the work that is the series, there may be several expressions of each member-work and 
so there a number of distinct expressions of the series as a whole. We will use a more specific 
example to illustrate this, by considering the Shannara series as it was in the early 80’s when only 
the first three novels in the series had been published. We will say there are three editions of the 
first book, The Sword of Shannara—one with illustrations by the Hildebrandt brothers, one with 
alternate illustrations of the same scenes but which are also by the Hildebrandt brothers, and one 
where the text comprises a third of an omnibus edition called The Sword of Shannara Trilogy. We 
will say that there are only two editions of the other two books, The Elfstones of Shannara and The 
Wishsong of Shannara—in one edition they are distinct novels packaged with cover art by the 
Hildebrandt brothers, but sans any internal illustrations, and another edition where each comprises 





Figure 6.4: The Shannara Series by Terry Brooks 
 
It is clear to us at this point in time that the expression of The Sword of Shannara Trilogy [an 
omnibus] is one expression of the work, The Shannara Series (since the other works have yet to 
be published). However, it is also the case that any particular combination of the two expressions 
of The Sword of Shannara, in combination with the expressions of The Elfstone of Shannara and 
The Wishsong of Shannara, also compose expressions of The Shannara Series. At this point we 
have three distinct expressions for one work.73  
 
This combinatorial expands when we begin to consider the combinatorials of manifestations for 
our expressions of The Shannara Series. Say for instance that there is a hardcover edition, a special 
collector’s hardcover edition, a mass-maket “book club” hardcover edition, a trade paperback 
edition, and two mass-market paperback editions (featuring different cover art) for each of the 
                                                 
73 It is possible that we might have two additional expressions if we allow parts of certain expressions, e.g., The Sword of Shannara Trilogy, to 
fulfill the role of whole monographs in the expression of The Shannara Series (circa the early 1980s). 
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individual expressions, including The Sword of Shannara Trilogy. Now we have a situation where 
our one work—The Shannara Series—is linked to 55 different manifestations. But this is to be 
expected, and this tree-like grouping structure of works, expressions, manifestations, and items is 
the whole point of the original WEMI model. 
 
However, things quickly go downhill if we apply the content-artifact aggregate model used in 
LRM, as the manifestations are the series, and so, the only metadata we have is of these 55 different 
versions of what appears to be the same series (at least from the perspective of work, i.e., the 
content). Now imagine this is true for the entirety of the series illustrated in Figure 6.4. One 
imagines that where bibliographic aggregates like series are defined as manifestations then there 
will be hundreds upon hundreds of aggregate manifestations (due to the combinatorials of 
aggregate manifestations comprising individual manifestations) and that for each, metadata 
distinct to its particular combination of individual manifestations, i.e., distinct to that aggregate 
manifestation will be recorded as though each was in fact a distinct series, a distinct bibliographic 
aggregate, even though the content remains the same across all of them. This seems to be contrary 
to the kind of disambiguating agenda set out by bibliographic theorists like Verona, Wilson, 
Lubetzky, and the like. What we really want is an approach like those set out by those scholars 
that lets us say something like, all of the different combinations, all the different bibliographic 
units, are in fact all the same literary unit. 
 
Unfortunately, things can once again be made complex, if we consider whether or not the content 
communicated through paratextual features is content that affects the context of a work’s 
“primary” content. If this is the case, then like the case we make for bibliographic aggregates 
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themselves, any combination of particular paratext with a primary text is actually a distinct work 
in its own right.  
 
Now a new question presents itself—how should we represent this kind of information? There 
would seem to be two approaches, we might model them as bibliographic aggregates or we might 
model them as derivative works. This is not a question the research carried out in this dissertation 
was designed to answer, or even to contribute an answer towards. However, some pragmatic issues 
present themselves. If we model the contextual relationship between paratextual content and 
primary textual content as a bibliographic aggregate, then it seems as though all or almost all 
bibliographic entities are bibliographic aggregates. Examples of dependent works in our standards 
in particular suggest that this might be the intention of standards writers. Such a solution is going 
to cause the same kinds of combinatorial problems that defining bibliographic aggregates as 
manifestations does; specifically, we can expect an explosion in the numbers of works which on 
the surface all seem alike. Such an explosion directly detracts from our ability to identify duplicate 
content. 
 
An alternative solution might be called for. One possible alternative is that when paratextual 
content alters the primary text content to such an extent that we feel that recording metadata about 
the paratextual content (and its paratext) is vitally important to the end user (as will likely be the 
case for scholarly editions and similar specialized products). Then, we employ an entirely different 




We can use this as a simplifying tactic for our metadata and the links among particular assertions 
that it makes. In the case of a scholarly edition, say for example of Brooks’ The Sword of Shannara, 
modeling the scholarly edition as a derivative work has the benefit of subtracting it from the context 
of the overarching work—Brooks’ The Shannara Series—that it is a part of. This is because the 
scholar may remark on the work, The Sword of Shannara, directly, but can only remark on the 
series indirectly. One imagines if a scholar were to desire to remark on the series directly itself, 
then they would need to produce a scholarly edition of the series in its entirety. 
 
In the end, both of these approaches are only tactics that we can propose here, but which we cannot 
definitively state as being better or worse with respect to one another, or with any other approach 
to the handling of paratextual features, without additional research. Ultimately, we leave this task 
to future meditations regarding paratextual features and their impact on metadata practices. 
 
6.5. Avenues for Future Research 
As we have seen, many of LRM’s and WEMI2’s shortcomings can be overcome when we remove 
the manifestation entity altogether. However, more work needs to be done to ascertain the full 
implications of such a radical change to both LRM and the WEMI2 model. A potential avenue for 
further research in this respect would be the comparison of the modified WEMI2 model proposed 




One such model (the Basic Representation Model) was proposed in Wickett et al. (2012) in their 
analysis of data. The figure below, reproduced from Wickett et al. (p 4)74 showcases how similar 
the modified model we proposed with Figure 6.3 is to their model. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Basic Representation Model (BRM) 
 
Here we have three entities that are content, signs, and objects. There are several subtle differences. 
The content-level is limited to just propositional content, but this is appropriate for the data objects 
that Wickett et al. are examining. Like WEMI2 items, the object-level is clearly intended to be 
limited to physical artifacts. And finally, the relationships seem somewhat clearer; there is, at least, 
a distinction made between when the carriers of symbol structures (i.e., signs) are other symbol 
structures, and when the carriers are physical objects onto which the symbol structures are 
inscribed. 
 
BRM is only a part of the story that Wickett et al. tell us about data. Equally important is an 
interpretive framework called the Systematic Assertion Model (SAM [Dubin, Wickett, and Sacchi 
2011; Wickett et al. 2012]). SAM is the part of their approach to describing data that does the 
heavy lifting of capturing information, such as metadata, provenance, etc., that are important for 
                                                 
74 This is Wickett et al.’s Figure 1. 
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end users to successfully understand what the data is, why it was made, and how they might go 
about assessing it for their own uses.  
 
This picture of data that Dubin, Wickett, and Sacchi give us is not so different to how the rest of 
Riva, Le Bœf, and Žumer’s LRM standard relates to WEMI2. One future avenue of research then, 
is to more closely examine the parallels between the BRM and SAM models and the WEMI2 and 
LRM models. 
 
Additionally, while the thesis here closely examines bibliographic aggregates in the context of 
four bibliographic standards, those four standards are hardly all of the standards that exist. In 
particular, the Library of Congress’s new Bibframe 2.0 standard seems poised to rival IFLA’s 
LRM as the quintessential high-level library metadata standard. And so, a natural expansion of the 
research carried out here is an examination of Bibframe 2.0’s treatment of bibliographic 
aggregates as full-fledged bibliographic entities. Similarly, the new cataloging bible, RDA,75 is 
being affected by our evolving understanding of standards like FRBR, LRM, and Bibframe 2.0. 
So, it too, is another natural expansion avenue for the research that has been carried out here. 
Unfortunately, RDA is a subscription service, which complicates its study by the need for greater 
financing. 
 
A final avenue for expanded research lies in more closely examining the various kinds of 
bibliographic aggregates themselves. The standards here all take high-level, generalized outlooks 
on bibliographic aggregates in order to provided overarching advice for the creation of minimal 
                                                 
75 Poised to be the successor to the ALA’s AACR2. 
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metadata for them. While some of the standards succeed at this more than others, the fact remains 
that the examples of bibliographic aggregates are a disparate grouping of bibliographic entities 
themselves. An archival collection is a very different kind of bibliographic entity than an anthology 
or a monograph series, even though all three of them are bibliographic aggregates.  
 
There is a need to more closely examine each kind of bibliographic aggregate and its user-base to 
better understand where gaps in metadata representing qualities unique to that particular kind of 
bibliographic aggregate (e.g., anthology, collection, series, etc.) exist. In turn, where such gaps 
are found to exist, there is often a clear need to propose extensions to existing standards to fill 
those gaps and thereby better help users accomplish the essential tasks of finding, identifying, 
selecting, and obtaining. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
Through our analysis here we have shown that: 
• All of the bibliographic standards all using mereological aggregate models all use the same 
aggregate model or portions of the same model.  
• In the case of the FRBROO standard, gaps in mereological aggregate model indicate that 
the standard requires supplementation or extension in order for bibliographic aggregates 
to receive equal treatment as bibliographic entities. 
• The content-artifact aggregate model used in LRM lacks the ability to capture work-level 
and item-level qualities of bibliographic aggregates and is thereby unable to model 
bibliographic aggregates as full-fledged bibliographic entities in their own right. 
• WEMI2’s manifestation entity is semantically overloaded and performs a variety of 
disparate functions in the LRM standard. This implies that it will be difficult to implement 
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in RDF-based and Linked-Data computational environments which have much stricter 
requirements with regard to semantic overlap of entities and relationships than simpler 
computational environments. 
 
Through these findings, we have better characterized how the mereological aggregate models used 
in the high-level conceptual standards DC-CAP, FRBR, and FRBROO are all, in essence, the same 
model of parts and wholes. The primary difference among the three standards’ approaches to 
modeling bibliographic aggregates is one of ever-narrowing scope. In the case of DC-CAP the is-
gathered-into relationship is general enough to be considered synonymous Winston, Chaffin, and 
Herrmann’s member-of relationship. One implication of this is that the DC-CAP aggregate model 
is actually general enough to model general groupings such as groups of people, forests, fleets, 
and other arbitrary groupings beyond bibliographic aggregates. While this may seem outside of 
the intentions of the DC-CAP designers, it is in keeping with the DCMI vocabulary’s extremely 
generalized semantics. In turn, with their narrower domains and ranges, it becomes more obvious 
that FRBR and FRBROO are both better fits for modeling bibliographic aggregates, specifically.  
 
Conversely, we have seen that because the content-artifact aggregate model is closely coupled to 
the WEMI model, it is extremely sensitive to variations in the definitions for WEMI’s entities and 
relationships. In the LRM case, we see that the employment of a set-theoretic definition for the 
manifestation entity has serious implications for how well the content-artifact aggregate model 
can articulate information regarding bibliographic entities. In this case, it fails on account of 
irreconcilable differences among the entities being modeled and the characteristics that describe 
them. In part, this is because the role that manifestations play at any given time is not clear in LRM 
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contexts, due to the significant semantic overloading of the manifestation concept. However, this 
problem has revealed opportunities to simplify both the WEMI conceptual model and how 
employment of mereological models for aggregates is beneficial by decoupling accounts of parts 
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Appendix A: Discussion of Functionality 
In many cases, it appears that, especially for components, a part is essential to the whole. Some 
common examples used in the literature (Bittner & Donnelly 2005; Guizzardi 2005) are hearts for 
human bodies, and engines for automobiles. For our more library-centric examples, we might 
consider things like particular characters (i.e., people, fictional or otherwise) essential to particular 
works, but particular articles might not be essential to particular journal issues. Developing a good 
sense of functionality will give us a method of marking such distinctions. 
 
Regarding functionality, we might begin by noting that if x is functionally-part-of y, then it is 
almost certainly the case that y is dependent-on x. While Husserl (1970) discusses dependence, 
both existentially and generically, the following definitions are adapted from Guizzardi (2005), 
who provides a treatment of parthood expressly designed for formal ontological work. 
 
Guizzardi’s first relevant definition here tells us that something is existentially-dependent on 
something else if it is necessarily the case that when one exists, then so does the other. 
 
D.8 (Existential Dependence): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  □
(𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  →  𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦))�  
 
Definition D.8 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is existentially-dependent on entity y, if 
and only if, it is necessarily the case that the existence of entity x implies the existence of entity y. 
 
This next definition tells us that if something is an essential-part-of of something else, then it must 
be the case that something else is existentially-dependent on that that thing and the thing is 
necessarily part-of it. 
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D.9 (Essential Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  (𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)  ˄ □
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ) �  
 
Definition D.9 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is an essential-part-of entity y, if and only 
if, entity y is existentially-dependent-on entity x and it is necessarily the case that entity x is part-
of entity y. 
 
In some cases, parts are existentially co-dependent with their wholes. A common example in the 
literature is that of a brain and the person it is part-of. In these cases, we say that the thing is an 
inseparable-part-of the whole. 
 
D.10 (Inseparable Parthood): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  �𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ˄ 
□𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.10 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is an inseparable-part-of entity y, if and 
only if, entity x is existentially-dependent-on entity y and it is necessarily the case that entity x is 
part-of entity y. 
 
From these definitions, we can develop a series of axioms that allow us to formalize which 
metaproperties (functionality, homeomerosity, and separability) Winston, Chaffin, and 
Herrmann’s mereonymous relationship pairings possess.  
 
We first consider what it means to be a functional part of something, by rooting the concept of 
functionality with the concepts of essentialness and inseparability. So, we can say that when 
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something is functionally-part-of a whole, then it seems to either be an essential-part-of that whole, 
or an inseparable-part-of that whole. 
 
A.53 (Functional Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  ∨  𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Axiom A.53 states that for all entities x and y, if entity x is functionally-part-of entity y, then it is 
the case that either entity x is an essential-part-of entity y or entity x is an inseparable-part-of 
entity y. 
 
Now, we can say that when something is separably-part-of a whole (e.g., like a book in a library 
collection or a tool in a toolbox), then it cannot be inseparably-part-of the whole. 
 
A.17 (Separable Parthood): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  →
 ~𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)� 
 
Axiom A.17 states that for entities x and y, if entity x is separably-part-of entity y, then it is not 
the case that entity x is inseparably-part-of entity y. Rather importantly, this axiom relies on 
definition D.10 which tells us that inseparable parts are both existentially-dependent on the whole 
and necessarily part-of it. 
 
Together, these additional axioms allow us to construct a table that accommodates Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann’s meronymous relationships (Table A.1 above).  
 
At first glance, the contents of Table A.1 seem plausible, but there are counter-examples for several 
of the underlying axioms. In particular, axiom A.53 (functional parts are either essential or 
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inseparable) seems vulnerable to counter-examples regarding existential necessity. There also 
seems to be some problems with axiom A.8 (homeomerous parts share properties). 
 
Fortunately, Vieu and Aurnague (2007) leverage previous work by Husserl (1970), Simons (1987), 
Fine (1995), and Masolo et al. (2003, 2004) to provide a definition for General Functional 
Dependence (GFD) using a temporalized existence primitive—exists-at-[time] and lexical types.  
 
While temporalization is very helpful for the variety of cases Vieu and Aurnague are examining, 
it is of somewhat limited benefit in the context this dissertation analyzes. Thereby, simplified 
versions of the supporting definitions and axioms for a simplified formalization of GFD are given 
below. 
 
As a first step, Vieu and Aurnague define a dependent-on relationship, which says that something 
is dependent-on something else if it is necessarily the case that when one exists the other exists 
and they are not the same thing. 
 
D.21 (Dependence): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦 �𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  □��𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)  →  𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦)�  ∧
 ~(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)�� 
 
Definition D.21 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is dependent-on entity y if and only if it 
is necessarily the case that when entity x exists, then entity y exists and, it is not the case that 


















Reflexive + - - - - - - - 
Irreflexive - + + + + + + + 
Symmetrical - - - - - - - - 
Asymmetrical - + + + + + + + 
Antisymmetrical + + + + + + + + 
Transitive + + + + + + + + 
Functional - - + - - - + - 
Homeomerous - - - - + - - + 




Next they reuse Masolo et al.’s (2004) classified-as[-an]-X-at[-time] axiom (simplified here). In 
simple terms this axiom says that if something is classified-as a member of a class then it exists. 
 
A.54 (Classification): ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  →  𝑜𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)�  
 
Axiom A.54 states that for all entities x, if entity x is classified-as kind X, then entity x exists. 
 
Classification is an indispensable part of Vieu and Aurnague’s definition for General Dependence. 
 
D.22 (General Dependence): 
∀𝑋𝑋∀𝑌𝑌 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌) =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 □∀𝑥𝑥 �𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  →
 ∃𝑦𝑦�~(𝑦𝑦 = 𝑥𝑥)  ∧  𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑌𝑌)��� 
 
Definition D.22 states that for all kinds X and Y, kind X is generally-dependent-on kind Y if and 
only if it is necessarily the case for all entities x that when entity x is classified-as kind X, then 
there exists an entity y such that y and x are not the same entities and entity y is classified-as kind 
Y. 
 
Finally, we arrive at the simplified version of Vieu and Aurnague’s definition for GFD. 
 
 









(~𝑦𝑦 = 𝑥𝑥)  ∧ 









Definition D.23 states that for all kinds X and Y, kind X is generally-functionally-dependent-on 
kind Y if and only if it is necessarily the case for all entities x that when entity x is classified-as 
and functioning-as kind X, then there exists some entity y such that y and x are not the same entity 
and entity y is both, classified-as and functioning-as kind Y. 
 
Vieu and Aurnague go on to provide serval definitions and axioms that support the development 
of theorems show-casing the transitivity of GFD and its propagation from types to supertypes. 
Simplified versions of these axioms, definitions, and theorems are provided below. 
 
D.24 (Subtype): ∀𝑋𝑋∀𝑌𝑌 �𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  ∀𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  →
𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑌𝑌)�� 
 
Definition D.24 states that for all kinds X and Y, kind X is a subtype-of kind Y if and only if it is 
the case that for all entities x, when entity x is classified-as kind X, then entity x is classified-as 
kind Y. 
 
A.55 (Sub-functioning): ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑋𝑋∀𝑌𝑌 ��𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌)�  →
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑌𝑌)� 
 
Axiom A.55 states that for entities x and kinds X and Y, if entity x is functioning-as kind X and it 
is the case that kind X is a subtype-of kind Y, then it is the case that entity x is functioning-as kind 
Y. 
 
D.25 (Disjoint Classes): 




Definition D.25 states that for all kinds X and Y, kind X is disjoint-from kind Y if and only if there 
exists no entities x such that entity x is both, classified-as kind X and classified-as kind Y. 
 
A.56 (Transitive GFD): ∀𝑋𝑋∀𝑌𝑌∀𝑍𝑍 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍)  ∧
 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍)�  → 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍)� 
 
Axiom A.56 states that for all kinds X, Y, and Z, if kind X is GFD on kind Y and kind Y is GFD on 
kind Z and kind X is disjoint-from kind Z, then kind X is GFD on kind Z. 
 
A.57 (Propagation of GFD): ∀𝑋𝑋∀𝑌𝑌∀𝑍𝑍 ��𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍)�  →
𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍)� 
 
Axiom A.57 states that for all kinds X, Y, and Z, if kind X is GFD on kind Y and kind Y is a subtype-
of kind Z, then kind X is GFD on kind Z. 
 
From here, it is necessary to step beyond the linkages between lexical types, to the linkages 
between entities. Fortunately, Vieu and Aurnague provide additional definitions, which are 
provided here in simplified form. 
 
D.26 (Individual Functional Dependency [IFD]): 
∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦�
𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)  =𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
∀𝑋𝑋∀𝑌𝑌 �
𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  ∧  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑌𝑌)  ∧ 
�𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥,𝑋𝑋)  → 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜(𝑦𝑦,𝑌𝑌)� �
� 
 
Definition D.26 states that for all entities x and y, entity x is IFD on entity y if and only if it is the 
case that for all kinds X and Y: kind X is GFD on kind Y, entity x is classified-as kind X, entity y is 
classified-as kind Y, and it is the case that when entity x is functioning-as kind X, then entity y is 
functioning-as kind Y. 
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At this point Vieu and Aurnague’s account takes a turn from complex to extremely complex, as 
they begin attempt to account to structural issues and the subsumption of one lexical type with 
another (via class hierarchy relations). However, for our purposes, we have accounted for where 
both axiom A.17 (separable parts) and the IFD metaproperty come from, and so we do not labor 
to explicate these matters any further.  
 
